Problem-solving in science.

Abstract

Problem-solving is a characteristic activity of scientists, Theoretical problems are formulated as a consequence of scientists' thirst for knowledge, and their solutions take the form of general propositions, termed hypotheses, which are consistent with, and provide provisionally satisfactory explanations of, empirical observations. Practical problems appear as the result of feedback from the extra-scientific world of everyday life, industry and professional practice. Their solutions provide an improved basis for decision-making in terms of existing options or increase the number of options from which a choice may be made. The categories theoretical and practical are not mutually exclusive: practical problems often generate interesting theoretical problems, and the solution of a theoretical problem may entrain the solution of a host of practical problems. All hypotheses are provisional because it is impossible to establish the truth of a generalization by rigorous deduction from any number of particular instances, though a single instance may suffice to refute it. This asymmetry forms the basis of Popper's analysis of scientific methodology. This analysis, though acceptable in the main, is open to criticism in the following respects; (1) it ignores the contribution to scientific progress made by unplanned perceptions; (2) it ignores the contribution of hypotheses which do not generate testable predictions; (3) it does not do justice to the extra-logical component in knowing (Polanyi's tacit dimension); and (4) its treatment of practical problems in inadequate.