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Primary care quality in the Medicare Program: comparing the performance of Medicare health maintenance organizations and traditional fee-for-service medicare.

BACKGROUND: Since 1972, Medicare beneficiaries have had the option of enrolling in a Medicare-qualified health maintenance organization (HMO). Little information exists to inform beneficiaries' choices between the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program and an HMO. OBJECTIVES: To compare the primary care received by seniors in Medicare HMOs with that of seniors in the traditional FFS Medicare program, and among HMOs, and to examine performance differences associated with HMO model-type and profit status. METHODS: Data were derived from a cross-sectional observational survey of Medicare beneficiaries 65 years or older in the 13 states with mature, substantial Medicare HMO markets. Only beneficiaries continuously enrolled for 12 months or more in traditional FFS Medicare or a qualified Medicare HMO were eligible. Data were obtained using a 5-stage protocol involving mail and telephone (64% response rate). Analyses included respondents who identified a primary physician and had all required data elements (N = 8828). We compared FFS and HMO performance on 11 summary scales measuring 7 defining characteristics of primary care: (1) access, (2) continuity, (3) integration, (4) comprehensiveness, (5) "whole-person" orientation, (6) clinical interaction, and (7) sustained clinician-patient partnership. RESULTS: For 9 of 11 indicators, performance favored traditional FFS Medicare over HMOs (P<.001). Financial access favored HMOs (P<.001). Preventive counseling did not differ by system. Network-model HMOs performed more favorably than staff/group-model HMOs on 9 of 11 indicators (P<.001). Few differences were associated with HMO profit status. CONCLUSIONS: The findings are consistent with previous comparisons of indemnity insurance and network-model and staff/group-model HMOs in elderly and nonelderly populations. The stability of results across time, geography, and populations suggests that the relative strengths and weaknesses of each system are enduring attributes of their care. Medicare enrollees seem to face the perennial cost-quality trade-off: that is, deciding whether the advantages of primary care under traditional FFS Medicare are worth the higher out-of-pocket costs.

Aged↗

Medicare program; reduction in Medicare Part B premiums as additional benefits under Medicare+Choice plans. Final rule.

This final rule revises the regulations to provide for a Medicare+Choice organization to offer a reduction in the standard Medicare Part B premium as an additional benefit under one or more Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans. The legislation specifies that the reduction to the Medicare Part B premium cannot exceed the standard Medicare Part B premium amount and cannot be applied to surcharges. Surcharges are increased premiums for late enrollment and for reenrollment. The Medicare Part B premium may be collected by a variety of methods: Paid directly to the Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services by the beneficiary; collected as an adjustment to any Social Security, Railroad Retirement, or Civil Service Retirement benefits; paid by an employer as part of an annuity package; or, paid by the State for individuals enrolled in a qualifying State Medicaid program. This legislation applies to benefits under Medicare M+C plans offered by an M+C organization electing this option, beginning January 1, 2003. This final rule revises the regulations to set out the basic rules under section 606 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) for adjustment and payment of the Medicare Part B premium.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Medicare program; Medicare secondary payer for individuals entitled to Medicare and also covered under group health plans--HCFA. Final rule with comment period.

These regulations establish limits on Medicare payment for services furnished to individuals who are entitled to Medicare on the basis of disability and who are covered under large group health plans (LGHPs) by virtue of their own or a family member's current employment status with an employer; and prohibit LGHPs from taking into account that those individuals are entitled to Medicare on the basis of disability. They also implement certain other provisions of section 1862(b) of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1986, 1989, 1990, and 1993 and the Social Security Act Amendments of 1994. Those amendments affect the Medicare secondary payer rules for individuals who are entitled to Medicare on the basis of age or who are eligible or entitled on the basis of end stage renal disease and who are also covered under group health plans (GHPs). The provisions that apply to all three groups include-- The rules under which HCFA determines that a GHP or LGHP is not in conformance with the requirements and prohibitions of the statute; The appeals procedures respecting GHPs and LGHPs that HCFA finds to be nonconforming. The referral of nonconforming plans to the Internal Revenue Service; and The rules for recovery of conditional or mistaken Medicare payments made by HCFA. The intent of the MSP provisions is to ensure that Medicare does not pay primary benefits for services for which a GHP or LGHP is the proper primary payer and that beneficiaries covered under these plans are not disadvantaged vis-a-vis other individuals who are covered under the plan but are not entitled to Medicare.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

The use of disease-modifying agents among multiple sclerosis patients enrolled in medicare from 1995 to 2002 and the impact of medicare part D: analysis of claims data from the medicare current beneficiary survey.

