Intersecting languages in psychoanalysis and philosophy.

Abstract

The introduction establishes a general view of the literature in which philosophers have profited from their encounters with analysis. It provides a frame within which to present more specific ideas about the method and language of psychoanalysis as viewed by philosophers. The method of interpretive reconstruction is unfolded from its original context of Freud's archaeological analogy. Further, the vocabulary of reconstruction, which is an intimate part of this analogy, is employed by Anna Freud is her discussion of defense mechanisms. Texts are cited and explicated. Meanwhile, the method of reconstruction is given independent, though related, application in the work of R. G. Collingwood, an archaeologist-philosopher-historian. The juxtaposition of Freud and Collingwood suggests that the methods of philosophy and analysis are more alike than the particular problems they try to solve. Both methods are oriented toward solving the problem of discovering meaning amid absurdity. The introduction of two specific examples lends substances to this claim. In the final section on the practice of interpretation, the question is raised as to how the introduction of the method of reconstruction affects the debate about the epistemological status of psychoanalysis as a science. Psychoanalytic knowledge shows itself to be more like that available to the historian than that accessible through physical theories. Still, physics and analysis can be compared. One must look to the interpretation of symbols. In psychoanalysis, giving an interpretation--in which nonsense becomes understandable--is a form of explanation. This methodological result suggests a conclusion about the relation between metapsychology and clinical practice.