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PubMed2001

Ethics counselors as a new priesthood.

The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the thesis that ethics counselors constitute a new priesthood in the pejorative sense of this term. In defense of the thesis, an account is given of the diverse variety of fundamental ideas about ethics or morality. The underlying argument is simply that there is such a diversity of opinion about so many fundamental issues that most ethical appraisals, especially in committees, are probably very shallow and barely warranted. Following this negative work, an attempt is made to try to find some positive benefits from the work of ethics counselors. Some potential benefits are identified, but there is a need for empirical research in order to construct a more persuasive case for such work. In the penultimate section of the paper I addressed some of my own second thoughts about the discussion and some provocative suggestions that friends gave me about earlier drafts.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2000

Medical informatics and the concept of disease.

This paper attempts to address the general question whether information technologies, as applied in the area of medicine and health care, have or are likely to change fundamental concepts regarding disease and health. After a short excursion into the domain of medical informatics I provide a brief overview of some of the current theories of what a disease is from a more philosophical perspective, i.e. the "value free" and "value laden" view of disease. Next, I consider at some length, whether health care informatics is currently modifying fundamental concepts of disease. To this question I will answer largely in the negative, and I will provide the sketch of some arguments from current research programs in medical informatics why I think this is the case. This argumentation is supported by a detailed account of how the disease profile for beriberi heart disease, used in one of the major medical informatics diagnostic programs, QMR (and its ancestor INTERNIST-1), was developed, and why at least this program essentially follows received views of traditional medicine. The one main exception to the conformity of this program to "received" views of a disease occurs when the program's designers need to fine-tune a disease definition. This fine-tuning is to comport with the expert's perspective on the disease, including his or her epistemic values, as well as the program's other resources for diagnosing components of a disease.

Beriberi↗
PubMed2000

Gadamerian dialogue in the patient-professional interaction.

In his seminal work, Truth and Method, the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer distinguishes between three types of what he calls the experience of the 'Thou'. In this paper, Gadamer's analysis of this experience is explained in terms of his philosophical hermeneutics and brought to bear upon the patient-professional relationship. It is argued that while Gadamer's analysis implies fruitful insights for a dialogical account of the patient-professional interaction, it harbours elements which are conducive to paternalistic practice of medicine. The strong attribution of value to tradition and the respect for authority emphasized in his theory result in a lack of sensitivity for individual self-determination which is needed for a successful account of the patient-professional relationship.

Communication↗
PubMed1998

The significance of prognosis for a theory of medical practice.

A typical problem of modern medicine results from the gap between scientific knowledge and its application in individual cases. Whereas scientific knowledge is generalized and impersonal information, medical practice takes place under conditions which are singular, individual and irreversible. The paper examines whether prognosis is able to bridge this gap or "hiatus theoreticus". It is shown that diagnosis of a single case always relies on prognostic considerations. The individual prognosis (as distinguished from the nosologic prognosis of a certain disease) enables doctors to apply scientific knowledge and practice according to the actual situation, the history and personal preferences of the patient. Prognosis--not diagnosis--therefore legitimizes medical interference. A methodology of individual prognosis as the basis for a theory of practice is discussed.

Decision Making↗
PubMed1998

The desire for health and the promises of medicine.

The varieties of meaning in which we use the terms illness and health requires that we developed a conceptualization allowing us to maintain a unity between the differences. In fact, the experiences of health and illness are complex ones and they need to be understood in their different levels so that the need for help of patients and their desire for health is adequately faced. At its roots, the experience of illness is that of a threat posed to the unreflective credit given to life in good health. This threat has not only a biopsychosocial dimension, but a moral and symbolic one as well, and it is mainly at this level that illness represents a moral challenge. Contemporary culture seems to be at pains in suggesting a shared set of meanings enabling the patient to give an intersubjectively valid sense of illness, since the only kind of answer offered is a technical one. The symbolic dimension of the notions of health and illness call for a deeper cultural enterprise of looking for a credible sense of illness for our times.

Attitude to Health↗
PubMed1998

Hermeneutics and experiences of the body. The case of low back pain.