OBJECTIVES: The goals of this analysis were as follows:(1) identify the prevalence of access barriers to disease-modifying agents (DMAs) used in the United States for the treatment of multiple sclerosis (MS), (2) identify the relationship between patient characteristics and use of DMAs, and (3) interpret the results in the context of Medicare Part D. METHODS: Using claims data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) 1992 to 2001, we identified beneficiaries with a diagnosis of MS on > or =4 claims. To adapt for the bimodality of the claims distribution and to capture the majority of MS claims, > or =4 claims were used. We estimated the mean out-of-pocket price of prescription medications and prevalence of perceived economic barriers to address the hypothesis that the expansion of Medicare to include an out-patient drug benefit will decrease beneficiaries' burden of MS. RESULTS: A total of 416 patients with MS were identified with the MCBS claims data. Furthermore, data for 3 DMAs used to manage MS were available: interferon beta-1b, interferon beta-1a, and glatiramer acetate. Data were available for interferon beta-1b for the years 1995 to 2002, and for interferon beta-1a and glatiramer acetate for the years 1999 to 2002. The mean out-of-pocket price per prescribing event (typically 30 days) for interferon beta-1b was US $44.40 from 1995 to 1998 and US $15.08 from 1999 to 2002. Between 1999 and 2002, the mean out-of-pocket price per prescribing event for interferon beta-1a was US $84.74; for glatiramer acetate during the same period, it was US $114.90. Assuming complete compliance for the year, the mean out-of-pocket burden per patient for each medication using the 1999-to-2002 numbers would be US $1016.88 for interferon beta-1a, US $548.91 for interferon beta-1b, and US $1378.80 for glatiramer acetate. The annual prevalence of use of any DMA increased from 6.5% during the years 1995 to 1998 to 21.2% during the years 1999 to 2002. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that these MS patients, who were Medicare beneficiaries, faced considerable economic barriers to necessary health care, particularly prescription medications. Substantial differences existed in the out-of-pocket prices of DMAs between the 2 time periods analyzed. These differences could be expected to be attenuated by the expansion of Medicare to include a drug benefit (Part D), which will increase insurance coverage for DMAs and reduce the out-of-pocket burden of MS therapies.

Antirheumatic Agents↗

Medicare program; establishing procedures for transmitting information between Medicare carriers and Medicare supplemental insurers--HCFA. General notice.

This notice announces and describes the procedure for the automatic transfer of claims information from Medicare carriers to Medicare supplemental (Medigap) insurers when a beneficiary has assigned his or her right of payment to a participating physician or supplier. It delineates the roles of the Medicare carriers, Medigap insurers, State insurance departments, beneficiaries, physicians and suppliers, and HCFA. The procedure for the automatic transfer of claims is required by section 1842(h)(3)(B) of the Social Security Act, as added by section 4081(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and is intended to speed payment of Medicare supplemental insurance benefits to participating physicians and suppliers.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Medicare program; Medicare coverage of home health services, Medicare conditions of participation, and home health aide supervision--HCFA. Final rule.

This regulation specifies home health aide supervision and duty requirements applicable to all home health agencies (HHAs) and hospices that furnish home health aide services under the Medicare program. It also specifies limitations and exclusions applicable to home health services covered under Medicare. The purpose of this regulation is to clarify Medicare home health policy and to promote consistent administration of the home health benefit.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Medicare program; Medicare secondary payer for individuals entitled to Medicare and also covered under group health plans; correction--HCFA. Final rule with comment period; correcting amendments.

This document makes corrections to the final rule with comment period entitled "medicare program; medicare secondary payer for individuals entitled to medicare and also covered under group health plans" that was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, August 31, 1995 (60 FR 45344).

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Do Medicare HMOs and Medicare FFS differ in their use of the Medicare hospice benefit?

