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Implicit learning.

Abstract

Implicit learning is nonepisodic learning of complex information in an incidental manner, without awareness of what has been learned. Implicit learning experiments use 3 different stimulus structures (visual, sequence, and function) and 3 different dependent measures or response modalities (conceptual fluency, efficiency, and prediction and control). Implicit learning may require a certain minimal amount of attention and may depend on attentional and working memory mechanisms. The result of implicit learning is implicit knowledge in the form of abstract (but possibly instantiated) representations rather than verbatim or aggregate representations. Implicit learning shows biases and dissociations in learning different stimulus structures. The dependence of implicit learning on particular brain areas is discussed, some conclusions are drawn for modeling implicit learning, and the interaction of implicit and explicit learning is considered.

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BibTeXRIS

C A Seger. 1994. Implicit learning.. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.163

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