Senior design capstone courses and ABET outcomes.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search PubMed
Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
This paper presents a set of algorithms for robust detection of vasculature in noisy retinal video images. Three methods are studied for effective handling of outliers. The first method is based on Huber's censored likelihood ratio test. The second is based on the use of a alpha-trimmed test statistic. The third is based on robust model selection algorithms. All of these algorithms rely on a mathematical model for the vasculature that accounts for the expected variations in intensity/texture profile, width, orientation, scale, and imaging noise. These unknown parameters are estimated implicitly within a robust detection and estimation framework. The proposed algorithms are also useful as nonlinear vessel enhancement filters. The proposed algorithms were evaluated over carefully constructed phantom images, where the ground truth is known a priori, as well as clinically recorded images for which the ground truth was manually compiled. A comparative evaluation of the proposed approaches is presented. Collectively, these methods outperformed prior approaches based on Chaudhuri et al. (1989) matched filtering, as well as the verification methods used by prior exploratory tracing algorithms, such as the work of Can et aL (1999). The Huber censored likelihood test yielded the best overall improvement, with a 145.7% improvement over the exploratory tracing algorithm, and a 43.7% improvement in detection rates over the matched filter.
The Government in the UK is encouraging consumerism within health care and is requiring Health Authorities to consult with the public on prioritisation of resources. Public consultation within the National Health Service (NHS) has had limited success in the past. Many of the techniques used are flawed. Despite the limited scope of the public surveys conducted so far, a number of themes have emerged: a willingness to pay for experimental, 'high-tech' life-saving treatments rather than more cost-effective treatments which will improve quality of life, which are more likely to maximise utility from the scarce resources available; preference for treating the young rather than the old; preference for treating patients with dependents (e.g. spouse, children) rather than those who have none; a willingness to discriminate against those patients who were partially responsible for their illness due to choice of 'unhealthy' lifestyle (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking excess alcohol). These public preferences raise ethical problems. For example, is it just to spend more on heroic treatments which are likely to fail? Is there a right to health care irrespective of whether you have had 'a fair innings' or whether a patient is in part responsible for their illness due to an unhealthy lifestyle? If there are ethical concerns about these preferences, should health authorities consult with the public at all? Is human life and suffering incommensurable, and hence is it impossible to prioritise anyway? Some of the ethical consequences of using empirical data on public preferences are discussed.
The Principle of Agency says that if it would be good for a state of affairs to occur "naturally," then it is permissable to take action to bring it about. This contradicts the views of some bioethicists, who object to euthanasia, in vitro fertilization, and cloning, even though they acknowledge that the states of affairs produced are good. But the principle, or some form of it, seems inescapable. The opposite view -- that we may not, by our action, reproduce "natural" goods -- may owe its appeal to an implicitly religious view of nature.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Increasing awareness of the importance of the biodiversity of the whole global biosphere has led to further awareness that the problems which arise in connection with preservation and exploitation of our planet's biodiversity are best tackled from a global perspective. The 'Biodiversity Convention' and the 'Human Genome Project' are some of the concrete attempts at such globalisation. But, while these efforts are certainly very good at the intentional level and on paper, there is, at the practical level of implementation, the danger that globalisation may simply translate into westernisation, given the Western world's dominance and will to dominate the rest of the globe. How is 'global bioethics' to be possible in a world inhabited by different cultural groups whose material situation, powers, ideas, experiences and attitudes differ rather markedly and who are not, in any case, equally represented in globalisation efforts and fora? One index of the pertinence of this question is that talk about biodiversity, biotechnology, biotrade etc. is being increasingly matched by talk about biopiracy, biorade, biocolonialism etc. In this paper, I attempt to explore and develop these very general concerns.
This paper reports on a UK social science and anthropological study into the debates surrounding xenotransplantation (XT), involving interviews and focus group discussions across a number of different stakeholders (scientists, regulators and publics--including patient groups and other lay participants). In these discussions, one image in particular--that of 'earmouse'--surfaced repeatedly in consideration of XT and allied areas of bioscience. Whilst the image itself has little technically in common with XT or transgenic biotechnologies, it has nevertheless become ineradicably connected with them. This paper seeks to make sense of earmouse as an iconic reference through which people articulate their differing and highly contested views on bioscience.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
My paper consists of three parts. In the first part I try to explain the intellectual basis of bioethics in developing countries. In the second part I describe the bioethical dilemmas facing these countries. In the third part I shall discuss the changes that have to be made in bioethics if it is to take root in these countries, and thereby help them to improve the human existence.
Do physicians have a duty to sustain the pregnancies of women who die during the first or second trimester? Physicians cannot simply assume that the woman would have wished the pregnancy to continue, nor (in the U.S., at any rate) is it clear that the state has any interest in fetal life before viability. The conditions for beneficence-based duties of fetal rescue will often be unmet, both because sustaining the pregnancy is not always a clear gain to the born child and because it may impose a substantial burden on the benefactor. And duties of special relationship cannot readily be applied in these cases, as it is difficult to see how the relationship between someone who no longer exists and someone who does not yet exist can breed special duties. Further, to draw on Marx's distinction between the architect, who builds purposefully, and the bee, who cannot help what she is doing, I argue that human pregnancy is in a number of respects purposeful, creative, and deliberate, and that postmortem pregnancy, which follows the model of the bee, is a destructive icon that undercuts women's agency.
There are a number of arguments that purport to show, in general terms, that there is no difference between killing and letting die. These are used to justify active euthanasia on the basis of the reasons given for allowing patients to die. I argue that the general and abstract arguments fail to take account of the complex and particular situations which are found in the care of those with terminal illness. When in such situations, there are perceptions and intuitions available that do not easily find propositional form but lead most of those whose practice is in the care of the dying to resist active euthanasia. I make a plea for their intuitions to be heeded above the sterile voice of abstract premises and arguments by examining the completeness of the outline form of the pro-euthanasia argument. In doing so, I make use of Nussbaum's discussion of moral perception and general claims to be found in the literature of moral particularism.
In The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgery, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise the arguments that have been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels' fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels' account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.