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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1990

Psychophysiology at the interface of clinical science, cognitive science, and neuroscience.

Research in schizophrenia illustrates that the field of psychophysiology lies at the interface of clinical science, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Electrodermal abnormalities in schizophrenic patients have been found reliably across laboratories, and data reported here demonstrate that these abnormalities are at least partially dependent upon the clinical state of the patients. Both tonic and phasic electrodermal activity increased when schizophrenic patients entered into a psychotic episode, and preliminary evidence suggests that the increases may serve as early prodromal signs of an impending episode. Significance of the electrodermal abnormalities for understanding cognitive and attentional deficits is suggested by associations with secondary reaction time and startle blink probe findings. Neuroscience implications are highlighted by the correlation of the electrodermal abnormalities with regional brain metabolic activity indexed by positron emission tomography. An important task for the future is to interrelate measures from these various domains. The field of psychophysiology is particularly well positioned for this task.

Arousal↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science.

Cognitive psychology has an opportunity to turn itself into a theoretically rigorous discipline in which a powerful set of theories organize observations and suggest focused new hypotheses. This cannot happen, however, as long as intuition and folk psychology continue to set our research agenda. This is because intuition systematically blinds us to the full universe of problems our minds spontaneously solve, restricting our attention instead to a minute class of unrepresentative "high-level" problems. In contrast, evolutionarily rigorous theories of adaptive function are the logical foundation on which to build cognitive theories, because the architecture of the human mind acquired its functional organization through the evolutionary process. Theories of adaptive function specify what problems our cognitive mechanisms were designed by evolution to solve, thereby supplying critical information about what their design features are likely to be. This information can free cognitive scientists from the blinders of intuition and folk psychology, allowing them to construct experiments capable of detecting complex mechanisms they otherwise would not have thought to test for. The choice is not between no-nonsense empiricism and evolutionary theory; it is between folk theory and evolutionary theory.

Animals↗
PubMed1998

The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.

Cognition↗
PubMed1992

Psychoanalysis and cognitive science: contrasting models of the mind.

Although the relationship between psychoanalysis and cognitive science has begun to be addressed, theorists have not constructed a unifying conceptual framework from which to compare and contrast these disciplines. This paper begins by considering the models of mind of cognitive science, and of classical and contemporary psychoanalysis. It is argued that it is useful to reformulate psychoanalytic constructs in terms of cognitive science models. Psychoanalysts have therefore become, and will continue to be, more cognitivist in their work. Nevertheless, psychoanalytic theory and practice is so fundamental that it constitutes the only starting point for clinical cognitivists. The reformulation of psychoanalysis in cognitivist terms is beneficial for both psychoanalysis and cognitive science. The explanatory power of the cognitivist remodelling of psychoanalysis can, of course, be fully assessed only once it has taken place. This paper encourages that theoretical work to proceed.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy↗
PubMed1993

Emotion and two kinds of meaning: cognitive therapy and applied cognitive science.

The clinical cognitive approach assumes that emotional reactions are mediated through the meanings given to events. Cognitive therapy aims to change emotion by changing meanings. It focuses on specific level meanings, evaluating the truth value of particular beliefs. Bower's science-driven associative network theory of cognition and emotion is also primarily concerned with specific meanings. This focus on meaning at a specific level causes problems, e.g. the contrasts between 'intellectual' and 'emotional' belief, between 'cold' and 'hot' cognition, and between explicit and intuitive knowledge. These problems are resolved in the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) approach. ICS distinguishes between a specific and a more holistic, intuitive, level of meaning. In contrast to alternative approaches, ICS suggest that holistic level meanings are of primary importance in emotion production. Representations at this level consist of schematic mental models, encoding high-order inter-relationships and prototypical patterns extracted from life experience. The ICS approach to meaning is described and its implications for understanding and treating emotional disorders discussed, together with relevant empirical findings. ICS suggests a therapeutic focus on holistic rather than specific meanings, a role for 'non-evidential' interventions, such as guided imagery, and a rational basis for certain experiential therapies.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Representation in natural and artificial agents: an embodied cognitive science perspective.

