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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1992

Narrowing the zone of uncertainty between research and development in biological warfare defense.

Although "research" is not prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention, States Parties to the Convention have maintained the spirit of the Convention in actions relating to research. The confidence-building measures agreed to at RC2 refer to research facilities, publication of research results, and promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in research related to the Convention. However, assessment of basic research on biological agents is not a productive way to distinguish an offensive from a defensive program. Additionally, if a country were to initiate a biological weapons program, basic research on biological agents may not be necessary. For example, the extensive published research on Bacillus anthracis, both as a cause of anthrax in cattle and other species and as a biological-warfare agent, would enable any motivated group or nation to initiate a biological weapons program that could immediately advance to the development and scale-up stages. Research on biological agents for offensive purposes would be characterized by activities such as selection for growth, virulence, and toxin production; improving stability under varying environmental conditions; and selection of strains that might overcome existing means of prophylaxis and treatment. A biological program with an offensive intent would in most cases be characterized by evidence of development efforts in mass production and dissemination, which are often agent-specific. Thus, an assessment of development may distinguish offensive from defensive programs. If a country were to initiate a biological weapons research program, and were willing to risk worldwide condemnation should existence of such a program become known, it is likely that such a program would include development and production capabilities. If a country were not committed to production capability, there would be no rationale for an offensive biological research that would bring worldwide condemnation. Critics of the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program have suggested that the program could easily and quickly be turned into an offensive effort. To accomplish this, however, we have to assume that all military personnel, including the civilians employed by the Department of the Army, are unethical and willing to break the law and run the risk of placing the U.S. in a noncompliance status. The Army is under constant scrutiny by governmental agencies, by visiting scientists, by audiences at scientific meetings, by scientists who review manuscripts for publications, by news media, and by private citizens.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

Biological Warfare↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Healing or killing?

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed1997

Deterrence of biological and chemical warfare: a review of policy options.

The deployment of biological and chemical weapons by aggressor states is not a hypothetical scenario but a life-threatening contingency. Although Iraq was deterred from using its biological and chemical weapons during Operation Desert Storm, what forms of deterrence must be considered in preventing the use of these weapons of mass destruction in the future? Traditional deterrents against their use have ranged from the threat of a military response to the ratification of diplomatic treaties and agreements. An overall strategy to deter the use of these weapons includes an additional, less frequently discussed approach-force protection-which encompasses defensive biomedical countermeasures (e.g., antibiotics, drugs, vaccines, diagnostic tests) and nonmedical protective devices (e.g., masks, specialized clothing/shelters, detectors). A combined, integrated approach to deterrence is reviewed in this article with regard to current policies and the roles played by Department of Defense research and development programs for biological and chemical defense.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2005

An assessment of health status among medical research volunteers who served in the Project Whitecoat program at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Between 1954 and 1973, more than 2000 men entering military service as conscientious objectors participated in Project Whitecoat as medical research volunteers for the Army's biological warfare defense program. An assessment of self-reported, current health status among 358 "exposed" individuals and 164 unexposed control subjects found no conclusive evidence that receipt of investigational agents was related to adverse health outcomes. No differences in current overall health, current exercise levels, self-reported symptoms, and self-reported medical conditions were seen between the study groups. Possible associations were seen between exposure to antibiotics or other biological agents and self-reported asthma (13.0% vs. 2.4%, relative risk [RR] = 6.00, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.03-34.90, p = 0.050), as well as between receipt of tularemia vaccine(s) and self-reported asthma (13.3% vs. 2.4%, RR = 6.15, 95% CI = 1.03-36.70, p = 0.049) and increased frequency/severity of headaches (35.6% vs. 18.3%, RR = 2.46, 95% CI = 0.99-6.15, p = 0.074). However, the size of the population under study was insufficient to assert with confidence that these statistical associations are real.

Aged↗
PubMed2002

Nuclear, biological, and chemical combined injuries and countermeasures on the battlefield.

The Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute (AFRRI) has developed a research program to determine the major health risks from exposure to ionizing radiation in combination with biological and chemical warfare agents and to assess the extent to which exposure to ionizing radiation compromises the effectiveness of protective drugs, vaccines, and other biological and chemical warfare prophylactic and treatment strategies. AFRRI's Defense Technology Objective MD22 supports the development of treatment modalities and studies to assess the mortality rates for combined injuries from exposure to ionizing radiation and Bacillus anthracis, and research to provide data for casualty prediction models that assess the health consequences of combined exposures. In conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, our research data are contributing to the development of casualty prediction models that estimate mortality and incapacitation in an environment of radiation exposure plus other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the AFFRI research program assesses the effects of ionizing radiation exposure in combination with B. anthracis, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, Shigella sonnei, nerve agents, and mustard as well as their associated treatments and vaccines. In addition, the long-term psychological effects of radiation combined with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) injuries are being evaluated. We are also assessing the effectiveness of gamma photons and high-speed neutrons and electrons for neutralizing biological and chemical warfare agents. New protocols based on our NBC bioeffects experiments will enable U.S. armed forces to accomplish military operations in NBC environments while optimizing both survival and military performance. Preserving combatants' health in an NBC environment will improve warfighting operations and mission capabilities.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2004

Implementation of biosurety systems in a Department of Defense medical research laboratory.

New biosurety regulations and guidelines were implemented in 2003 because of increased concern for the safety and security of biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) that may be used as weapons of mass destruction. Biosurety is defined as the combination of security, biosafety, agent accountability, and personnel reliability needed to prevent unauthorized access to select agents of bioterrorism. These new regulations will lead to increased scrutiny of the use of select biological agents in registered research laboratories, but the regulations may have unintended effects on cost, progress, and perceptions in programs previously considered part of the academic research community. We review the history of biosurety, evolving guidelines, implementation of the regulations, and impacts at the lead research laboratory for medical biological defense for the Department of Defense.

Bioterrorism↗
PubMed1953

Biological warfare.

The use of biological agents as controlled weapons of war is practical although uncertain. Three types of agents are feasible, including pathogenic organisms and biological pests, toxins, and synthetic hormones regulating plant growth. These agents may be chosen for selective effects varying from prolonged incipient illness to death of plants, man and domestic animals. For specific preventive and control measures required to combat these situations, there must be careful and detailed planning. The nucleus of such a program is available within the existing framework of public health activities. Additional research and expansion of established activities in time of attack are necessary parts of biological warfare defense.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed1990

An evolutionary perspective of endotoxin: a signal for a well-adapted defense system.

In the evolutionary view of endotoxin presented here, endotoxin is the primary signal animals use to detect gram negative (Gr-) bacteria. Since endotoxin, or lipopolysaccharide (LPS), is an integral part of the surface of all Gr- bacteria, it was excellent evolutionary 'choice' for the signal. The concept of an 'endotoxin response system' (ERS) is introduced. The ERS protects against Gr- bacteria by employing many of the body's defenses to both detect and react against LPS. The intensity of the response has evolved to maximize protection while minimizing the biological cost and self-damaging effects. The setting of the response, here termed the 'endostat', is programmed by natural selection and fine tuned by feedback mechanisms. Other potentially invasive organisms are detected by different signals, but the effector components of the defenses are similar. This evolutionary view of LPS offers a framework for the seemingly contradictory findings on endotoxin and suggests new avenues of productive research.

Adaptation, Physiological↗
PubMed2005

Variegation of the immune response with dendritic cells and pathogen recognition receptors.

One of the most fundamental questions in biology is: "How do cells differentiate in the right place, at the right time, into the right kinds?" Understanding the phenomenon of cell differentiation in its spatial and temporal framework is a prelude to understanding the development and physiology of all multicellular systems, including the immune system. Insights over the past 2300 years, since Aristotle, suggest that biological differentiation is guided by the interplay between genetic programs and specific environmental signals. This is exemplified by the mammalian immune response to pathogens, where qualitatively different types can emerge. Although it is appreciated that this type immunity is critical for optimal defense against different pathogens, the early "decision-making mechanisms" are largely obscure. Recent developments in innate immunity and genomics, especially in the biology of dendritic cells (DCs) and pathogen recognition receptors, have stimulated intense research in understanding the mechanisms guiding the differentiation of Th1, Th2, and T regulatory responses. In this study, I summarize recent findings which suggest that activation of DCs via distinct pathogen recognition receptors stimulate different gene expression programs and signaling networks in DCs that guide the variegation of immune responses.

