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PubMed2006

Making the normal deviant: the introduction of predictive medicine in life insurance.

Over the past years, one of the most discussed topics in policy debates on genetics has been the use of genetic testing in insurance. Many of these debates have been rather speculative and abstract. In a recent contribution to this journal, Kaufert therefore urged for "a proper research agenda" to study the issue, arguing for the need of anthropological and sociological research of the insurance world. This article will make a start with this. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in two Belgium insurance companies, this study analyses the ways insurers account for predictive medicine (lifestyle, genetics) during underwriting. We demonstrate how insurers highlight predictive lifestyle health information and how this articulates with a fault based approach in underwriting. Individual responsibility for health risks becomes the golden standard for assessing one's fitness for membership of the insurance pool. Moreover, these developments imply a changed concept of "normal standard" in insurance, increasing the conditions to fulfil to be part of the insurance group. Predictive medicine constitutes new ground in the old debates about individual control, responsibility and blame for health. This goes to the heart of the basis for citizenship and how this articulates with membership--or, if you want, exclusion--of the insurance pool.

Belgium↗
PubMed1992

Third-party reimbursement coverage for diabetes outpatient education programs.

The purpose of this study was to report on current third-party reimbursement coverage for diabetes outpatient education programs. In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control began to collect and analyze information about reimbursement of outpatient diabetes education programs. Data compiled in the Diabetes Outpatient Education Reimbursement Database represented various information sources, including contact people in 42 states, surveys, government publications, the American Diabetes Association, the American Association of Diabetes Educators, and Communicating for Agriculture. The purpose of the data base was twofold: 1) to track national reimbursement trends and 2) to support health-care professional efforts in obtaining third-party reimbursement for education services. This article analyzes the Diabetes Outpatient Education Reimbursement Database. This study is a descriptive analysis of the major carriers that reimburse, legislation for reimbursement of education programs, and state risk-sharing insurance pools. Currently, Medicaid (in 37 states), Medicare (in 49 states), Blue Cross/Blue Shield (in 43 states), and private carriers (in 48 states) reimburse diabetes outpatient education programs. Sixteen states have operational pooled risk health insurance plans. This represents an increase in the number of states that report reimbursement from 1986. Progress has been made in procuring reimbursement coverage for diabetes outpatient education programs. However, progress does not imply that third-party reimbursement is uniform nationwide or effortlessly achieved. Many challenges must be addressed before reimbursement is no longer an issue in the management of diabetes education programs and the provision of essential services for people with diabetes.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans↗
PubMed1981

Financing and demand for mental health services.

This paper surveys the emerging literature on financing and demand for mental health services. Most studies at present simply report the cost experience of members of an insurance pool, and research on demand behavior has been very limited. Nevertheless, some conclusion are possible. First, the responsiveness of demand for outpatient mental health care is greater than the responsiveness of demand for general medical services. Second, demand for mental health services grows over time among members of an insurance pool, even as coverage remains stable. Third, demand of lower income groups is more responsive to insurance than is demand of upper income groups. New research should focus on the effect of financing policy on the choice of setting for care.

Financing, Organized↗
PubMed2002

Who should pay for bad genes?

Parents have long been able to influence the genetic composition of their children through their choice of a reproductive partner, if only very approximately. They are, however, increasingly able to determine the genetic make-up of their children in other, more precise ways, such as by selecting a particular gamete or embryo or by genetically modifying an embryo prior to artificial implantation. This Article discusses parents' obligations to their children and other members of the community stemming from their children's genes. In a just state, it argues, parents would be responsible for redressing any genetic disadvantage their children suffer as a result of parents' voluntary actions. Within the context of a liberal egalitarian account of distributive justice, this responsibility might most fairly be discharged through a compulsory insurance plan that provides compensation to genetically disadvantaged children when they might have had non-disadvantaged children instead would in some circumstances incur greater liability, because they could not fairly push the cost of their choices off on other members of the insurance pool. The Article also asks whether parents wrong a child by allowing it to be born with a genetic impairment when, had they taken steps to remove the impairment, the unimpaired child they had would have been a different person from the genetically disadvantaged child because the better-off child's capacities and experiences differed considerably from those that the disadvantaged child would have had. Contrary to many people's moral intuitions, the Article argues that parents do not wrong such a child. Nevertheless, parents remain morally obligated to bear any added costs occasioned by the child's impairment. Any other approach would allow them unjustly to shift the burden of their choices to other parents. Finally, the Article takes up the much debated question of whether parents harm a child by allowing it to be born with a life not worth living when they could have prevented its birth. It suggests that the answer to this question should be irrelevant to parents' legal liability. Acting on behalf of the parental insurance pool, the state may nonetheless adopt a variety of measures to help potential parents avoid giving birth to such children, which one can assume virtually all would prefer.