The goal of the present paper is to provide an embodied cognitive science view on representation. Using the fundamental task of category learning, we will demonstrate that this perspective enables us to shed new light on many pertinent issues and opens up new prospects for investigation. The main focus of this paper is on the prerequisites to acquire representations of objects in the real world. We suggest that the main prerequisite is embodiment which allows an agent--human, animal or robot--to manipulate its sensory input such that invariances are generated. These invariances, in turn, are the basis of representation formation. In other words, the paper does not focus on representations per se, but rather discusses the various processes involved in order to make learning and representation acquisition possible. The argument structure is as follows. First we introduce two new perspectives on representation, namely frame-of-reference, and complete agent. Then we elaborate the complete agent perspective and focus in particular on embodiment and situatedness. We argue that embodiment has two main aspects, a dynamic and an information theoretic one. Focusing on the latter, there are a number of implications: Representation can only be understood if the embedding of the neural substrate in the physical agent is known, which includes morphology (shape), positioning and nature of sensors. Because an autonomous mobile agent in the real world is exposed to a continuously changing high-dimensional stream of sensory stimulation, if it is to learn category distinctions, it first needs a focus of attention mechanism, and then it must have a way to reduce the dimensionality of this high-dimensional sensory stream. Learning is very hard because the invariances are typically not found in the sensory data directly--the classical problem of object constancy: it is a so-called type 2 problem. Rather than trying to improve the learning algorithms--which is the standard approach--the embodied cognitive science view suggests a different approach which focuses on the nature of the data: the agent is not passively exposed to a given data distribution, but, by exploiting its body and through the interaction with the environment, it can actually generate the data. More specifically, it can generate correlated data that has the property that it can be easily learned. This learnability is due to redundancies resulting from the appropriate interactions with the environment. Through such interactions, the former type 2 problem is transformed into a type 1 problem, thus reducing the complexity of the learning task by orders of magnitude. By observing the frame-of-reference problem we will discuss to what extent these invariances are reflected--represented--in the "neural substrate", i.e. the internal mechanisms of the agent. It is concluded, that representation is not a concept that can be studied in the abstract, but should be elaborated in the context of concrete agent-environment interactions. These ideas are all illustrated with examples of natural agents and artificial agents. In particular, we will present a suite of experiments on simulated and real-world artificial agents instantiating the main arguments.

Algorithms↗
PubMed1997

Consider the simple screw: cognitive science, quality improvement, and psychotherapy.

Psychological therapy based on cognitive science advances as psychological states can be precisely measured. This article describes a treatment approach, personal quality improvement (PQI), that draws on (a) the states of mind (SOM) model, a mathematical model built on cognitive assessment research on the balance of positive and negative thoughts and feelings; (b) total quality control, a method for improving quality as defined by increased system stability by empowering average workers to reduce variability through process monitoring; and (c) the phase model of psychotherapy, a framework that proposes 3 distinct stages of treatment. In a single-case study, a depressed client used PQI to track emotional, self-image, and optimism balance, achieving an improvement trajectory consistent with the SOM and phase models. PQI emphasizes process, uses a patient focused treatment paradigm that provides tools for autonomous functioning, and allows for calibration of psychological measures.

Adult↗
PubMed1989

[Motivation and emotional disorders: a cognitive science approach. II: Strategies for intervention].

In this paper, a Cognitive Science theory of motivational cognitive and emotional processes is applied to clinical psychology. We are demonstrating that a dynamic view of psychiatric disturbances and diagnoses can be derived from this theory (part I). In part II it is shown that-as a by-product-the theory allows to classify from a neutral "meta-perspective" different psychotherapeutic approaches in treating motivational and emotional disturbances (e.g., classical behaviour therapy, cognitive psychotherapy, client centered therapy, medical treatments, creative therapies and psychoanalysis). This is illustrated by theoretical analyses and a clinical example. We are intending to contribute to a deeper dialogue between the different psychotherapeutic schools in understanding in detail the communalities and the differences of some psychotherapeutic approaches.

Adult↗
PubMed1995

Bridging theory and practice: cognitive science and medical informatics.

Medical informatics has experienced dramatic growth, both as an applied and as a research discipline in recent years. In this paper, we argue that there is a need to expand the research base to characterize the cognitive dimension of informatics. Theories and methods from cognitive science can provide an effective counterpart to traditional medical informatics in addressing issues of usability of the systems, the processing of information, and the training of physicians. In the first part of the paper, we address the problems inherent in applying basic theories to practice and suggest some potential solutions. The second section deals with epistemological issues that are fundamental to cognitive science research and medical informatics. We then discuss two areas of application of cognitive scientific theories and methods to medical informatics: cognitive evaluation of human computer interface and intelligent medical decision support systems. The paper addresses the progress that has been made thus far and discusses how future cognitive research can facilitate further growth in the development of these applications.

