PubMed · 15868677
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Louis M Guenin. 2004. On classifying the developing organism.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15868677/
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This paper defines a human embryo from a biological standpoint that takes into account emerging technologies in reproductive science. The paper does not consider legal, moral, religious or social views. As the definition of a human embryo must reflect the multifactorial processes of development, an approach has been adopted which combines recognition of observed events with potential for further development. This acknowledges that fertilization and development are not static processes, and as such embryo status can only be defined by observation of specific markers. The following biological definition of 'human embryo' is proposed. A human embryo is a discrete entity that has arisen from either: the first mitotic division when fertilization of a human oocyte by a human sperm is complete or any other process that initiates organized development of a biological entity with a human nuclear genome or altered human nuclear genome that has the potential to develop up to, or beyond, the stage at which the primitive streak appears, and has not yet reached 8 weeks of development since the first mitotic division.
Although few ethical concerns exist regarding the use of adult stem cells, the field of embryonic stem cell research is fraught with moral qualms. Several alternative sources of pluripotent stem cells have recently been presented that try to sidestep the destruction of human embryos. The goal of these new proposals is to avoid embryo destruction, the main objection to embryonic stem cell research and thus introduce a type of stem cell research that would gain widespread approval and support. This article suggests that most embryo-saving alternatives fail to reach this goal given the concessions they require with regard to the speed of progress, technical complexity, safety and security of applications, degree of dependence on limited resources and extent of the field of application. The second part of the article identifies and analyses the two main strategies that alternative sources of pluripotent stem cells are based on and points out their shortcomings.
It is commonly assumed that persons who hold abortions to be generally impermissible must, for the same reasons, be opposed to embryonic stem cell research [ESR]. Yet a settled position against abortion does not necessarily direct one to reject that research. The difference in potentiality between the embryos used in ESR and embryos discussed in the abortion debate can make ESR acceptable even if one holds that abortion is impermissible. With regard to their potentiality, in vitro embryos are here argued to be more morally similar to clonable somatic cells than they are to in vivo embryos. This creates an important moral distinction between embryos in vivo and in vitro. Attempts to refute this moral distinction, raised in the recent debate in this journal between Alfonso Gómez-Lobo and Mary Mahowald, are also addressed.