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At least 145 records · Page 8Linked to original sources
PubMed1994

Statistical analysis of HIV seropositive results from 1988-1993 performed on life insurance applicants.

This review of statistical data, derived from HIV antibody testing performed on life insurance applicants over a period of five and one-half years, reflects the evolving nature of the HIV epidemic in the United States and demonstrates how the findings in the life insurance low risk population mirror the trends and changes that are occurring in the general population.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed1994

[Cause of death statistics (I). Resources for risk evaluation in life insurance?].

Vital statistics as they are generally used are of no help for evaluation of risks in life insurance since they are biased by the high number of the elderly population beyond age 70. Therefore the causes of death were compiled for the age groups from 15 to 70 that are of importance in life insurance. Tumors are the number one cause of death and not cardiovascular diseases which so far have been considered to be the number one. They take second place. Even in the male population cardiovascular diseases are the number one cause of death only from age 60 on upwards. Further cross-sectioning according to decades of age shows the typical causes of death for any particular age group. Below age 30 non-natural causes s. a. accident and suicide take with over 50 per cent first place. Females have a much lower mortality as is generally known; they contribute only one third to the overall mortality of the age group under consideration.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1995

Genetic information and life insurance: a proposal for an ethical European policy.

Developments in molecular biology will enable development of tests for genetic predisposition to multifactorial diseases. People identified with increased risk might be able to prevent or delay the onset of illness by medical treatment and/or changing their environmental exposure. But tests might also help organizations, such as employers, insurers, and government bodies, to minimize their future economic risks. This article searches for an ethical and feasible European policy for the use of genetic information in life insurance. It first argues that genetic information is not so relevantly different from at least one other kind of medical information, that of HIV infection, that it justifies unlike policy treatment. European life insurance is then claimed to be a non-primary social good which should be handled by the private market. The problem of adverse selection is argued to be a reasonably serious threat. Insurers should therefore be allowed to demand some genetic risk information in order to secure the sustainability of insurance schemes. However, the moral principles and values of autonomy, privacy, non-discrimination, non-deterrence, solidarity and confidentiality, put limits on insurers justified information demands. The article ends up advocating a regime of limited community-rated private life insurance, first proposed by a Dutch committee. It stipulates that insurers should be forbidden to demand genetic tests as a condition for an insurance contract, but be allowed to ask for existing genetic information when the sought insurance cover is above a certain limit.

Confidentiality↗
PubMed1995

Genetic information and life insurance.

Genetic testing will become the future standard of medical care. Life insurers will also need access to genetic information if the insurance industry is to survive intact and if cover is to remain affordable.

Genetic Diseases, Inborn↗
PubMed1998

Genetic discrimination in life insurance: empirical evidence from a cross sectional survey of genetic support groups in the United Kingdom.

OBJECTIVES: To gather empirical evidence on any discrimination based on genetic information shown by the insurance industry in the United Kingdom and to assess how society is likely to handle future genetic information from tests for polygenic multifactorial conditions. DESIGN: Postal questionnaire survey. SUBJECTS: Sample (n=7000) of members from seven British support groups for families with genetic disorders and a representative sample (n=1033) of the general public who answered questions on applying for life insurance as part of an omnibus survey. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Subjects were asked about their experiences with insurers, the medical profession, employers, and social services. Experiences with insurers are reported here. RESULTS: Altogether 33.4% of the study group had problems when applying for life insurance compared with 5% of applicants in the omnibus survey. Thirteen per cent of study respondents from subgroups who represented no adverse actuarial risk on genetic grounds reported that their treatment by insurers seemed to represent unjustified genetic discrimination. CONCLUSIONS: Life insurers may not be operating a consistent policy for assessing genetic information or acting in accord with the actuarial risks brought to them. The inconsistency suggests error rather than a corporate policy of discrimination based on genetic characteristics. Any future proposals for genetic testing for common or multifactorial disorders should be examined carefully.

Age of Onset↗