This study compares use of the hospice benefit in Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) and Medicare risk-health maintenance organization (HMO) options in South Florida in 1992. A higher percentage of deaths occurred in hospice in the HMO option than in the FFS option. Compared to individuals in the FFS option, HMO-enrolled hospice users had longer lengths of hospice stay, lower 7-day mortality and higher 180-day (6 month) survival. These differences are consistent with the physician's financial incentives associated with the two programs.

Aged↗

Beneficiary knowledge of original Medicare and Medicare managed care.

BACKGROUND: Previous research on beneficiary knowledge of the Medicare program has shown that the beneficiary population is not well informed about Medicare. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the National Medicare Education Program in 1998 to educate Medicare beneficiaries about program benefits; choices, rights, responsibilities and protections, and health behaviors. OBJECTIVES: We sought to measure beneficiary knowledge of the Medicare program and to assess how knowledge varies by beneficiary subgroups and topic areas. RESEARCH DESIGN: We conducted psychometric analyses of survey data from Round 36 of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey to construct knowledge indices and estimated regression models with each knowledge index as the dependent variable, controlling for sociodemographic characteristics, self-reported health status, and insurance. SUBJECTS: The study sample included 2634 noninstitutionalized Medicare beneficiaries. MEASURES: There were 2 separate knowledge indices representing the 2 primary avenues for receiving Medicare benefits: Original Medicare and Medicare managed care. RESULTS: Beneficiaries ages 75 or older, nonwhite, with lower incomes, lower education levels, and public insurance had lower levels of knowledge on both indices. Enrollment in Medicare managed care was positively associated with knowledge about Medicare managed care but negatively associated with knowledge about Original Medicare. Areas of low program knowledge included coverage and benefits, enrollment/disenrollment, and plan choice. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest the need to develop educational campaigns targeting vulnerable beneficiaries who have continued to demonstrate low levels of Medicare program knowledge.

Aged↗

Medicare program; Medicare prescription drug benefit. Final rule.

This final rule implements the provisions of the Social Security Act (the Act) establishing and regulating the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit. The new voluntary prescription drug benefit program was enacted into law on December 8, 2003 in section 101 of Title I of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (Pub. L. 108-173). Although this final rule specifies most of the requirements for implementing the new prescription drug program, readers should note that we are also issuing a closely related rule that concerns Medicare Advantage organizations, which, if they offer coordinated care plans, must offer at least one plan that combines medical coverage under Parts A and B with prescription drug coverage. Readers should also note that separate CMS guidance on many operational details appears or will soon appear on the CMS website, such as materials on formulary review criteria, risk plan and fallback plan solicitations, bid instructions, solvency standards and pricing tools, plan benefit packages. The addition of a prescription drug benefit to Medicare represents a landmark change to the Medicare program that will significantly improve the health care coverage available to millions of Medicare beneficiaries. The MMA specifies that the prescription drug benefit program will become available to beneficiaries beginning on January 1, 2006. Generally, coverage for the prescription drug benefit will be provided under private prescription drug plans (PDPs), which will offer only prescription drug coverage, or through Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans (MA PDs), which will offer prescription drug coverage that is integrated with the health care coverage they provide to Medicare beneficiaries under Part C of Medicare. PDPs must offer a basic prescription drug benefit. MA-PDs must offer either a basic benefit or broader coverage for no additional cost. If this required level of coverage is offered, MA-PDs or PDPs, but not fallback PDPs may also offer supplemental benefits through enhanced alternative coverage for an additional premium. All organizations offering drug plans will have flexibility in the design of the prescription drug benefit. Consistent with the MMA, this final rule also provides for subsidy payments to sponsors of qualified retiree prescription drug plans to encourage retention of employer-sponsored benefits. We are implementing the drug benefit in a way that permits and encourages a range of options for Medicare beneficiaries to augment the standard Medicare coverage. These options include facilitating additional coverage through employer plans, MA-PD plans and high-option PDPs, and through charity organizations and State pharmaceutical assistance programs. See sections II.C, II.J, and II.P, and II.R of this preamble for further details on these issues. The proposed rule identified options and alternatives to the provisions we proposed and we strongly encouraged comments and ideas on our approach and on alternatives to help us design the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program to operate as effectively and efficiently as possible in meeting the needs of Medicare beneficiaries.

Aged↗

Medicare program; Medicare prescription drug discount card. Interim final rule with comment period.

