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A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism. We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a naïve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.
Many theories of mental health agree on the important role played by cognition. They differ however in how and by what process cognition influences mental health. Research in cognitive neuroscience directs our attention to 4 major points as relevant to theories of mental health: (1) monism as a framework, (2) issue of neural plasticity, (3) connection between mental operation and action system (i.e., the control of cognitive and motor activity is shared by the same neural connection.), (4) the issue of the unconscious. On the other hand, research in cross-cultural psychology indicates that cognitive process is strongly influenced by cultural values and norms. Thus, a valid mental health theory should account for all these components. The paper discusses cross-cultural differences in information processing, particularly contrasting East Asian and Western cultural contexts, which may have implications for understanding of mental health and suggests the doctrine of Morita Therapy as a possible integrated theory. It also critiques some therapy techniques on the grounds of both cultural psychology and cognitive science.
The development of urine diagnostics has been well examined historiographically. However, its importance for science studies has not yet been stressed enough. As a diagnostic tool, that survived many centuries, it underwent several changes. Therefore, its use for science studies is exemplarily displayed in this paper. An attempt is made by the authors to combine questions of the history of science with methods from the cognitive sciences. The reader is introduced into an interdisciplinary approach aiming at the visualisation of scientific shifts to make a deeper analyse of such shifts possible. Lawrence Barsalou proposed a dynamic frame model to represent cognitive structures. This model is used to reconstruct scientific revolutions (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) as well as barely noticeable shifts (in the sense of Ludwik Fleck's shifting thought styles). The value of this approach for the history of medicine in general and the history of uroscopy in special is discussed.
This paper outlines several aspects of the integration of basic sciences into the predoctoral dental curriculum. It addresses a number of the points or questions posed by the organizers of the Third Educational Conference to Develop the Curriculum in Temporomandibular Disorders and Orofacial Pain. The importance of the basic sciences for a comprehensive overview of knowledge bearing on temporomandibular disorders and orofacial pain is first emphasized, followed by considerations of what material should be taught and by whom. The paper concludes by considering at what stage of the curriculum this material should be included, how the pertinent basics sciences should be taught, and under what circumstances. Under the term "basic sciences" are included not only relevant biomedical or biologic sciences such as physiology and anatomy, but also the behavioral sciences such as psychology and cognitive science.
This article summarizes recent conceptual and empirical advances in understanding basic affective processes of hte mammalian brain and how we might distinguish affective from cognitive processes. Six reasons are advanced for distinguishing the two types of consciousness, including (i) the presence of experienced valence, (ii) cortical sub-cortical locus of control, (iii) different developmental trajectories, (iv) informational vs organic considerations, (v) differences in bodily expressions, (vi) differences in cerebral laterality. The position is advanced that to make progress on understanding the neurobiological nature of affect, we need to utilize experimental strategies different from those that are common in cognitive science.
The subject of this article is the frame problem, as conceived by certain cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, notably Fodor for whom it stands as a fundamental obstacle to progress in cognitive science. The challenge is to explain the capacity of so-called informationally unencapsulated cognitive processes to deal effectively with information from potentially any cognitive domain without the burden of having to explicitly sift the relevant from the irrelevant. The paper advocates a global workspace architecture, with its ability to manage massively parallel resources in the context of a serial thread of computation, as an answer to this challenge. Analogical reasoning is given particular attention, since it exemplifies informational unencapsulation in its most extreme form. Because global workspace theory also purports to account for the distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing, the paper advances the tentative conclusion that consciousness may go hand-in-hand with a solution to the frame problem in the biological brain.
Analogy is a powerful cognitive mechanism that people use to make inferences and learn new abstractions. The history of work on analogy in modern cognitive science is sketched, focusing on contributions from cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of science. This review sets the stage for the 3 articles that follow in this Science Watch section.