Artificial Intelligence↗
PubMed1996

A cognitive science perspective on kindling and episode sensitization in recurrent affective disorder.

A cognitive science analysis of the interaction between psychological stress and the neurobiology of affective illness highlights a number of mechanisms relevant to the study of recurrence in major depressive disorder. It builds on observations previously offered by Post (1992) regarding the importance of kindling and sensitization effects in determining activation of neural structures, and proposes a model of knowledge structure activation that follows similar parameters. Vulnerability to depressive relapse/recurrence is determined by the increased risk of particular negative patterns of information processing being activated in depressed states. As is found in studies of kindling and behavioural sensitization, the likelihood of cognitive patterns being activated is dependent on the frequency of past usage, and increased reliance on these patterns of processing makes it easier for their future activation to be achieved on the basis of increasingly minimal cues. This model suggests that the processes related to relapse/recurrence and episode onset may not be isomorphic and, as such, treatments that emphasize relapse prevention strategies should take this distinction into account.

Arousal↗
PubMed1990

Towards a developmental cognitive science. The implications of cross-modal matching and imitation for the development of representation and memory in infancy.

This chapter began with a query about whether there was any content to an enterprise called "developmental cognitive science," and if so, whether the findings could inform work in adult cognition and neuropsychology. Both questions can now be answered in the affirmative. Evidence has been marshaled from infant studies concerning five topics of enduring interest in the cognitive and neuro-sciences: cross-modal integration, imitation, the coordination of perception and action, memory, and representation. The data show that young human infants can detect equivalences between information picked up by different sensory modalities. This was demonstrated both in tactual-visual perception of objects and auditory-visual perception of speech. Results also show that perception and production are intertwined literally from the earliest phases of infancy, with 4-month-olds demonstrating vocal imitation and newborns reproducing elementary gestures they saw an adult perform. There seems to be a transparency between the perceptual and motor systems, and it is conceivable that they may draw on the same internal code. Infants' proclivity to imitate was used to investigate early memory. It was found that young infants were not constrained to immediate mimicry, but could imitate after significant delays. The findings support the inference that infants, perhaps as early as birth, have a functioning memory system that cannot be reduced to "habit formation" or an exclusively "procedural memory." It was proposed instead that there is a kernel of some higher level memory system right from the earliest phases of human infancy. This does not imply that there is no development in the representational world of infants. Data were reviewed suggesting that there is a watershed transformation in childhood cognition at about 18 months of age. However, this is not a change from a stage in which there was a purely sensorimotor or habit-based system. Rather the development was characterized as a shift from using empirical or experience-based representations to using hypothetical representations, which concern possible realities. This developmental shift allows children to project into the future "what must be" and deduce from the past "what must have been," in advance of, and sometimes in the absence of, strictly perceptual evidence. This capacity provides the underpinnings for the conduct of science itself. Its origins are to be found in infancy.

Aging↗
PubMed1991

From Freud to cognitive science: a contemporary account of the unconscious.

We present an account of two influential approaches to the unconscious; those of Freud and of cognitive science. It is argued that although Freud's ideas require updating in some respects, in other ways many of them have stood the test of time. We describe the similarities and differences between the two approaches and the attention each pays to innate cognitive and emotional competencies. Finally, we provide a contemporary cognitive account of the unconscious that attempts to combine the best both approaches within an information-processing framework.

Awareness↗
PubMed1998

Interface design for health care environments: the role of cognitive science.

An important challenge in the development of computer-based health care environments is the design of effective user interfaces. In this paper we consider a number of aspects of interface design related to the study of human-computer interaction from a cognitive perspective. It is argued that user interfaces must be designed with consideration of the information requirements, cognitive capabilities and limitations of the end users. Greater concern for fundamental research in design of user interfaces is also needed to complement short-term goals and approaches to improving user interfaces. Towards these objectives, several emerging trends are beginning to have an important impact in the design of health care interfaces. This includes the recognition of the need for iterative design and evaluation of user interfaces, applying theoretical frameworks and methods from cognitive science. An understanding of distributed as well as individual cognition will also become critical in the development of effective user interfaces as access to health care systems becomes increasingly widespread.