Child↗
PubMed1993

Reorganizing the financial flows in American health care.

The essays in this volume concentrate heavily on "managed competition," which is merely a particular form of controlling the flow of funds from an insurance pool to the providers of health care. By contrast, this essay emphasizes the funneling of money into the insurance fund. It is argued inter alia that American business has been a quite unreliable partner in the financing of American health care and also a major cost driver. A reformed health system should reduce the role of business to the mere collection of premiums at the nexus of payroll.

Community Participation↗
PubMed2003

Public sector health insurance trusts.

Public sector associations have successfully developed and run employee health insurance pools for almost 30 years, providing members with savings and flexibility not available from commercial health insurance carriers. This article looks at the models, technical tools and governance philosophy that have contributed to their success in a very challenging business environment.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Expanding access and choice for health care consumers through tax reform.

A refundable tax credit for the uninsured would complement the existing job-based health insurance system while letting people keep their job-based coverage if they wish. Among the wide variety of design options for a tax credit, policy and political analysis does not reveal an obvious choice, but a tax credit based on a percentage of spending may have a slight advantage. Congress should give states maximum flexibility to use existing funding sources to supplement the value of a federal tax credit and encourage the use of techniques to create stable insurance pools.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed1986

Insuring the uninsured through private action: ideas and initiatives.

The growing issue of health coverage for the uninsured has no single solution, but private initiatives hold promise for some alleviation. The keys to increasing coverage are: more insurance pooling (to share risk and management); different insurance products, especially ones featuring better spending controls (to be attractive yet affordable at the low end of the market); and subsidy plus information (to encourage voluntary enrollment). Lack of insurance is not a problem for employees in large workplaces because relatively low prices and high incomes, as well as employer and tax code paternalism, assure coverage to almost 100% of workers in large groups. People on their own or in small groups, as well as increasing numbers of dependents of workers in large groups, are significantly disadvantaged in comparison. Considerable progress should be possible privately, but no one should expect large improvements without more cultural change or social intervention.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans↗
PubMed2005

Federal aid to state high-risk pools: promoting health insurance coverage or providing fiscal relief?

To help people whose health conditions make it difficult for them to obtain insurance coverage, the Trade Act of 2002 initiated federal matching payments to support state high-risk pools and promote coverage expansion through them. Some 30 states already had high-risk pools, but enrollment was very limited, largely because of high premiums, exclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions, and high cost-sharing. In interviewing officials from high-risk pools that received grants in the program's first year, the authors found that most states did not use grant funds to make their pools more accessible or affordable; instead, 18 of 19 states used some or all funds to refinance existing programs. Only one state used its entire grant award to reduce enrollee premiums, expand covered benefits, or otherwise enact changes to promote enrollment. Policymakers may need to strengthen grant requirements and/or financial incentives to promote expansion of coverage via state high-risk pools.

Consumer Behavior↗
PubMed2002

Policy change and private health insurance: did the cheapest policy do the trick?