OBJECTIVE: An evaluation of the cognitive processes used in the translation of a clinical guideline from text into an encoded form so that it can be shared among medical institutions. DESIGN: A comparative study at three sites regarding the generation of individual and collaborative representations of a guideline for the management of encephalopathy using the GuideLine Interchange Format (GLIF) developed by members of the InterMed Collaboratory. MEASUREMENTS: Using theories and methods of cognitive science, the study involves a detailed analysis of the cognitive processes used in generating representations in GLIF. The resulting process-outcome measures are used to compare subjects with various types of computer science or clinical expertise and from different institutions. RESULTS: Consistent with prior studies of text comprehension and expertise, the variability in strategies was found to be dependent on the degree of prior experience and knowledge of the domain. Differing both in content and structure, the representations developed by physicians were found to have additional information and organization not explicitly stated in the guidelines, reflecting the physicians' understanding of the underlying pathophysiology. The computer scientists developed more literal representations of the guidelines; addition were mostly limited to specifications mandated by the logic of GLIF itself. Collaboration between physicians and computer scientists resulted in consistent representations that were more than the sum of the separate parts, in that both domain-specific knowledge of medicine and generic knowledge of guideline structure were seamlessly integrated. CONCLUSION: Because of the variable construction of guideline representations, understanding the processes and limitations involved in their generation is important in developing strategies to construct shared representations that are both accurate and efficient. The encoded guidelines developed by teams that include both clinicians and experts in computer-based representations are preferable to those developed by individuals of either type working alone.
The unity of psychology as a science is to be found in its definition as the science of mental life, and its explanation of individual behavior in terms of mental states. This disciplinary focus will help negotiate psychology's relations with other disciplines, such as neuroscience and cognitive science. The unity within psychology between science and practice is to be found in a focus on scientific evidence as the source of the status, autonomy, and privileges of professional practitioners. Psychology should avoid the temptations of reductionism, and assert (and enjoy) its twin status as both a biological science and a social science.
The appeal of simple algorithms that take account of both the constraints of human cognitive capacity and the structure of environments has been an enduring theme in cognitive science. A novel version of such a boundedly rational perspective views the mind as containing an 'adaptive toolbox' of specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems. Although intuitively appealing, when this version was proposed, empirical evidence for the use of such heuristics was scant. I argue that in the light of empirical studies carried out since then, it is time this 'vision of rationality' was revised. An alternative view based on integrative models rather than collections of heuristics is proposed.
Modularity is a concept central to cognitive science, and Fodor's analysis of cognitive modularity in his book The Modularity Of Mind has been widely influential - but also widely misunderstood. It is often claimed that the possession of some or other system-property is a necessary condition for that system to be modular in Fodor's sense, but Fodor made it clear that he was not proposing a definition of modularity, nor proposing any necessary conditions for the applicability of the term. He was simply suggesting a number of system properties that are typical of modular systems. I argue that it is nevertheless possible to derive a useful definition of modularity from the kinds of arguments put forward by Fodor: A cognitive system is modular when and only when it is domain-specific. Given any such proposed module, the other features of modularity discussed by Fodor should be dealt with as empirical issues: for each feature (innateness, for example), it is an empirical question whether or not the proposed module has that feature.
Normative-IQ individuals with autism are capable of solving explicit social cognitive problems at a level that is not matched by their ability to meet the demands of everyday social situations. The magnitude of this discrepancy is now being documented through newer techniques such as eye tracking, which allows us to see and measure how individuals with autism search for meaning when presented with naturalistic social scenes. This paper offers an approach to social cognitive development intended to address the above discrepancy, which is considered a key element for any understanding of the pathophysiology of autism. This approach, called the enactive mind (EM), originates from the emerging work on 'embodied cognitive science', a neuroscience framework that views cognition as bodily experiences accrued as a result of an organism's adaptive actions upon salient aspects of the surrounding environment. The EM approach offers a developmental hypothesis of autism in which the process of acquisition of embodied social cognition is derailed early on, as a result of reduced salience of social stimuli and concomitant enactment of socially irrelevant aspects of the environment.
