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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

"In this miserable spot called quarantine": the healthy and unhealthy in nineteenth century Australian and Pacific quarantine stations.

By examining sources created by people who were detained or employed at the quarantine stations of Australia and the Western Pacific, this article illuminates aspects of the history of disease control that cannot be observed in other source material. Most research examining the history of maritime quarantine has tended to rely on the records of official and government agencies. As a result, discussion has largely been confined to government policy and larger issues of the political, economic, and social consequences of maritime disease control. This article contributes to the historiography by examining personal sources that show how quarantine policy and practice were experienced from the perspective of its participants. They reveal the experiences of otherwise obscured healthy detainees and illuminate agency among quarantined individuals that cannot be observed without these sources.

Australia↗
PubMed2002

PCR based molecular technique for identification and discrimination of quarantined and non-quarantined Tilletia sps.

Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) based RAPD profiles, in conjunction with six primers, of Karnal bunt of wheat and rice bunt exhibiting distinct polymorphic DNA. A total of 84 RAPD loci were observed on polyacrylamide gel for both Tilletia sps. Out of 84, 16 loci were found monomorphic, while other 68 loci were unique. Usefulness of random primers was also checked with other seed borne fungal pathogens of wheat and rice. None of primers gave amplification with Magnaporthe grisea, a causative agent of rice blast. However, distinct RAPD profiles were obtained with Alternaria triticina, Fusarium monaliforme, Helminthosporium sativum and Rhizoctonia solani. These six arbitrary primers could distinguish T. indica, a quarantine fungal pathogen from a non-quarantine fungal pathogen, T. barclayana. The two Tilletia sps. could be discriminated not only on the basis of distinct RAPD profiles, but also by presence of few unique gene fragments amplified using all six primers.

Basidiomycota↗
PubMed2005

Assessment of the risk of introduction of Anoplophora glabripennis (Coleoptera: Cerambycidae) in municipal solid waste from the quarantine area of New York City to landfills outside of the quarantine area: a pathway analysis of the risk of spread and establishment.

The risk associated with spread of Asian longhorned beetle, Anoplophora glabripennis (Motschulsky), from infested areas in New York City to the wide array of landfills across the eastern United States contracted by the city since 1997 was unknown, but of great concern. Landfills, some as far as South Carolina, Virginia, and Ohio, occupied forest types and climates at high risk of Asian longhorned beetle establishment. The city proposed a separate waste wood collection known as the "311 System;" this was estimated to cost federal and state agencies $6.1 to $9.1 million per year, including the cost of processing and disposal of the wood. Pathway analysis was used to quantify the probability that Asian longhorned beetle present in wood waste collected at curbside would survive transport, compaction, and burial to form a mated pair. The study found that in seven alternate management scenarios, risks with most pathways are very low, especially given existing mitigations. Mitigations included chemical control, removal of infested trees, and burial of wood waste in managed landfills that involved multiple-layering, compaction, and capping of dumped waste with a 15-cm soil cover at the end of each day. Although the risk of business-as-usual collection and disposal practices was virtually nil, any changes of policy or practice such as illegal dumping or disposal at a single landfill increased the risk many thousandfold. By rigorously maintaining and monitoring existing mitigations, it was estimated that taxpayers would save $75 to $122 million dollars over the next decade.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

[Efficiency of the quarantine system during the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome in Beijing, 2003].

