PubMed · 14348121
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P H VENABLES. 1964. INPUT DYSFUNCTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14348121/
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Four- and-a-half-month-old infants' (N = 100) category formation and use was studied in a series of five experiments. For each experiment, the test events featured a display composed of a cylinder and a box. Previous research showed that this display is not clearly parsed as a single unit or as two separate units by infants of this age. Immediately prior to testing, infants were shown a set of category exemplars. Knowledge about this category could help infants disambiguate the test display, which contained a novel exemplar of this category. Clear interpretation of the test display as composed of two separate units (as indicated by infants' longer looking at the move-together than at the move-apart test event) was taken as evidence of category formation and use. In Experiments 1 and 5, infants' prior experience with a set of three different boxes that were similar to the test box facilitated their segregation of the test display. Experiment 2 showed that three different exemplars are necessary: prior experience with any two of the three boxes used in Experiment 1 did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 3 showed that variability in the exemplar set is necessary: prior experience with three identical boxes did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 4 showed that under these conditions of very brief prior exposure, similarity between the exemplar set and test box is necessary: prior experience with three different boxes that were not very similar to the test box did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Together, these findings suggest that: (a) number of exemplars, variability, and similarity in the exemplar set are important for infants' category formation, and (b) infants use their category knowledge to determine the boundaries of the objects in a display.
Recently developed accounts of language comprehension propose that sentences are understood by constructing a perceptual simulation of the events being described. These simulations involve the re-activation of patterns of brain activation that were formed during the comprehender's interaction with the world. In two experiments we explored the specificity of the processing mechanisms required to construct simulations during language comprehension. Participants listened to (and made judgments on) sentences that described motion in a particular direction (e.g. "The car approached you"). They simultaneously viewed dynamic black-and-white stimuli that produced the perception of movement in the same direction as the action specified in the sentence (i.e. towards you) or in the opposite direction as the action specified in the sentence (i.e. away from you). Responses were faster to sentences presented concurrently with a visual stimulus depicting motion in the opposite direction as the action described in the sentence. This suggests that the processing mechanisms recruited to construct simulations during language comprehension are also used during visual perception, and that these mechanisms can be quite specific.
Rosen and Davison [Rosen, G.M. and Davison, G.C. (2003). Psychology should list empirically supported principles of change (ESPs) and not credential trademarked therapies or other treatment packages. Behavior Modification, 27, 300-312] recommended that empirically supported principles be listed instead of empirically supported treatments because the latter approach enables the creation of putatively new therapies by adding functionally inert components to already listed effective treatments. This article attempts to facilitate inquiry into empirically supported principles by reviewing possible mechanisms responsible for the effectiveness of systematic desensitization and exposure therapy. These interventions were selected because they were among the first empirically supported treatments for which some attempt was made at explanation. Reciprocal inhibition, counterconditioning, habituation, extinction, two-factor model, cognitive changes including expectation, self-efficacy, cognitive restructuring, and informal network-based emotional processing explanations are considered. Logical problems and/or available empirical evidence attenuate or undercut these explanations. A connectionist learning-memory mechanism supported by findings from behavioral and neuroscience research is provided. It demonstrates the utility of preferring empirically supported principles over treatments. Problems and limitations of connectionist explanations are presented. This explanation warrants further consideration and should stimulate discussion concerning empirically supported principles.