Section 101, subpart 4 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, codified in section 1860D-31 of the Social Security Act, provides for a voluntary prescription drug discount card program for Medicare beneficiaries entitled to benefits, or enrolled, under Part A or enrolled under Part B, excluding beneficiaries entitled to medical assistance for outpatient prescription drugs under Medicaid, including section 1115 waiver demonstrations. Eligible beneficiaries may access negotiated prices on prescription drugs by enrolling in drug discount card programs offered by Medicare-endorsed sponsors. Eligible beneficiaries may enroll in the Medicare drug discount card program beginning no later than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 and ending December 31, 2005. After December 31, 2005, beneficiaries enrolled in the program may continue to use their drug discount card during a short transition period beginning January 1, 2006 and ending upon the effective date of a beneficiary's outpatient drug coverage under Medicare Part D, but no later than the last day of the initial open enrollment period under Part D. Beneficiaries with incomes no more than 135 percent of the poverty line applicable to their family size who do not have outpatient prescription drug coverage under certain programs--Medicaid, certain health insurance coverage or group health insurance (such as retiree coverage), TRICARE, and Federal employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP)--also are eligible for transitional assistance, or payment of $600 in 2004 and up to $600 in 2005 of the cost of covered discount card drugs obtained under the program. In most cases, any transitional assistance remaining available to a beneficiary on December 31, 2004 may be rolled over to 2005 and applied toward the cost of covered discount card drugs obtained under the program during 2005. Similarly, in most cases, any transitional assistance remaining available to a beneficiary on December 31, 2005 may be applied toward the cost of covered discount card drugs obtained under the program during the transition period. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services will solicit applications from entities seeking to offer beneficiaries negotiated prices on covered discount card drugs. Those meeting the requirements described in the authorizing statute and this rule, including administration of transitional assistance, will be permitted to offer a Medicare-endorsed drug discount card program to eligible beneficiaries. Endorsed sponsors may charge beneficiaries enrolling in their endorsed programs an annual enrollment fee for 2004 and 2005 of no more than $30; CMS will pay this fee on behalf of enrollees entitled to transitional assistance. To ensure that eligible Medicare beneficiaries take full advantage of the Medicare drug discount card program and make informed choices, CMS will educate beneficiaries about the existence and features of the program and the availability of transitional assistance for certain low-income beneficiaries; and publicize information that will allow Medicare beneficiaries to compare the various Medicare-endorsed drug discount card programs.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Differences in U.S. hospital service utilization between traditional Medicare and Medicare HMO patients.

This study examines the differences between traditional U.S. Medicare and Medicare HMO Florida inpatient hospital utilization during the years 1992-1998, using nine high volume Diagnosis Related Groups. Utilization was measured by the number of ancillary services consumed, as well as the charges for those services. The analyses controlled for differences in utilization due to patient age, race, hospital size, year and market differences in hospital costs. Patient data were severity-adjusted and the analysis focused on the patients at the highest severity level. The study found that Medicare HMO patients with chronic diseases at the highest severity of illness level consumed significantly more services than traditional Medicare patients with the same chronic diseases. It was concluded that these Medicare HMO patients were either sicker (despite the severity adjustment) than the traditional Medicare patients and/or Medicare HMOs used different production processes than traditional Medicare, perhaps in order to minimize length of stay. Medicare HMO patients with acute illnesses at the highest severity level did not, in general, consume significantly more services than traditional Medicare patients at the same level of severity for the same diagnoses. The results imply that Medicare policy with regard to HMO expansion may not result in cost savings, and may, instead, result in higher costs if the proportion of the Medicare population hospitalized with chronic illnesses increases.

Diagnosis-Related Groups↗

Comparison of performance of traditional Medicare vs Medicare managed care.

