DRG validation advisory committee completes guidelines.
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In light of information uncovered about human radiation experiments conducted during the Cold War, an important charge for the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments was to assess the current state of protections for human research subjects. This assessment was designed to enhance the Committee's ability to make informed recommendations for the improvement of future policies and practices for the protection of research subjects. The Committee's examination of current protections revealed great improvement over those from the past, yet some problems remain. Although the data collected by the Committee highlight specific areas in need of attention, the Committee's work should be viewed in part as the beginning of a series of ongoing assessments of the adequacy and effectiveness of the protections afforded to human subjects.
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This notice announces the establishment of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee that will advise the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, as requested by the Secretary, whether medical items and services are reasonable and necessary under title XVIII of the Social Security Act. This notice requests nominations for members for the Committee. This notice also announces the signing by the Secretary on November 24, 1998 of the charter establishing the Committee. This charter ends at close of business on November 23, 2000 unless renewed by the Secretary.
These revised recommendations regarding vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine update the previous Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations (MMWR 1991;40; No. RR-14:1-10) and include current information regarding the nonemergency use of vaccinia vaccine among laboratory and health-care workers occupationally exposed to vaccinia virus, recombinant vaccinia viruses, and other Orthopoxviruses that can infect humans. In addition, this report contains ACIP's recommendations for the use of vaccinia vaccine if smallpox (variola) virus were used as an agent of biological terrorism or if a smallpox outbreak were to occur for another unforeseen reason.
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In 1997, the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods (NACMCF/the Committee) was asked to review the current literature on sprout-associated outbreaks: identify the organisms and production practices of greatest public health concern: prioritize research needs: and provide recommendations on intervention and prevention strategies. In response to this charge, the Fresh Produce Work Group (FPWG) documented the relevant epidemiology and microbial ecology of sprout-associated outbreaks and reviewed current industry practices and initiatives related to the growing of seed and the production of sprouts. Sprouts have been identified as a special problem because of the potential for pathogen growth during the sprouting process. If pathogens are present on or in the seed, sprouting conditions may favor their proliferation. There is no inherent step in the production of raw sprouts to reduce or eliminate pathogens. Contaminated seed is the likely source for most reported sprout-associated outbreaks. Research has been initiated on methods to reduce or eliminate pathogenic bacteria on seeds and sprouts and some treatments show promise. However, to date, no single treatment has been shown to completely eliminate pathogens under experimental conditions used. Finally, the Committee found that, at the time of the charge, there was a lack of fundamental food safety knowledge along the continuum from seed production through sprout consumption. More recently, many have become aware of the potential for this food to be a vehicle for foodborne illness and the need for appropriate controls: however, such awareness is not universal. Although seed appears to be the most likely source of contamination in sprout associated outbreaks, practices and conditions at the sprouting facility may also impact on the safety of the finished product. In recent sprout-associated outbreak investigations, facilities associated with outbreaks did not consistently apply seed disinfection treatments prior to sprouting. Conversely, facilities that used seed from the same lot as an implicated facility, but had not been associated with reported illnesses, appear to have been consistently using seed disinfection treatments, such as 20,000 ppm calcium hypochlorite, to disinfect seed prior to sprouting. The Committee has developed a number of specific recommendations, including: 1. The knowledge of all interested parties pertaining to the microbiological safety of sprouted seeds must be enhanced; government and industry should develop education programs for seed and sprout producers on basic principles for microbiological food safety, good agricultural practices, good manufacturing practices, and hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) systems. 2. Good agricultural practices should be systematically implemented to reduce the potential for microbial contamination of seeds for sprout production. 3. Seed cleaning, storage, and handling practices that minimize the potential for microbial contamination should be developed and implemented. 4. Seeds should be treated with one or more treatments that have been shown to reduce pathogenic bacteria that may be present. Intervention strategies that deliver less than a given reduction (at this time, 5-log) in levels of Salmonella spp. and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli O157 should be coupled with a microbiological testing program. 5. Establish good manufacturing practices and food safety systems, including regulatory oversight, microbial testing, adoption of HACCP, and improved traceback, that systematically look for means to prevent seeds from serving as the vehicle for foodborne disease, and 6. Conduct research related to the microbiological safety of sprouted seeds, particularly in the areas of pathogen reduction or elimination, sources of contamination and its prevention, and preventing or retarding pathogen growth during sprouting.
