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PubMed · 1865837

Dissipative structure and the mind-body problem.

G G Dudley
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Abstract

A theory explaining the link between mind and body is presented which depends upon viewing personal awareness as a figure against the ground of infinity. It is proposed that a tendency toward dissipation, in tension with an opposite tendency toward structural integrity, determines both the 'illumination' and specificity of awareness. Mind, as an aspect of the awareness bubble, is envisioned as influencing the body via a regressive discrepancy in relation to the current organization of the body mass - a conclusion derived from the fact that the origin of the tension between structure and its dissipation extends regressively back to the time when self was infinite or boundless, i.e., non-existent. This regressive discrepancy drives behavior in an expectable and therefore visible direction [corrected]. The entire thesis rests upon viewing reality as fundamentally personal, such that the linkage between a sensory field and neural activity can be explained on the basis of a simple gap between structure and its dissipation. The significance of this viewpoint for understanding the brain is briefly discussed.

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AwarenessBehaviorBrainConsciousnessEgoHumansMental ProcessesModels, NeurologicalModels, PsychologicalNeural AnalyzersPerceptionJournal Article

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BibTeXRIS

G G Dudley. 1991. Dissipative structure and the mind-body problem.. https://doi.org/10.1016/0306-9877(91)90047-3

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