From the introduction of Australia's national health insurance scheme (Medicare) in 1984 until recently, the proportion of the population covered by private health insurance declined steadily. Following an Industry Commission inquiry into the private health insurance industry in 1997, a number of policy changes were effected in an attempt to reverse this trend. The main policy changes were of two types: "carrots and sticks" financial incentives that provided subsidies for purchasing, or tax penalties for not purchasing, private health insurance; and lifetime community rating, which aimed to revise the community rating regulations governing private health insurance in Australia. This paper argues that the membership uptake that has occurred recently is largely attributable to the introduction of lifetime community rating which goes some way towards addressing the adverse selection associated with the previous community rating regulations. This policy change had virtually no cost to government. However, it was introduced after subsidies for private health insurance were already in place. The chronological sequencing of these policies has resulted in substantial increases in government expenditure on private health insurance subsidies, with such increases not being a cause but rather an effect of increased demand for private health insurance. The paper also considers whether the decline in membership that has occurred since the implementation of lifetime community rating presages the re-emergence of an adverse selection problem in private health insurance. Much of the decline to date may be attributable to failure on the part of some members to honour premium payments when they first fell due. However, the changing age composition of the insured pool since September 2000, resulting in an increasing average age of those insured, suggests the possible reappearance of an adverse selection dynamic. Thus the 'trick' delivered by lifetime community ratings may not be maintained in the longer term.

Australia↗
PubMed2003

Contracting with limited commitment: evidence from employment-based health insurance contracts.

Impediments to worker mobility serve to mitigate the attrition of healthy individuals from employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby creating a de facto commitment mechanism that allows for more complete insurance of health risks than would be possible in the absence of such frictions. Using data on health insurance contracts obtained from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, we find that the quantity of insurance provided is positively related to the degree of worker commitment. These results illustrate the importance of commitment in the design of long-term contracts, and provide an additional rationale for the bundling of health insurance with employment.

Career Mobility↗
PubMed2001

Payment levels, resource use, and insurance risk of medicaid versus private insured in three states.

Concerns with access and costs in the Medicaid program often lead policy makers to consider alternatives. These include subsidizing poor persons' purchases of health insurance in private markets or integrating Medicaid beneficiaries into commercial managed care systems. As policy makers consider such alternatives, a persistent question is, apart from the disabled within Medicaid, do younger Medicaid enrollees represent a different insurance risk than people of similar age and sex within private insurance pools? We use 1994 data from Georgia, Mississippi, and California to assess relative payment levels, resource use/costs, and risk-adjusted utilization of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicaid enrollees versus privately insured people. When resources are valued at private prices, the use by Medicaid enrollees represents a higher cost. After risk adjustment, Medicaid enrollee resource use appears higher than expected for the privately insured only for outpatient facility visits in the southern states and for inpatient days by pregnant women in California Medi-Cal. Indeed, we find evidence that Medicaid enrollees are underserved relative to their health needs. Given the higher dollar value of their resource usage, apparently obtained under FFS at discounted provider rates, and the lack of evidence on significant overuse relative to need, their integration into private provider systems appears challenging.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2006

Drug insurance instability and its correlates: results from the 2000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.

BACKGROUND: Health insurance instability (ie, temporal gaps in health insurance coverage) is a prevalent phenomenon in the United States. To date, most studies have focused on the factors that affect the intermittent lack of health insurance coverage. However, no studies known to the authors have examined the factors associated with prescription drug insurance instability (ie, temporal gaps in drug insurance coverage) among working-age adults. Developing an accurate profile of persons with unstable drug insurance is essential to formulate rational policy to address this problem. OBJECTIVES: The objectives of this study were to (1) document the prevalence of prescription insurance instability among working-age adults and (2) describe the association between prescription drug insurance instability and demographic, socioeconomic status, and employment characteristics. METHODS: The data source used in this study was the 2000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. This study used a cross-sectional design using data provided by respondents at each of the 3 interviews conducted during the year 2000. Chi-square and hierarchical multinomial logistic regression analyses were used to describe the associations among (1) demographics, (2) socioeconomic status, and (3) employment characteristics and drug insurance status (classified as continuous, absent, or unstable). RESULTS: During the year 2000, 12.5% (21.1 million) of the working-age adults in the United States had unstable prescription drug coverage. Persons aged 35-54 years had lower rates of drug insurance instability compared with those aged 18-24 [adjusted odds ratio 0.66 (95% confidence interval 0.54-0.80)]. The least educated (12 or fewer years of education) were more likely than those with more education (13-16 years) to experience at least one period without drug coverage (62% vs 32%, P<0.01). The poorest respondents (those at less than 200% of the federal poverty level) were more likely than the wealthiest respondents (those at more than 400% of the poverty level) to report at least some time without drug coverage (37% vs 28%, P<0.01). Those experiencing a divorce or death of a spouse were more than twice as likely as stably married persons to experience at least one period without drug insurance [adjusted odds ratio 2.23 (95% confidence interval 1.68-2.96)]. Adults who were unstably employed during the year and/or who worked for small firms generally experienced higher rates of drug insurance instability. CONCLUSIONS: Prescription drug insurance instability is a prevalent phenomenon among working-age adults in the United States, with approximately 1 in 8 experiencing this problem during 2000. Our results suggest that demographics, socioeconomic status, and employment characteristics all play important roles in predicting prescription drug insurance status, with the least educated and poorest being particularly vulnerable to interruptions in drug coverage. Premium assistance programs providing subsidies to small firms' low-income employees and permitting small firms to form insurance pools may help to decrease the number of drug coverage uninsurance spells in this population.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

