PubMed · 6900962
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D Coombs. 1980. Precision foundry hazards.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6900962/
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An accident in a plant for solvent recovery from solvent-contaminated wastes was examined. An experimental investigation of the accident was carried out using calorimetric and thermogravimetric techniques. The immediate cause of the accident was an unforeseen exothermic decomposition reaction. The main underlying cause of the accident was the absence of safety culture in the plant management, that resulted in the lack of a testing procedure to evaluate the thermal stability of the process feed. A simplified screening procedure based on differential scanning calorimetry was used in order to test the thermal stability of the nonvolatile fraction of the solvent-contaminated wastes present on the plant in order to be processed. More than 75% of the samples examined showed exothermal decomposition phenomena starting at temperatures higher than 100 degrees C. These phenomena were common to solvent wastes that originated from a number of different industrial activities. Thus, the thermal instability of the process feed is one of the main problems in solvent recovery operations. Our analysis of the accident suggested that the safe operation of waste solvent recovery processes requires an accurate characterization of the thermal stability of the process feed. Process safety is also increased by an adequate emergency vent and an accurate control of operating temperature, that may be reduced operating under vacuum. Safety devices may also include a water supply for emergency quench.
First, the paper presents a brief summary of the French actual regulation on installations registered for the protection of the environment and covered by the Seveso I Directive. Then the paper discusses research and development needs for a sound implementation of the Directive, and for the new requirements on safety reports established by the Seveso II Directive. Further, it discusses issues connected with coverage of hazardous activities, learning from accidents, technical and organisational measures (safety management systems and emergency response) and human factors. The conclusions stress the need for networking and dissemination of accident investigations, development of safety management systems, and research on cognitive ergonomics and psychology related to the decision making and interventions of the operator.
Adopted approaches to safety reports and internal emergency plans are described. Based on the provisions of the Seveso II Directive and on the achieved state of hazard prevention management of the respective enterprises in central and eastern European states, reports and plans were prepared. Although these states are no members of the European Union, the parties recognised the requirements of the Seveso II Directive as a working basis. In detail: Methodical experience in preparing safety reports and emergency plans include a methodology in the three main steps: Analysis of information on hazardous substances, hazard analysis including all plants, more specific hazard analysis for representative plants. Basic ways of forming scenarios are given. According to a procedure, various types of scenarios were usually taken into account. Based on the assessment of effects of a substance release, important conclusions can be drawn regarding the extent of danger prevention. In most cases, the structure of the described internal accident emergency plan turned out to be helpful. The programmed system DISMA (Disaster Management) which is widely used in Germany turned out to be a suitable tool for the internal as well as external emergency planning. An example of information to the population is described.