CONTEXT: Since 2000, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been collecting information on beneficiaries' experiences with health care for Medicare managed care (MMC) and traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare. OBJECTIVES: To compare beneficiary experiences with managed care and FFS arrangements throughout the country and to assess the stability of those differences over time. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: CMS administered managed care and FFS versions of the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study (CAHPS) survey to samples of beneficiaries (aged > or =65 years) from Medicare + Choice MMC organizations and from geographic strata within the traditional FFS Medicare program. We analyzed responses collected in 2000 and 2001 from 497,869 respondents: 299,058 beneficiaries enrolled in MMC plans (response rate, 82%) and 198,811 enrolled in FFS Medicare (response rate, 68%). Differences between MMC and FFS within states were assessed after adjustment for case mix and nonresponse. For estimates at the regional and national level, state estimates were combined after weighting by the MMC enrollment in the state. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Four overall ratings (of the plan, personal physician, care received overall, and care received from specialists), 5 measures summarizing beneficiaries' experiences with care (getting care needed; getting care quickly; communication with clinicians; courtesy and respect of physician's office staff; and paperwork, information, and customer service), and reports of receipt of 3 preventive services (flu shots, pneumococcal vaccinations, and being advised to quit smoking) were assessed. RESULTS: Respondents in MMC and FFS plans were similar to each other and to the Medicare population as a whole. Nationally, FFS Medicare beneficiaries rated experiences with care measured by the CAHPS survey higher than did MMC beneficiaries; for instance, in ratings of care received overall (scale of 1-10) (8.91 FFS vs 8.86 MMC, P<.001, in 2000; and 8.88 FFS vs 8.78 MMC, P<.001, in 2001). Differences between FFS and MMC varied across states, however. Managed care enrollees reported significantly fewer problems with paperwork, information, and customer service (2.62 FFS vs 2.55 MMC, P<.001, in 2000; and 2.59 FFS vs 2.51 MMC, P<.001, in 2001). Enrollees in MMC were also more likely to report having received immunizations for influenza and pneumococcus (from any source) (in 2000, 77% of MMC vs 63% of FFS respondents; P<.001), and smokers were more likely to report having received counseling to quit smoking. CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggest that managed care was better at delivering preventive services, whereas traditional Medicare was better in other aspects of care related to access and beneficiary experiences. These relative strengths should be considered when policy decisions are made that affect the availability of choice or influence beneficiaries to choose one model of care over another.

Aged↗

Determinants of Medicare home healthcare service use among Medicare recipients.

BACKGROUND: Medicare reimbursement for home healthcare (HHC) services has changed dramatically in recent years. A clear understanding of the determinants of Medicare HHC services use is needed so that HHC agencies can meet the demand for services from an aging population while remaining financially sound. OBJECTIVES: The purpose of the study was to identify the determinants of Medicare HHC service within the framework of the Andersen Behavioral Model. METHODS: This cross-sectional secondary analysis used data from the 1996 Medical Expenditures Panel Survey to examine characteristics of 239 subjects who had received Medicare reimbursed HHC services. Predisposing characteristics, enabling resources, and need characteristics were examined to explain Medicare HHC service use. Two criterion measures, annual Medicare expenditures and days of care, were employed in hierarchical regression analyses. RESULTS: Variance in annual Medicare expenditures was explained by both the predisposing (R(2) =.16, <.001) and need characteristics (R(2) =.09, <.001). Variance in days of care was explained by predisposing characteristics (R(2) =.12, <.001) and need characteristics (R(2) =.15, <.001). The adjusted for the total model was.21 for annual Medicare expenditures and.25 for days of care. CONCLUSIONS: While Andersen's Behavioral Model is useful in explaining Medicare HHC service use, it may be important to use multiple measures as criterion variables since the amount and proportion of variance explained differs with the variable used.

Activities of Daily Living↗

The costs of decedents in the Medicare program: implications for payments to Medicare + Choice plans.

OBJECTIVE: To discuss and quantify the incentives that Medicare managed care plans have to avoid (through selective enrollment or disenrollment) people who are at risk for very high costs, focusing on Medicare beneficiaries in the last year of life-a group that accounts for more than one-quarter of Medicare's annual expenditures. DATA SOURCE: Medicare administrative claims for 1994 and 1995. STUDY DESIGN: We calculated the payment a plan would have received under three risk-adjustment systems for each beneficiary in our 1995 sample based on his or her age, gender, county of residence, original reason for Medicare entitlement, and principal inpatient diagnoses received during any hospital stays in 1994. We compared these amounts to the actual costs incurred by those beneficiaries. We then looked for clinical categories that were predictive of costs, including costs in a beneficiary's last year of life, not accounted for by the risk adjusters. DATA EXTRACTION METHODS: The analyses were conducted using claims for a 5 percent random sample of Medicare beneficiaries who died in 1995 and a matched group of survivors. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Medicare is currently implementing the Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIP-DCG) risk adjustment payment system to address the problem of risk selection in the Medicare+Choice program. We quantify the strong financial disincentives to enroll terminally ill beneficiaries that plans still have under this risk adjustment system. We also show that up to one-third of the selection observed between Medicare HMOs and the traditional fee-for-service system could be due to differential enrollment of decedents. A risk adjustment system that incorporated more of the available diagnostic information would attenuate this disincentive; however, plans could still use clinical information (not included in the risk adjustment scheme) to identify beneficiaries whose expected costs exceed expected payments. CONCLUSIONS: More disaggregated prospective risk adjustment methods and alternative payment systems that compensate plans for delivering care to certain classes of patients should be considered to ensure access to high-quality managed care for all beneficiaries.

