[On the constellation pathology of episodic obsession syndromes in old age. A contribution to the theory of symptomatic obsession].
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This paper follows the hypothesis that differentiation between obsessive compulsive disorder and schizophrenia is possible only by focusing on the single phenomenon of obsession. The declaration of a nosological specificity of obsession is set against the current view of ICD-10 and DSM-IV, of obsession as a ubiquitous nonspecific phenomenon appearing with comorbidities. The historic development of these two most different views of obsession and their combination is explained. The distinction between obsessive compulsive disorder and schizophrenia can be made at the psychopathologic dividing line between obsession and delusional thoughts. Examination of the literature on the transition from obsessive compulsive disorder into schizophrenia shows that there is no clear link between obsession and schizophrenia.
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The similarity between positive and negative intrusive thoughts is considered for both recently occurring, personally relevant intrusions and for the same intrusions occurring during an experimental task involving self-monitoring. The results indicate that positive and negative intrusions differ in most respects. There was evidence that increasing the frequency of negative thinking is associated with a deterioration of mood. In a subsequent experiment, induced happy and sad moods were shown to differentially affect frequency of intrusions in a fashion consistent with mood congruency effects previously found in experiments on the effect of mood on memory. The implications of these findings for disorders involving the experience of intrusive thoughts such as OCD and depression are discussed.
Several studies have suggested that worry and obsessional symptoms are systematically associated. In the present study, the relationship between worry and obsessional symptoms was confirmed. Measures included a worry content measure, a worry visual analogue scale, a modification of the everyday checking behaviours scale, and the MOCI. Worry was found to be more consistently associated with checking and doubting, than washing and slowness. It is suggested that worry and obsessional symptoms both occur in response to stress. In addition, it is suggested that worry and checking are functionally similar, and Generalised Anxiety Disorder may represent a 'cognitive' variant of obsessional checking.
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The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input account of perseverative checking. Using an analogue checking task, both experiments showed that perseveration, as indicted by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by the configuration of the stop rule for the task and mood at the outset of checking. Perseveration was most significant in the condition that most closely resembled the characteristics of obsessive-compulsive checkers (negative mood combined with a stop rule that specifies that the task should be done as thoroughly as possible--namely, an 'as many as can' stop rule). The studies also indicated that confidence at having completed the checking task successfully was (1) significantly related to the use of 'as many as can' stop rules at the outset of checking, (2) mood ratings at the end of checking, and (3) checking perseveration generally. These findings provide support for a mood-as-input explanation of perseverative psychopathologies such as compulsive checking, and begin to cast some light on how anxiety-reduction and 'confidence' models of compulsive checking, might be explained within broader mechanisms of perseveration.
An experiment was carried out in order to test the hypothesis that feelings of mental pollution can be induced without physical contact. A sample of 121 female university undergraduates were asked to imagine experiencing a non-consensual kiss at a party, as described on an audiotape, or a consensual kiss described on a comparable audiotape. The manipulation succeeded and participants in the non-consensual kiss condition reported significant feelings of mental pollution, negative emotions and cognitions, as well as the urge to wash. Further, eight participants in the non-consensual kiss condition engaged in washing/rinsing behaviour to counteract feelings of mental pollution. The results are consistent with the hypothesis and with reports from an earlier study of victims of sexual assault, a majority of whom described feelings of mental pollution post-assault. The results are also compatible with case descriptions of the onset of mental pollution and OCD subsequent to sexual trauma. Some possible implications of the results, clinical and theoretical are adumbrated.
Contemporary cognitive approaches to obsession assume that the content of clinical obsessions does not differ from non-clinical obsessive intrusions. This assumption goes back to a classic study by Rachman and De Silva [(1978). Abnormal and normal obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16, 233-248]. In the present paper, it is argued that Rachman and De Silva did not postulate a complete indifference between clinical and non-clinical obsessions. Study 1 is a simple statistical analysis of data presented by Rachman and De Silva. This analysis suggested that psychologists are able to discriminate clinical and non-clinical obsessions beyond chance level, merely by looking at the content of obsessions. In study 2, a list of 23 clinical and 47 non-clinical obsessions was presented to 11 psychotherapists and 90 psychology undergraduates. Both therapists and students were able to distinguish clinical and non-clinical obsession beyond chance level. It is concluded that some clinical obsessions can be identified as being evidently abnormal, and that additional theory and research is needed to identify the causes of these recognisable obsessions.
There are many open questions about the phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) in the elderly, and theories about the development of OCD have rarely been applied to older populations. The current study uses structural equation models to evaluate the relationship between obsessional beliefs and OCD symptoms across young and older adult age groups in a large community sample (aged 18-93; N=335), and to examine whether subjective concerns about cognitive decline partially mediate this relationship. Results support partial mediation, and follow-up analyses suggest that the pattern of relationships among subjective cognitive concerns, obsessional beliefs and OCD symptoms is invariant for younger and older adults, but older adults report relatively greater levels of subjective cognitive concerns.
Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) assume that clinical obsessions evolve from some modalities of intrusive thoughts (ITs) that are experienced by the vast majority of the population. These approaches also consider that the differences between "abnormal" obsessions and "normal" ITs rely on quantitative parameters rather than qualitative. The present paper examines the frequency, contents, emotional impact, consequences, cognitive appraisals and control strategies associated with clinical obsessions in a group of 31 OCD patients compared with the obsession-relevant ITs in three control groups: 22 depressed patients, 31 non-obsessive anxious patients, and 30 non-clinical community subjects. Between-group differences indicated that the ITs frequency, the unpleasantness and uncontrollability of having the IT, and the avoidance of thought triggers obtained the highest effect sizes, and they were specific to OCD patients. Moreover, two dysfunctional appraisals (worry that the thought will come true, and the importance of controlling thoughts) were specific to OCD patients. The OCD and depressed patients shared some dysfunctional appraisals about their most disturbing obsession or IT (guilt, unacceptability, likelihood thought would come true, danger, and responsibility for having the IT), whereas the non-obsessive anxious were nearer to the non-clinical participants than to the other two groups of patients. The OCD patients showed an increased use of thought control strategies, with overt neutralizing, thought suppression, and searching for reassurance being highly specific to this group.
We evaluated the prevalence of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and we investigated the hypothesis that obsessionality may represent a trait in TLE. Eighty-two consecutive patients with epilepsy, 62 with TLE and 20 with idiopathic generalized epilepsy (IGE), and 82 matched healthy controls were evaluated using the SCID-IP, Y-BOCS, MMPI-2 (specifically the Psychasthenia and Obsessiveness scales), BDI, and STAI Y1 and Y2. Nine of the TLE patients, none of the IGE patients, and one of the controls had a diagnosis of OCD. Psychasthenia and Obsessiveness scores were significantly higher in the TLE than in the IGE and control groups. Patients with TLE and OCD differed significantly with respect to history of depression when compared with patients with TLE without OCD, whereas there were no differences in age at onset and duration of epilepsy, seizure pattern and frequency, MRI features, laterality of the EEG focus, antiepileptic drug therapy and combinations, and BDI scores.
Patients' deliberate concealment from others of the content and frequency of their obsessions is a common and important aspect of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). It is an overlooked manifestation of the safety behaviour that is believed to sustain OCD (e.g., neutralizing, thought suppression, avoidance behaviour, concealment). The phenomenon of concealment is understandable in terms of the cognitive theory of obsessions which states that obsessions are caused when the person attaches catastrophic personal significance to their unwanted intrusive thoughts. It is suggested that the selected, planned, suitable disclosure of obsessions can be therapeutic--presumably because it exposes the patient to alternative interpretations of the significance of the unwanted thoughts.
Rachman (Rachman, S. (1993). Obsessions, responsibility, and guilt. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 149-154) suggested that patients with OCD may interpret thoughts as having special importance, thus experiencing thought-action fusion (TAF). Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (Shafran, R., Thordarson, D. S. & Rachman, S. (1996). Thought-action fusion in obsessive compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 710, 379-391) developed a questionnaire (TAF) and found that obsessives scored higher than non-obsessives on the measure. In the current study, we modified the TAF to include a scale that assessed the "likelihood of events happening to others" as well as ratings of the responsibility and cost for having these thoughts. Replicating previous findings, we found that individuals with OC symptoms gave higher ratings to the likelihood of negative events happening as a result of their negative thoughts. Individuals with OC symptoms also rated the likelihood that they would prevent harm by their positive thoughts higher than did individuals without OC symptoms. These results suggest that the role of thought-action fusion in OCs may extend to exaggerated beliefs about thoughts regarding the reduction of harm.
The present study examined thought-action fusion (TAF) in a large sample of normal adolescents (n=427). Participants completed the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents (TAFQ-A) and scales measuring trait anxiety, symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder, other anxiety disorders, and depression. Results showed that the TAFQ-A is a reliable instrument assessing two dimensions of TAF, viz. Morality (i.e., the belief that unacceptable thoughts are morally equivalent to overt actions) and Likelihood (i.e., the belief that thinking of an unacceptable or disturbing situation will increase the probability that that situation actually occurs). Furthermore, TAF was not only associated with symptoms of OCD, but also with symptoms of other anxiety disorders and depression. However, when controlling for levels of trait anxiety, most connections between TAF and anxiety disorders symptoms disappeared. Symptoms of OCD and generalised anxiety remained significantly related to TAF. Altogether, the data are supportive of the notion that TAF is involved in a broad range of anxiety disorders and in particular OCD.
The present study examined the hypothesis, stimulated by the looming vulnerability model of anxiety (Riskind, in press, Behaviour Research and Therapy), that subclinical OCD is associated with a subjective sense of looming vulnerability. One-hundred and four undergraduates rated vignettes of common, everyday situations involving exposure to possible dirt, germs, or contamination. Participants in a subclinical obsessional group had a far higher sense of looming vulnerability to spreading contamination than did those in a control group. Results verified that the subjective sense of looming vulnerability still had separate, distinct and significant contributions to fear-of-contamination symptoms, with the effects of cognitive appraisals of other aspects of threat (such as probability of harm, or lack of control) removed. In contrast, these other cognitive appraisals had no significant associations with symptoms that proved to be independent of the subjective sense of looming vulnerability. A path analysis further explored the dependency of these other cognitive appraisals on looming vulnerability. This analysis found that part of the effects of the subjective sense of looming vulnerability on fears may be indirect and mediated via correlated effects of other cognitive appraisals.