OBJECTIVE: An epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) hit Beijing, China, between March and July 2003 with an attack rate of 1.9 per 10 thousand. (2,521 cases). To control the epidemic of SARS, a total of 30,173 residents were quarantined either in their residence or in quarantine sites. In order to understand the personal need of being quarantined and to estimate the risk of developing SARS during the quarantine period, a survey on the quarantined residents of Haidian District, Beijing, China was carried out. METHODS: 33 precincts in Haidian District divided into five groups (7 in north, 6 in south, 7 in west, 6 in east and 7 in central of Haidian District) according to the location of the precincts were involved. The director of Center of Disease Control and Prevention of Haidian District was asked to select 1 precinct from each group according to the workload of the precinct quarantine officers. From those 5 precincts we obtained lists of all quarantined persons from the precinct quarantine officers. All quarantinees were asked to complete a self-administered questionnaire. The SARS patients were diagnosed and verified according to the diagnosis criteria released by Chinese Ministry of Health which was equivalent to the SARS 'probable case' definition of WHO. All SARS cases had been reported to the relative authorities. RESULTS: By May 23, 2003, 5,186 persons had been quarantined in Haidian district, accounting for 0.23% of all residents. 1,028 of sampled quarantined residents completed the questionnaire. Of those who completed the questionnaire, 2.3% (95% CI: 1.5% - 3.5%) developed SARS while under quarantine. The median quarantine period was 14 days (range 1 day to 28 days). 61% of the quarantinees had a direct contact history with SARS patients, and all secondary SARS patients developed through contact to these quarantinees. The remaining 39% quarantinees who did not have a direct contact history with SARS patients had not developed SARS during the period under quarantine. 37% of the quarantees had direct contact during original patients' symptomatic period with an AR of 6.3%. Persons who looked after the illed SARS patient(s) during their symptomatic period, had an highest attack rate of 31% (95% CI: 20% - 44%). 63% (95% CI: 60% - 66%) of the total quarantined persons did not have direct contact with a SARS patient during his/her symptomatic period, with an attack rate of 0% (95% CI: 0% - 0.73%). CONCLUSION: Only those persons having direct contact with ill SARS patients need to be under quarantine. The overall cost for quarantine on SARS prevention could be reduced by as much as 63% if the quarantine program was limited to this group. No evidence was found that SARS patient was infective during the incubation period.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2005

A world apart: geography, Australian quarantine, and the mother country.

In many respects the Australian colonies were what one person called "the proud offspring of a grand old mother." Yet when it came to the prevention of imported infectious disease, Britain's Australian colonies were not a chip off the old block. British opposition to the lengthy and costly imposition of quarantine had intensified throughout the nineteenth century, eventuating in the abolition of human quarantine in 1896. The Australian colonies, on the other hand, which had based their first quarantine regulations on British law and remained constantly aware of changing medical trends in the mother country, gradually expanded the breadth and capabilities of their maritime quarantine as the century progressed. Although other European powers and British colonies progressively adopted systems of medical inspection more in line with British port prophylaxis and away from quarantine, the Australian colonies invested increasing amounts of time and money into more elaborate quarantine stations and regulations. In this article I examine some of the basic features of coastal disease prevention in the Australian colonies and how they differed from British controls. Australia's distance from Britain was emphasized in the quarantine debates geographically as well as in policy. I argue that the often controversial differences in quarantine policy were for the most part a product of Australia's geographical location. The natural prophylactic of Australia's remoteness was not a reason to minimize quarantine in the colonies but rather served to increase it; whereas, it was argued that "the geographical position of England deprived it of the advantages...derived from a comprehensive quarantine system." I discuss this seeming anomaly in light of other arguments that have claimed that the close proximity of a state to the acknowledged origin of a disease was likely to increase its eagerness to quarantine.

Asia↗
PubMed2005

Quarantine for SARS, Taiwan.

During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, >150,000 persons were quarantined, 24 of whom were later found to have laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Since no evidence exists that SARS-CoV is infective before the onset of symptoms and the quarantined persons were exposed but not symptomatic, we thought the quarantine's effectiveness should be investigated. Using the Taiwan quarantine data, we found that the onset-to-diagnosis time of previously quarantined confirmed case-patients was significantly shortened compared to that for those who had not been quarantined. Thus, quarantine for SARS in Taiwan screened potentially infective persons for swift diagnosis and hospitalization after onset, thereby indirectly reducing infections. Full-scale quarantine measures implemented on April 28 led to a significant improvement in onset-to-diagnosis time of all SARS patients, regardless of previous quarantine status. We discuss the temporal effects of quarantine measures and other interventions on detection and isolation as well as the potential usefulness of quarantine in faster identification of persons with SARS and in improving isolation measures.