Actuarial Analysis↗

Use of ineffective or unsafe medications among members of a Medicare HMO compared to individuals in a Medicare fee-for-service program.

Adverse drug reactions and inappropriate prescribing practices are an important cause of hospitalization, morbidity, and mortality in the elderly. This study compares prescribing practices within a Medicare risk contract health maintenance organization (HMO) in 1993 and 1994 with prescribing practices for two nationally representative samples of elderly individuals predominantly receiving medical care within the Medicare fee-for-service sector. Information on prescriptions in the fee-for-service sector came from the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey (NMES) and the 1992 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). A total of 20 drugs were studied; these drugs were deemed inappropriate for the elderly because their risk of causing adverse events exceeded their health benefits, according to a consensus panel of experts in geriatrics and pharmacology. One or more of the 20 potentially inappropriate drugs was prescribed to 11.53% of the Medicare HMO members in 1994. These medications were prescribed significantly less often to HMO members in 1994 than to individuals in the fee-for-service sector, based on information from both the 1987 NMES and the 1992 MCBS. Utilization of unsafe or ineffective medications actually decreased with increasing age in the HMO sample, with lowest rates in individuals over the age of 85. However, no relationship between age and medication use was seen in the NMES study, except for individuals over the age of 90 years. The study data support the conclusion that ineffective or unsafe medications were prescribed less often in the Medicare HMO than in national comparison groups. In fact, for the very old, who are most at risk, the use of these medications was much lower in the Medicare HMO than in the Medicare fee-for-service sector. Nevertheless, in 1994, approximately one of every nine members of this Medicare HMO received at least one such medication. Continued efforts and innovative strategies to further reduce the use of unsafe and ineffective drugs among elderly Medicare HMO members are needed.

Aged↗

How raising the age of eligibility for Social Security and Medicare might affect the disability insurance and Medicare programs.

The normal age of retirement is scheduled to increase to 67 by 2022, and several proposals to increase it to age 70 are being considered. The Medicare eligibility age is not scheduled to increase under current law, but proposals to raise it in step with the retirement age were recently considered by the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare (1999). This article examines how raising both the normal retirement age and the Medicare eligibility age would affect Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) eligibility, Medicare eligibility, and Medicare expenditures under two hypothetical policy scenarios. The first (the 2022 age-67 scenario) assumes that the eligibility age is raised to 67 by 2022, in step with the scheduled increase in the normal retirement age. The second (the 2040 age-70 scenario) assumes that the eligibility ages are increased to 70 by 2040. The findings are based on a summary of two reports. The earlier one (Wittenburg and others 1999) describes a series of microsimulation models developed from data in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The base simulations in that report assume that the normal retirement and Medicare eligibility ages had already been increased in 1993, when the SIPP and MCBS respondents were observed. In the later report (Wittenburg, Stapleton, and Scrivner 2000), adjustment factors were developed to reflect future increases in Medicare expenditures, population growth, and increased participation in DI. The base simulations were then adjusted by those factors, yielding a final set of annual projections under the two policy scenarios. The hypothetical policy scenarios illustrate that the major cost reductions from jointly raising the Medicare eligibility age and the normal age of retirement would not be realized until after 2020, when the increases are fully phased in and a large portion of baby boomers have reached age 65. Although the projections provide important cost estimates, the equity and efficiency of those policies must be studied before the desirability of any specific proposal can be evaluated fully.

Age Factors↗