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At least 613 records · Page 34Linked to original sources
PubMed1991

Ethics and embryos.

In this paper we argue that the human form should be seen to exist, in a longitudinal way, throughout the continuum of human growth and development. This entails that the moral value of that form, which we link analytically to the adult, interacting, social and rational being, attaches to all phases of human life to some extent. Having established this we discuss the consequences it has for the moral status of the human embryo. We then apply this argument, and the resulting moral status, to the area of reproductive technology. In doing this we show that there are certain regulations and controls which ought to apply to the use of these infertility treatments.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed1991

From the patient's point of view: medical ethics and the moral imagination.

This paper concerns the difficulties of imagining the subjective point of view of another human being, and the relevance of these difficulties to medical decisions. It explores especially the difficulties of imagining the experience of the mentally impaired, and examines several standards for decision-making: the 'prior expressed wishes standard', the 'substituted judgement standard', and the 'best interests standard'.

Beginning of Human Life↗
PubMed1992

The reversibility of death.

The ordinary concept of death is analysed and compared with revisionary medical definitions, especially those based on irreversible loss of brain function. Prior critics of revisionary definitions have focused on the locus, the brain; I am concerned with the irreversibility condition. I argue that 1) the irreversibility condition is ambiguous, 2) it has unacceptable epistemic and other consequences on any plausible construal, and 3) irreversibility is not part of the ordinary concept of death. I conclude that recent medical definitions seek illegitimately to obtain the certainty of a weak construal of 'irreversible' along with the freedom from moral obligation of the strong construal.

Attitude to Death↗
PubMed1992

Death and reductionism: a reply to John F Catherwood.

This reply to John F Catherwood's criticism of brain-related criteria for death argues that brainstem criteria are neither reductionist nor do they presuppose a materialist theory of mind. Furthermore, it is argued that brain-related criteria are compatible with the majority of religious views concerning death.

Brain Death↗
PubMed1993

The ethics of medical involvement in torture.

The difficulties of establishing a definition of torture are discussed, and a definition is suggested. It is then argued that, irrespective of general ethical questions, doctors in particular should never be involved because of their social role.

Codes of Ethics↗
PubMed1994

Metaphysics and medical ethics: a reply.

The total longitudinal form view of human beings is a metaphysical view which aims to locate our moral judgements about human embryos in a broader set of attitudes and characterisations. On this basis it has explanatory power and a real function in that it grounds our ethical discussion of embryos in other discourses. Contra Leavitt, this grounding suggests a broader criterion of relevance for metaphysical discussion than asking 'what comes out of' such a discussion for a particular ethical dilemma.

Beginning of Human Life↗
PubMed1994

Are withholding and withdrawing therapy always morally equivalent?

Many medical ethicists accept the thesis that there is no moral difference between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining therapy. In this paper, we offer an interesting counterexample which shows that this thesis is not always true. Withholding is distinguished from withdrawing by the simple fact that therapy must have already been initiated in order to speak coherently about withdrawal. Provided that there is a genuine need and that therapy is biomedically effective, the historical fact that therapy has been initiated entails a claim to continue therapy that cannot be attributed to patients who have not yet received therapy. This intrinsic difference between withholding and withdrawing therapy is of moral importance. In many instances, patients will waive this claim. But when one considers withdrawing therapy from one patient to help another in a setting of scarce resources, this intrinsic moral difference comes into sharp focus. In an era of shrinking medical resources, this difference cannot be ignored.

Ethical Analysis↗
PubMed2005

A dualist analysis of abortion: personhood and the concept of self qua experiential subject.

There is no issue more central to the abortion debate than the controversial issue of whether the fetus is a moral person. Abortion-rights opponents almost universally claim that abortion is murder and should be legally prohibited because the fetus is a moral person at the moment of conception. Abortion-rights proponents almost universally deny the crucial assumption that the fetus is a person; on their view, whatever moral disvalue abortion involves does not rise to the level of murder and hence does not rise to the level of something that should be legally prohibited. In this essay, I argue that, under dualist assumptions about the nature of mind, the fetus is not a person until brain activity has begun.(i) First, I argue it is a necessary condition for a thing to be a moral person that it is (or has) a self. Second, I argue it is a necessary condition for a fetus to be (or have) a self, under dualist assumptions, that there has been some electrical activity in the brain. I conclude that a dualist can take the position that abortion ought to be legally permitted at least until the beginning of brain activity in the fetus.iI make no attempt to determine what conditions are sufficient for moral personhood; for this reason, the relevant claim about personhood is purely negative.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed2004

Genes and equality.

The way people think about equality as a value will influence how they think genetic interventions should be regulated. In this paper the author uses the taxonomy of equality put forth by Derek Parfit and applies this to the issue of genetic interventions. It is argued that telic egalitarianism is untenable and that deontic egalitarianism collapses into prioritarianism. The priority view maintains that it is morally more important to benefit the people who are worse off. Once this precision has been given to the concerns egalitarians have, a number of diverse issues must be considered before determining what the just regulation of genetic interventions would be. Consideration must be given to the current situation of the least advantaged, the fiscal realities behind genetic interventions, the budget constraints on other social programmes egalitarians believe should receive scarce public funds, and the interconnected nature of genetic information. These considerations might lead egalitarians to abandon what they take to be the obvious policy recommendations for them to endorse regarding the regulation of gene therapies and enhancements.

Ethics, Medical↗
PubMed1995

Differences between death and dying.

With so much attention being paid to the development and refinement of appropriate criteria and tests for death, little attention has been given to the broader conceptual issues having to do with its definition or with the relation of a definition to its criterion. The task of selecting the correct criterion is, however, virtually impossible without proper attention to the broader conceptual setting in which the definition operates as the key feature. All of the issues I will discuss arise because of this lack of concern with conceptual matters. Such problems as incorrectly diagnosing a patient as dead prior to the harvesting of his or her organs, defending the idea that death is reversible, and advocating a brainstem criterion of death, are all, I believe, errors that derive from this misplaced emphasis.

Brain Death↗
PubMed1999

Equality and selection for existence.

It is argued that the policy of excluding from further life some human gametes and pre-embryos as "unfit" for existence is not at odds with a defensible idea of human equality. Such an idea must be compatible with the obvious fact that the "functional" value of humans differs, that their "use" to themselves and others differs. A defensible idea of human equality is instead grounded in the fact that as this functional difference is genetically determined, it is nothing which makes humans deserve or be worthy of being better or worse off. Rather, nobody is worth a better life than anyone else. This idea of equality is, however, not applicable to gametes and pre-embryos, since they are not human beings, but something out of which human beings develop.

Beginning of Human Life↗
PubMed1999

Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled.

Two versions of the argument that prenatal diagnosis discriminates against the disabled are distinguished and analysed. Both are shown to be inadequate, but some valid concerns about the social effects of prenatal diagnosis are highlighted.

Abortion, Induced↗