Communicable Disease Control↗
PubMed1998

Effects of quarantine on cats and their owners.

The effects of quarantine on 16 cats and their owners were assessed by means of four questionnaires completed by the owners at the beginning of their cat's stay in quarantine, three months later, and two weeks and three months after the cats left quarantine. Changes in body condition were evident in two-thirds of the cats during and at the end of quarantine but not three months later. Mid-way through quarantine, the owners considered their cats were less attached to them, less relaxed, more excitable, more aggressive, more nervous and less playful than before quarantine. When they left quarantine the cats were friendlier, more affectionate and more timid, and three months later they were more affectionate, more nervous and more vocal than before quarantine. When they left quarantine and three months later the cats spent more time with their owners than before quarantine. Most owners visited their cats once or twice a month; the location of the cattery and the limited opening hours restricted the number of visits they made.

Animals↗
PubMed1999

Procedures utilized for primate import quarantine at the International Center for Gibbon Studies.

The intent of the Foreign Quarantine requirements (42 CFR 71.53) for nonhuman primates (NHPs) is to prevent the importation of potentially serious infectious diseases that are not endemic to the United States. In 1990, prompted by an outbreak of Ebola (Reston) hemorrhagic fever at an (NHP) quarantine facility, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initiated unannounced inspections of all NHP importers' quarantine facilities. During the inspections, the majority did not meet the required infection control and containment standards. Numerous discrepancies were identified in infection control and NHP quarantine protocols. Zoos should have knowledge of CDC requirements and recommendations for the importation of NHPs into the United States. Zoos planning to import NHPs should register with the CDC and have their NHP quarantine facility and protocols inspected and approved by CDC's Division of Quarantine. Specific areas addressed must include protocols for in-transit shipping and handling, transport to the quarantine facility, biocontainment procedures (transfer of NHPs from shipping containers to quarantine cages, entering/exiting the quarantine room, routine daily and emergency procedures, protective clothing, infection control, infectious waste disposal), occupational health, and employee training. Here, we provide information on the approved protocols used for import quarantine at a single registered importer facility specializing in importation of gibbons (Hylobatidae) for species conservation purposes. These procedures are site specific and are not intended to be applicable to the needs of all NHP import facilities.

Animals↗
PubMed2006

Impact of quarantine on the 2003 SARS outbreak: a retrospective modeling study.

During the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, traditional intervention measures such as quarantine and border control were found to be useful in containing the outbreak. We used laboratory verified SARS case data and the detailed quarantine data in Taiwan, where over 150,000 people were quarantined during the 2003 outbreak, to formulate a mathematical model which incorporates Level A quarantine (of potentially exposed contacts of suspected SARS patients) and Level B quarantine (of travelers arriving at borders from SARS affected areas) implemented in Taiwan during the outbreak. We obtain the average case fatality ratio and the daily quarantine rate for the Taiwan outbreak. Model simulations is utilized to show that Level A quarantine prevented approximately 461 additional SARS cases and 62 additional deaths, while the effect of Level B quarantine was comparatively minor, yielding only around 5% reduction of cases and deaths. The combined impact of the two levels of quarantine had reduced the case number and deaths by almost a half. The results demonstrate how modeling can be useful in qualitative evaluation of the impact of traditional intervention measures for newly emerging infectious diseases outbreak when there is inadequate information on the characteristics and clinical features of the new disease-measures which could become particularly important with the looming threat of global flu pandemic possibly caused by a novel mutating flu strain, including that of avian variety.

Communicable Diseases, Emerging↗
PubMed2004

Factors influencing compliance with quarantine in Toronto during the 2003 SARS outbreak.