These revised recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices update the previous recommendations on rabies prevention (MMWR 1991;40[No.RR-3]:1-14) to reflect the current status of rabies and antirabies biologics in the United States. This report includes new information about a human rabies vaccine approved for U.S. use in 1997, recommendations regarding exposure to bats, recommendations regarding an observation period for domestic ferrets, and changes in the local administration of rabies immune globulin.
These revised recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices concerning prevention of plague update previous recommendations (MMWR 1982;31:301-4). This report includes information and recommendations on vaccination, public health practices, and medical treatment to prevent plague among humans.
These revised recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) replace recommendations on poliomyelitis issued in 1982 and 1987, and present a new ACIP poliovirus vaccination policy that increases reliance on inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). This change in policy is the most substantive since the introduction of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in 1961. ACIP has determined that the risk-benefit ratio associated with the exclusive use of OPV for routine immunization has changed because of rapid progress in global polio eradication efforts. In particular, the relative benefits of OPV to the U.S. population have diminished because of the elimination of wild-virus-associated poliomyelitis in the Western Hemisphere and the reduced threat of poliovirus importation into the United States. The risk for vaccine-associated poliomyelitis caused by OPV is now judged less acceptable because of the diminished risk for wild-virus-associated disease (indigenous or imported). Consequently, ACIP recommends a transition policy that will increase use of IPV and decrease use of OPV during the next 3-5 years. The revised recommendations include three options for poliovirus vaccination, all of which meet acceptable standards of care: sequential vaccination with IPV followed by OPV, OPV alone, or IPV alone. For overall public health benefit, ACIP recommends a sequential vaccination schedule of two doses of IPV followed by two doses of OPV for routine childhood vaccination. Vaccination schedules that include OPV alone or IPV alone are also acceptable and are preferred in some situations (e.g., IPV alone is recommended for children who are immunosuppressed; OPV alone is preferred for children who begin the primary vaccination schedule after 6 months of age). Implementation of these recommendations should reduce the risk for vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis and facilitate a transition to exclusive use of IPV following further progress in global polio eradication.
These revised recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) on measles, mumps, and rubella prevention supersede recommendations published in 1989 and 1990. This statement summarizes the goals and current strategies for measles, rubella, and congenital rubella syndrome (CRS) elimination and for mumps reduction in the United States. Changes from previous recommendations include: Emphasis on the use of combined MMR vaccine for most indications; A change in the recommended age for routine vaccination to 12-15 months for the first dose of MMR, and to 4-6 years for the second dose of MMR; A recommendation that all states take immediate steps to implement a two dose MMR requirement for school entry and any additional measures needed to ensure that all school-aged children are vaccinated with two doses of MMR by 2001; A clarification of the role of serologic screening to determine immunity; A change in the criteria for determining acceptable evidence of rubella immunity; A recommendation that all persons who work in health-care facilities have acceptable evidence of measles and rubella immunity; Changes in the recommended interval between administration of immune globulin and measles vaccination; and Updated information on adverse events and contraindications, particularly for persons with severe HIV infection, persons with a history of egg allergy or gelatin allergy, persons with a history of thrombocytopenia, and persons receiving steroid therapy.
In May 1997, the Advisory Committee for HIV and STD Prevention (ACHSP) reviewed data on the relation between curable sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and the risk for sexual transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). ACHSP considered that the evidence was strong that early detection and treatment of other STDs is an effective strategy for preventing sexually transmitted HIV infection but was concerned that this strategy has not been clearly articulated or implemented as a core strategy for HIV prevention in the United States. In the context of persistently high prevalence of STDs in many parts of the United States and with emerging evidence that the U.S. epidemic of HIV infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) increasingly is affecting population groups with the highest rates of curable STDs, ACHSP recommends the following actions: Early detection and treatment of curable STDs should become a major, explicit component of comprehensive HIV prevention programs at national, state, and local levels. In areas where STDS that facilitate HIV transmission are prevalent, screening and treatment programs should be expanded. HIV and STD prevention programs in the United States, together with private and public sector partners, should take joint responsibility for implementing this strategy.