Cognition↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Medical informatics and the science of cognition.

Recent developments in medical informatics research have afforded possibilities for great advances in health care delivery. These exciting opportunities also present formidable challenges to the implementation and integration of technologies in the workplace. As in most domains, there is a gulf between technologic artifacts and end users. Since medical practice is a human endeavor, there is a need for bridging disciplines to enable clinicians to benefit from rapid technologic advances. This is turn necessitates a broadening of disciplinary boundaries to consider cognitive and social factors pertaining to the design and use of technology. The authors argue for a place of prominence for cognitive science. Cognitive science provides a framework for the analysis and modeling of complex human performance and has considerable applicability to a range of issues in informatics. Its methods have been employed to illuminate different facets of design and implementation. This approach has also yielded insights into the mechanisms and processes involved in collaborative design. Cognitive scientific methods and theories are illustrated in the context of two examples that examine human-computer interaction in medical contexts and computer-mediated collaborative processes. The framework outlined in this paper can be used to refine the process of iterative design, end-user training, and productive practice.

Cognitive Science↗
PubMed1992

Essentialism and selectionism in cognitive science and behavior analysis.

Contingencies of selection, be they phylogenetic or ontogenetic, merely set boundaries on units; they do not provide blueprints. Thus, variability is fundamental to all products of selection. Skinner, by characterizing the units of analysis in behavior as generic in nature, established his science squarely within the selectionist paradigm, thereby avoiding the tendency, common throughout psychology, to slip into essentialist analyses. The distinction between essentialism and selectionism is refined in this article, and prominent examples of essentialism in linguistics, theories of memory, theories of representation, associationism, and even in behavior analysis are identified. Recent trends in cognitive science--specifically, research on adaptive networks--is amenable to a selectionist interpretation, suggesting the possibility of future fruitful interactions with behavior analysis.

Behaviorism↗
PubMed1999

Medical curriculum reform in North America, 1765 to the present: a cognitive science perspective.

Since 1765, five major curricular reform movements have catalyzed significant changes in North American medical education. This article describes each reform movement in terms of its underlying educational practices and principles, inherent instructional problems, and the innovations that were carried forward. When considering the motivating factors underlying these reform movements, a unifying theme gradually emerges: increasing interest in, attention to, and understanding of the knowledge-base structures and cognitive processes that characterize and distinguish medical experts and novices. Concurrent with this emerging theme is a growing realization that medical educators must call upon and utilize the literature, research methods, and theoretical perspectives of cognitive science if future curricular reform efforts are to move forward efficiently and effectively. The authors hope that the discussion and perspective offered herein will broaden, stimulate, and challenge educators as they strive to create the reform movements that will define 21st-century medical education.

Curriculum↗
PubMed1998

Folk biology and the anthropology of science: cognitive universals and cultural particulars.

This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials, or social groups. These structures are routine products of our "habits of mind," which may in part be naturally selected to grasp relevant and recurrent "habits of the world." An experiment illustrates that the same taxonomic rank is preferred for making biological inferences in two diverse populations: Lowland Maya and Midwest Americans. These findings cannot be explained by domain-general models of similarity because such models cannot account for why both cultures prefer species-like groups, although Americans have relatively little actual knowledge or experience at this level. This supports a modular view of folk biology as a core domain of human knowledge and as a special player, or "core meme," in the selection processes by which cultures evolve. Structural aspects of folk taxonomy provide people in different cultures with the built-in constraints and flexibility that allow them to understand and respond appropriately to different cultural and ecological settings. Another set of reasoning experiments shows that Maya, American folk, and scientists use similarly structured taxonomies in somewhat different ways to extend their understanding of the world in the face of uncertainty. Although folk and scientific taxonomies diverge historically, they continue to interact. The theory of evolution may ultimately dispense with the core concepts of folk biology, including species, taxonomy, and teleology; in practice, however, these may remain indispensable to doing scientific work. Moreover, theory-driven scientific knowledge cannot simply replace folk knowledge in everyday life. Folk-biological knowledge is not driven by implicit or inchoate theories of the sort science aims to make more accurate and perfect.

Aged↗