Rite of passage? Why young adults become uninsured and how new policies can help.

Young adults (ages 19 to 29) are one of the largest and fastest-growing segments of the population without health insurance in the United States. Young adults often lose coverage under their parents' policies at age 19, or when they graduate from high school or college. Nearly two of five college graduates and one-half of high school graduates who do not go on to college will endure a time without health insurance in the first year after graduation. Three policy changes could extend coverage to uninsured young adults and prevent others from losing coverage: extending eligibility for dependents under private coverage through age 23; extending eligibility for Medicaid/CHIP public coverage to age 23; and ensuring that colleges and universities require full-time and part-time students to have insurance, and that they offer coverage to both. Young adults are a relatively low-cost population to insure, and keeping them in insurance pools may lower the average costs of group coverage.

Adolescent↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The Breaux Plan: a radically centrist approach to a new health care system.

Sen. John Breaux (D-LA) proposes a new universal health insurance scheme that takes the best from both the private and the public sectors. Government would use its strength as regulator to set minimum standards and offer a fallback coverage system; states would organize their own insurance pools and arrange coverage for the most vulnerable. The private sector would play a critical role to ensure that the new system was based on principles of competition; employers would have the option of covering their workers much as they do now; and individual coverage would still be available for those who desire and can afford it. For the first time, Americans would be held accountable for obtaining health insurance and would be assisted in doing so.

Consumer Behavior↗
PubMed1997

Winners and losers under medical savings accounts.

As legislators wait to see how the MSA approach to health care reform plays out in the laboratory of the states, authors Marilyn Moon, Len M. Nichols and Susan Wall have put the numbers to work. The researchers simulated the effects of introducing MSAs into the health insurance market. What they found is what critics of MSAs suspected: As the young and healthy shift to MSAs, the premiums for those left in the remaining insurance pool will escalate. However, the authors conclude that if you are male, young and healthy, you stand to gain a lot from the MSA experiment.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed2006

Reconsidering the moral hazard-risk avoidance tradeoff.

The received model for optimal demand-side cost sharing trades off moral hazard and risk avoidance. This model appears to lie behind recent increases in initial cost sharing, such as those embodied in Health Savings Accounts and Health Reimbursement Accounts. At the same time there is evidence that lower cost sharing for certain drugs can reduce future total health care costs and/or improve future health, and this may be true of other medical services as well. To the degree that individuals remain in the same common insurance pool, lower cost sharing that induces increases in certain services that reduce total costs, including future costs, represents a classic case for a subsidy and will minimize an employer's labor costs. Even if total costs increase, the value of a change in health could increase more. In that case such a subsidy is consistent with recent work in behavioral economics for those with self-control problems.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed2003

Enrollee mix, treatment intensity, and cost in competing indemnity and HMO plans.

Why do indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita--77% more in our study--than HMOs? We answer this question using data from a large organization's insurance pool, covering 215,000 lives. We decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources: demographics, incidence within demographic groups, treatment intensity, and prices per service. Greater incidence of disease in the indemnity plan (both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups) and higher prices each explain nearly 50% of the difference. Contrary to conventional wisdom, indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity.

Adult↗