Levels and reduction.

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of reconciling pluralism with reductionism, i.e., acknowledging both the variety of the world and the need and possibility to explain it. First the various kinds of monism and pluralism that litter the scientific and philosophical literature are examined cursorily. Then certain maligned notions are examined, mainly those of novelty, self-assembly, level, and levels "hierarchy." They are shown to be amenable to analysis and even mathematization. Then the logic of reduction is analyzed. Two kinds of reduction are distinguished: full or straight, and partial or roundabout. And three stands on reduction are examined: anti-, radical, and moderate reductionism. The former is dismissed for being obscurantist and the second for being quixotic. Moderate reductionism, aiming at the (partial) reduction of higher levels to lower ones without skipping any intermediate levels, is adopted. Finally moderate reductionism is found to be consistent with a certain variety of pluralism, characterized as naturalistic.