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Results for “Biological Weapons Convention”

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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMedDate not supplied

Closing loopholes in the Biological Weapons Convention.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti-material agents.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The Biological Weapons Convention after November 2002.

The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, in November 2002, was the first to fail to produce a Final Document. It saw heated debate on non-compliance with the spirit of the prohibitions that it enshrines and marked the collapse of almost ten years of negotiations attempting to create a Protocol to strengthen the Convention. What was to emerge was a new process, very different from the traditional tools of arms control. This article examines the events that culminated in this drastic new approach, details the nature of this new process and discusses the possible short-, medium- and long-term impact of these events on the norm against the weaponization of disease.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Verification of the biological weapons convention: what is needed?

The lack of transparency and verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is one factor behind the current weakening of the ban on biological weapons. Despite recent setbacks, governments need to fill the verification gap so that violations of the BWC can be detected and deterred. Continued talks on a strong verification mechanism for the BWC should aim for an open verification regime and one that is flexible enough to adapt to new technical and political circumstances. Effective monitoring of compliance with the BWC will require concerted effort by governments and civil society.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2005

Disease surveillance and response: update on the biological weapons convention.

At a meeting in Geneva in December 2004, the member States of the Biological Weapons Convention discussed disease surveillance and response in the context of alleged use of biological weapons, disease outbreaks deemed 'suspicious' and naturally occurring outbreaks. The meeting itself had no mandate to direct States to undertake specific actions regarding these issues. However, the discussions indicated that the problem of biological weapons may be shifting away from the traditional arms control paradigm and towards broader notions of disease-based threats to national and international security. In an era of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, security analysts are beginning to recognise that strong public health surveillance and response mechanisms are vital defences during disease outbreaks, whether deliberately caused or of natural

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed1998

Strengthening the biological weapons convention and implications on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.

The development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons are banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Reflecting the realities of the Cold War era in which it was negotiated, the BWC lacks means for compliance verification or enforcement. International efforts to remedy this deficiency are accelerating in the face of evidence that covert biological weapon programs are proliferating at the national and subnational levels.

Bacterial Infections↗
PubMed1990

[Biological weapons--conventions and history].

The UN Convention of 10 April 1972 bans the development, production and storage of biological weapons. Prohibition of their use was already covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Pursuant to Article XII of the 1972 Convention, two follow-up conferences have been held, in 1980 and 1986, and an expert meeting in Geneva in 1987. As a result, the parties to the Convention have agreed to the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific information relevant to biological weapons, open publication of research, and exchange of scientists. Historically, the spread of infections has often been attempted in warfare. Presently, the very rapid development of biotechnology creates a diffuse situation, where the development of biological weapons is quite conceivable. This indicates that our national preparedness concept will have to include preparedness against biological warfare for several more decades.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Investigating disease outbreaks under a protocol to the biological and toxin weapons convention.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons agents or delivery devices for anything other than peaceful purposes. A protocol currently in the final stages of negotiation adds verification measures to the convention. One of these measures will be international investigation of disease outbreaks that suggest a violation of the convention, i.e., outbreaks that may be caused by use of biological weapons or release of harmful agents from a facility conducting prohibited work. Adding verification measures to the current Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will affect the international public health and epidemiology communities; therefore, active involvement of these communities in planning the implementation details of the protocol will be important.

Disease Outbreaks↗
PubMed2000

Varieties of secrets and secret varieties: the case of biotechnology.

This article examines several trends that have combined to veil the new field of biotechnology in secrecy: the transformation of biotechnology from an essentially academic field characterized by strong norms of openness to a field with extensive corporate connections that have reached even to research in leading universities; the establishment of intellectual property rights for life-forms initiated by the landmark Supreme Court decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty; and the limiting of public access to information about the genetically altered organisms whose use in agriculture, industry, and medicine falls under government controls. The article also examines the effects of the U.S. biotechnology industry's demand for secrecy on the negotiations for a protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, particularly the turn from requirements for transparency to protection of opacity with respect to biotechnology and other biological processes, equipment, and production.

Access to Information↗
PubMed1998

Verifying compliance to the biological and toxin weapons convention.

There are difficult technical problems inherent in verifying compliance to the Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention (BWC) that are making it difficult to reach international agreement on a verification protocol. A compliance regime will most likely involve the formation of an Organization for the Prevention of Biological Warfare (OPBW). Based in part on the experience of UNSCOM in Iraq, this article considers the value of establishing an OPBW and the problems that would be faced by such an international organization. It also reviews the types of verification measures that might be applied by the OPBW and their limitations and benefits for deterring biological weapons programs.

Biological Warfare↗