The choreutic conception of kinesthetic-motor space originally proposed by Rudolf Laban is given psychological validation through comparisons with similar conceptual models in spatial cognition and motor control research. Highly differentiated systems of reference are distinguished. Spatial paths are mentally represented as a series of locations linked into polygonal trajectories. Map-like images of the kinesphere' are structured with polyhedral networks. A fundamental practice consists of transforming spatial information with various operations (rotation, reflection, sizing, etc.). Loci are linked into spatial 'scales' which provide symmetrical solutions to geometric puzzles such as the traveling salesman problem and those devised by Hamilton (Icosian game) and Euler (Koenigsberg bridge problem). In the body these are considered to be prototypes for spatial paths used during adjustments of dynamic equilibrium. The choreutic conception of polyhedral body space is especially similar to the trajectory formation model. The choreutic principal of topological forms deflecting across various kinespheric nets is analogous to N. Bernstein's description of the "net of the motor field ... as oscillating like a cobweb in the wind." These commonalities indicate that further critical reviews of "choreutic laws" might be valuable in suggesting conceptual models and analytical tools for movement study in cognitive science.
A less resource intensive but more structured modification of problem-based learning was developed to teach pharmacology to pharmacy students in classes of 90 students. The method utilizes an active learning tool developed from cognitive science and cognitive learning theory. This case-based approach was developed to address the need to teach problem-solving skills to relatively large classes while conserving faculty and other resources. The method involves students working through cases in small groups according to a prescribed format. Groups are chosen at random to present the case to the whole class followed by open but structured discussion. Students bring recommended texts to class and groups are asked to answer questions relating to the material in the case, or to determine how the way their approach to the case would differ if patient parameters or medications in the case were altered utilizing the required texts. Each class begins with a short 1-min quiz on the fact-based material to be discussed that day and ends with a wrap-up of critical issues or principles learned. Continual probing of "what" and "why" characterizes each class meeting. Examinations are predominately open book and follow the same format as the in class cases. Learning outcomes for each general topic are provided at the beginning of the semester. Although the method does require students to learn pharmacology "facts", it places the facts within the context of application to practice. Rather than memorizing lists of side effects, for example, the format requires utilizing the side effects list and information about them to appropriately counsel the patient on how to deal with each and/or to suggest modifications in the therapy. Since implementing this method in an endocrine pharmacology course, student performance on problem-solving examinations has improved. Additionally, student evaluation of the method is extremely positive.
The possibilities for building and nourishing connections among the social, cultural, neuroscientific, biological, and cognitive sciences in the service of understanding children and their development are tremendously exciting. Crossing, and integrating across, disciplinary boundaries, especially those disciplines relating to biology/neuroscience, society/culture, cognition, emotion, perception, and motor function has greatly increased over the last decade and hopefully will increase exponentially in the future. All of these aspects of being human are multiply-interrelated and we need to make far more progress in understanding those interrelations.
Two prominent intellectual disciplines dominate the discipline of psychology, the cognitive and neural sciences. Separate departments for both are now commonplace at major universities across America. I suggest, however, that the discipline of psychology asks key questions about experience, mind, or central states not found in other disciplines. Psychology is embodied in both the cognitive and neural sciences, and an important common thread is the Jamesian-Deweyian emphasis on experience. The Jamesian-Deweyian tradition emphasized the sense of experience in problem-solving and functional adaptations. The pragmatists' sense of experience is the way by which one engages the world, is inherently cognitive, and orchestrated by central states of the brain. Any attempt within the neural and cognitive sciences to capture human experience will need to resurrect this tradition.
Several branches of cognitive science now focus on the nature of the unconscious. This paper explores some of the findings and models from this research. By introducing formulations based on non-clinical data, the cognitive scientists--in neural linguistics, computational modelling, and neuroscience--may depart from the older psychoanalytic formulations. An understanding of unconscious neural processes is nevertheless emerging showing how synapses are modified by experience and how learning, conscious and unconscious, is due to this important aspect of brain plasticity. Freud and Jung's formulations about the unconscious psyche, representing the main tenets of depth psychology, are also based on a conception of the mind as extending beyond immediate awareness. However, their models are more hypothetical in that their data, almost exclusively, come from treatments of psychotherapy patients and their verbal accounts. So how do these two conceptions of the unconscious match, where do they differ? And how does the neural understanding in the present research support theories and practices of analytic treatments?