PubMed · 16844827
The source did not provide an abstract. Follow the original record for more information.
Explore connections, maps & timelines
John E Cooper, Roland Minor. 2006-07-15. Internet access overseas.. https://doi.org/10.1136/vr.159.3.92-a
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.
KEEP EXPLORING
INTRODUCTION: Papyrus manuscripts nearly 2000 years old, can still be read, but documents composed on a Wang or other word processor just 30 years ago are gone forever. Standards and formats used for storing and accessing information are constantly changing, and the required hardware or software will likely be obsolete or no longer exist in the near future. PURPOSE: To understand how to urgently address the data preservation issue as we migrate to greater use of e-records, in particular 'lifetime' electronic health records (EHR's), as our primary, perhaps sole, e-record. In principle, these dynamic and critical health data must be preserved and capable of real-time access on a 7/24/365 basis for perhaps 125 years. Without forethought, only a small fraction of the data currently stored within any healthcare jurisdiction will survive for more than a decade or so, or be exchangeable between jurisdictions. The situation will only be compounded as EHR's become ubiquitous. APPROACH: The literature was reviewed to identify data preservation issues and potential solutions, and guide development of policy recommendations to minimise the impact of this potentially catastrophic system failure. These recommendations are directed at the practice, program, and decision-making levels, and in both the public and private sectors. CONCLUSION: Data preservation poses a critical barrier to e-health and future healthcare systems. At this time broad awareness of data preservation issues is poor. This paper offers policy recommendations to stimulate debate and development of suitable strategies.
The interconnection of medical networks in different healthcare institutions will be constantly increasing over the next few years, which will require concepts for securing medical data during transfer, since transmitting patient related data via potentially insecure public networks is considered a violation of data privacy. The aim of our work was to develop a model-based approach towards end-to-end security which is defined as continuous security from point of origin to point of destination in a communication process. We show that end-to-end security must be seen as a holistic security concept, which comprises the following three major parts: authentication and access control, transport security, as well as system security. For integration into existing security infrastructures abuse case models were used, which extend UML use cases, by elements necessary to describe abusive interactions. Abuse case models can be constructed for each part mentioned above, allowing for potential security risks in communication from point of origin to point of destination to be identified and counteractive measures to be directly derived from the abuse case models. The model-based approach is a guideline to continuous risk assessment and improvement of end-to-end security in medical networks. Validity and relevance to practice will be systematically evaluated using close-to-reality test networks as well as in production environments.
BACKGROUND: A system ensuring tight control access is used since 5 years at the University Geneva Hospitals (HUG) over a four campuses health care system with ambulatory care settings behaving like a small community care network. Access to identified clinical information is limited to care providers that have a therapeutic relationship with the patient and to those data needed for that relation. The same policy applies to administrative or scientific research accesses. This paper presents how the HUG met the challenging goal of protecting patient privacy within regulatory limits while keeping the system operational in terms of use and management. SOLUTION: The main characteristics of the system are: (a) an institution-wide policy for access rights to the computerized patient record; (b) an institutional management of the contracts of the collaborators; (c) access profiles based on application-independent, fine-grained access rights; (d) a decentralized attribution of profession-specific access profiles; (e) a complete, centralized log of all accesses to the clinical information system; and (f) a decentralized verification of the accesses. Many of these characteristics can be maintained when evolving towards a trans-institutional computerized patient record, but new constraints need to be taken into account.