The purpose of this study was to cull lessons from Toronto's experiences with large-scale quarantine during the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in early 2003. We focused on issues that affected the population's willingness to comply with quarantine. Information was acquired from interviews, telephone polling, and focus groups. Issues of quarantine legitimacy, criteria for quarantine, and the need to allow some quarantined healthcare workers to leave their homes to go to work were identified. Also important was the need to answer questions from people entering quarantine about the continuation of their wages, salaries, and other forms of income while they were not working, and about the means by which they would be supplied with groceries and other services necessary for daily living. The threat of enforcement had less effect on compliance than did the credibility of compliance-monitoring. Fighting boredom and other psychological stresses of quarantine, muting the forces of stigma against those in quarantine, and crafting and delivering effective and believable communications to a population of mixed cultures and languages also were critical. The need for officials to develop consistent quarantine policies, procedures, and public messages across jurisdictional boundaries was paramount.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2002

The first line of defence: British quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authorities in the nineteenth century.

This article examines the history of quarantine in Britain in the nineteenth century and the establishment of the Port Sanitary Authorities. Opposition to quarantine, which began at the beginning of the century, gained momentum over the following decades. In 1872, the Port Sanitary Authorities were introduced as an alternative system of port prophylaxis and as a means of rectifying some of the deficiencies quarantine presented in the prevention of imported infections. Unlike most previous scholarship, which claims that quarantine became redundant when the sanitary system was extended to the ports, this article demonstrates that quarantine was maintained in Britain for the reception of the 'exotic' diseases, plague, and yellow fever, and continued to play a central role in the day-to-day operation of British ports. The dual authority maintained by the Quarantine Service and the Port Sanitary Authorities continued until 1896 when quarantine was finally abolished and it was not without its problems. These problems centred on the ambiguous definition of 'quarantineable' and 'non-quarantineable' disease.

Communicable Disease Control↗
PubMed2001

Large-scale quarantine following biological terrorism in the United States: scientific examination, logistic and legal limits, and possible consequences.

Concern for potential bioterrorist attacks causing mass casualties has increased recently. Particular attention has been paid to scenarios in which a biological agent capable of person-to-person transmission, such as smallpox, is intentionally released among civilians. Multiple public health interventions are possible to effect disease containment in this context. One disease control measure that has been regularly proposed in various settings is the imposition of large-scale or geographic quarantine on the potentially exposed population. Although large-scale quarantine has not been implemented in recent US history, it has been used on a small scale in biological hoaxes, and it has been invoked in federally sponsored bioterrorism exercises. This article reviews the scientific principles that are relevant to the likely effectiveness of quarantine, the logistic barriers to its implementation, legal issues that a large-scale quarantine raises, and possible adverse consequences that might result from quarantine action. Imposition of large-scale quarantine-compulsory sequestration of groups of possibly exposed persons or human confinement within certain geographic areas to prevent spread of contagious disease-should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most imaginable circumstances. In the majority of contexts, other less extreme public health actions are likely to be more effective and create fewer unintended adverse consequences than quarantine. Actions and areas for future research, policy development, and response planning efforts are provided.

Bioterrorism↗
PubMed2005

Use of quarantine in the control of SARS in Singapore.

BACKGROUND: A total of 238 cases of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Singapore between February 25 and May 11, 2003. Control relied on empirical methods to detect early and isolate all cases and quarantine those who were exposed to prevent spread in the community. METHODS: On April 28, 2003, the Infectious Diseases Act was amended in Parliament to strengthen the legal provisions for serving the Home Quarantine Order (HQO). In mounting large-scale quarantine operations, a framework for contact tracing, serving quarantine orders, surveillance, enforcement, health education, transport, and financial support was developed and urgently put in place. RESULTS: A total of 7863 contacts of SARS cases were served with an HQO, giving a ratio of 38 contacts per case. Most of those served complied well with quarantine; 26 (0.03%) who broke quarantine were penalized. CONCLUSION: Singapore's experience underscored the importance of being prepared to respond to challenges with extraordinary measures. With emerging diseases, health authorities need to rethink the value of quarantine to reduce opportunities for spread from potential reservoirs of infection.

Contact Tracing↗