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the notion of clinical medicine as a hermeneutical enterprise and to bridge the gap between the general perspectives of hermeneutics and the particularities of medical practice. The case of a patient with low back pain is analyzed. The discussion centers around the metaphor of "the patient as a text" and a model of five social discourses about low back pain. The problems addressed are: (1) the nature of a moral experience, (2) the variety of available texts, (3) the difference between the doctor's and patient's narratives, and (4) the patient's and doctor's responsibility regarding the existential, biographical meaning of an illness. Although many problems are left unsolved, it is argued that from a philosophical point of view the notion of medicine as a hermeneutical enterprise opens up the possibility of gaining insight in the foundations of the clinical encounter.

Adult↗
PubMed1998

Suffering and the goals of medicine.

Taking as its starting point a recent statement of the Goals of Medicine published by the Hastings Centre, this paper argues against the dualistic distinction between pain and suffering. It uses an Aristotelian conception of the person to suggest that malady, pain, and disablement are objective forms of suffering not dependent upon any state of consciousness of the victim. As a result, medicine effectively relieves suffering when it cures malady and relieves pain. There is no medical mission to confront the spiritual condition of the patient.

Disease↗
PubMed1999

Hermeneutics and the philosophy of medicine: Hans-Georg Gadamer's platonic metaphor.

Taking as our starting point Plato's metaphor of the doctor as philosopher we reflect on some aspects of the epistemological status of medicine. The framework to this paper is the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer which shows the paradoxical nature of Western medicine in choosing the body-object as its investigative starting point, while in actual fact dealing with subjects. Gadamer proposes a model of medicine as the art of understanding and dialogue, which is capable of bringing together its various constituent parts, i.e. knowledge, knowing how to do and knowing how to be, in medical practice and in the physician's training. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the dyadic figure of the physician as Platonic "master of the living totality" and wounded healer, capable of activating the patient's self-healing capacity.

Art↗
PubMed1999

Moral perception and the pursuit of medical philosophy.

This paper begins by examining the claim that the practice of medicine is essentially a moral endeavor. According to this view, all clinical practice has moral content, and each clinical situation has a moral dimension. I suggest that in order to recognize this moral dimension, clinicians must engage in an interpretive process, and that they must be able to interpret clinical data in ethical terms. However, clinicians often lack the 'moral perception' required to appreciate this moral dimension. I will argue that physicians lack moral perception when the clinical data they are given do not offer sufficient opportunity for interpretation. This paper draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty to suggest that this loss of interpretation is, paradoxically, the result of the way that patients experience illness. This thesis may be productive, first, because it suggests opportunities to explore the process of moral perception. This thesis also suggests ways for ethicists and educators to enhance clinicians' perception of the ethical dimensions of clinical practice. Finally, the concept of moral perception, when grounded in the patient's experience of illness, creates a fruitful area of inquiry that warrants inclusion in what may someday be the philosophy of medicine's canon.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2000

Intention and responsibility in double effect cases.

I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of the acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples.

Abortion, Therapeutic↗
PubMed1999

Towards an ethics of immediacy. A defense of a noncontractual foundation of the care giver-patient relationship.

In this article, I argue that the relationship between patients and their health care providers need not be construed as a contract between moral strangers. Contrary to the (American) legal presumption that health care providers are not obligated to assist others in need unless the latter are already contracted patients of record, I submit that the presence of a suffering human being constitutes an immediate moral commandment to try to relieve such suffering. This thesis is developed in reference to the French philosopher Levinas and the Dutch theologian Schillebeeckx. An expanded version of the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan serves as test case.

Contracts↗
PubMed1998

Interpreting the notion that technology is value-neutral.

Value-freedom or value-neutrality is a well-known topic in the philosophy of science. But what about the value-neutrality of technology, medical or other? Is it too far-fetched to imagine technology as in some sense value-neutral--in view of its intimate connection with purposeful human action? No; unexpected perhaps, but less far-fetched than expected. If we try to conceive of technology as a cognitive possibility abstracted from each and every specific social context, we shall find (at least) three senses in which it may be regarded as value-neutral: (1) neutral vis-à-vis different possible uses and ends; (2) neutral before action; (3) neutral qua cognitive object, analogous to the cognitive core of science. The further meanings and implications of these three senses of value-neutrality are discussed. What is this exercise good for? The nature of technology is indeed worth pondering in its own right, not least from this rather unusual angle. But beyond that: as the possible meanings of value-neutrality are tried out, the radical nature of human responsibility for the social implementation of technology will be highlighted.

Diffusion of Innovation↗