Adaptor Proteins, Signal Transducing↗
PubMed2005

Biological threat characterization research: a critical component of national biodefense.

Biological warfare (BW) threat assessments identify and prioritize BW threats to civilian and military populations. In an ideal world, they provide policymakers with clear and compelling guidance to prioritize biodefense research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of countermeasures. Unfortunately, the biodefense community does not exist in an ideal world. National security professionals responsible for crafting BW threat assessments often are challenged by factors that limit the clarity and/or timeliness of those assessments. Moreover, the potential for life science advances to enhance threats enabled by state programs and the possibility that non-state actors may pursue crude but effective BW methodologies will drastically expand the scope of the perceived threat. Appropriate investment of federal biodefense funds will require some mechanism for validating and prioritizing present and future threats. Ideally, such a mechanism will incorporate empirical data targeted to elucidate actual hazards. In this regard, the Department of Homeland Security's creation of a Biological Threat Characterization Program for the technical validation of threat agents will be a valuable addition to the nation's overall biodefense strategy. This article articulates the need for a coordinated national biological threat characterization program, discusses some of the principal challenges associated with such research, and suggests a few options for their resolution.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed1998

Natural defenses and autoprotection: naturotherapy, an old concept of healing in a new perspective.

Recent molecular-biological and molecular-genetic research has shown that important cellular-based autoprotective mechanisms are mediated by heat-shock proteins (HSPs) or stress-response proteins, also called 'chaperones'. This can happen because cells react to extracellular stimuli by activating signal transduction pathways which result in activating the genetic program. Molecular biologists and cardiologists are tempted to evaluate these phenomena in respect to their potential meaning for a better understanding of the complex notions of health and disease. When molecular geneticists or cardiologists talk about autoprotective or natural defense mechanisms, and physicians talk about salutogenesis, they all mean something very specific. The phenomenon seen here belongs to the body's own defense mechanisms which make it capable of reacting to harmful influences and allow it to stabilize a structure and/or function of the body for a certain period. Here we see a connecting link to the historically grounded term self-healing forces, which has challenged medical doctors in the different historical periods of medical science. They tried to explain these effects based on the current model of the organism. Their understanding of this phenomenon played a role in defining the concept of health and disease. Thus, it seems very fitting to look back into history, since the phenomena discussed here as well as the insights into autoprotective mechanisms will continue to influence medical understanding of health and disease.

Animals↗
PubMed2001

History of the development and use of biological weapons.

The United States began its BW program based on intelligence information and a very thorough evaluation of that information by a panel of scientists, engineers, medical personnel from a variety of areas including the military, other government agencies, industry, and the academic community. Initial efforts were directed toward defense against BW, but it soon became clear defense required a knowledge of offensive capabilities. The initial offensive studies started with a definition of what infectious organisms were available, how they could grow in quantities to support a munitions program, what kind of facilities were required, and where they could be positioned. Further studies were then initiated to design and evaluate testing sites and methodologies to evaluate the weapons. During all of these phases, concurrent medical and safety programs were studied, emphasized, and implemented. These studies resulted in the development of a number of vaccines, toxoids, treatments, therapies, and facility personnel management. The US program had one of the lowest, if not the lowest, personnel lost time because of personnel infections. The overall conclusion was that BW, offensive and defensive, was possible, and efficiencies could be obtained. The work accomplished by this group of very dedicated military and civilian personnel at military installations, universities, research institutes, and industrial organizations presented truly a combined operation with numerous achievements. Many of the detailed achievements were published in the open scientific, peer-reviewed journals, and many patents were obtained. The current defensive program is breaking new scientific ground and there is evidence indicating that very rapid detection and identification of BW agents is possible and will be instrumented.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMedDate not supplied

[Signal role of nitric oxide in plants].

Discovery of nitric oxide (NO*) as a key endogenous molecule, which regulates metabolism among very distantly related organisms, stimulated intensive research related to its multiple functions in plants. NO* exerts its cellular effects as toxic agent, metabolism regulator, second messenger during elicitation of different defense responses. It can induce various processes in plants, including programmed cell death, stomatal closure, seed germination and root development. Currently, elucidation of NO* signaling role in regulation of cellular responses is a "hot spot" of modern cell biology.

Nitric Oxide↗