Lorance v. A.T.&T. [12 June 1989].
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The Court ruled that the right of a woman to custody over her ward is not affected by the fact that she goes out to work if she leaves the ward in the care of a suitably diligent and qualified person during her absence.
The appellants were female employees of Vietnamese origin of the Postal Commission who were refused permanent employment because they did not meet weight requirements by reference to height and sex set by the Commission. They lodged complaints under the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 charging sex discrimination, among other things. The issue on appeal was whether the appellants could rely on the 1977 Act, which was inconsistent with the respondent's requirements for employment specified in Section 42 of the Commonwealth Postal Services Act 1975. The Court held that the 1977 Act could not be relied upon because it was inconsistent with a Commonwealth Act, which under the Australian Constitution must prevail in cases of inconsistency.
The complainant women employees appealed a lower court ruling that, although they had been discriminated against in employment by their employer, the creation of an affirmative action program setting a percentage of women to be hired was not an appropriate remedy under the Canadian Human Rights Act. The Court reversed this ruling. It held a) that the Act was to be given a fair, large, and liberal interpretation; b) that remedies under the Act were not limited at the prevention of future discrimination, but could be used as a remedy for past practices; c) that in not requiring proof of intent the Act was clearly designed to deal with systematic discrimination; and d) that systematic discrimination required systematic remedies, including specific hiring goals. The Court also rejected an appeal of the employer that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination.
The appellant brought a complaint under the Canadian Human Rights Act against her supervisor and employer charging sexual discrimination in the form of sexual harassment. She complained that her supervisor had pressured her into sexual acts and threatened her with work-related consequences if she refused. The issue on appeal was whether the employer was liable for acts of its employee. The Supreme Court held that it was. It ruled a) that since the Act was primarily concerned with ending discrimination, rather than punishment, intent to discriminate was irrelevant; b) that the Act contemplated employer liability for acts of its employees; c) that only the employer could provide the most important remedy, a healthy work environment; and d) that the objectives of the Act would be nullified if the employer were not liable to make remedies.
The respondent female employee charged her employer with discrimination under the Equal Remuneration Act (No. 25 of 1976). She claimed that she was paid less as a stenographer than male stenographers performing the same work or work of a similar nature. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision supporting the respondent's claims. It rejected arguments that a) the work of female stenographers was different because they worked in a different place and as confidential stenographers attached to senior executives; and b) the difference in pay was justified under the terms of a settlement between the employer and the respondent's union. It noted that an employer could not deliberately create conditions of work only with the object of driving away women from a particular type of work that they can otherwise perform with the object of paying them less and that union settlements must yield to the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act.
This Act amends the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, specifically to prohibit discrimination between men and women in relation to conditions of service subsequent to employment such as promotions, training, or transfer. The original Act contained no such provisions. Sections of the Act are also amended to provide for greater penalties and for the lodging of complaints by any person aggrieved and by any recognized welfare institution or organization, in addition to government officials.
This legislation provides that, under any collective agreement in which the retirement age for female workers is lower than that for male workers, women can choose to retire at any point between the different ages set for men and women. Passage of this legislation followed a decision of the National Labour Court that setting a different retirement age for men and women in a collective agreement did not constitute discrimination.
The plaintiff challenged an affirmative action plan adopted by the defendant employer which took into consideration sex as one factor in promotion. The plan had been voluntarily adopted by the defendant and was intended to achieve a statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring and promoting minorities and women in job classifications where they were underrepresented in order to obtain a work force whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force. While setting no quotas, it required that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted. Under it, the plaintiff who was rated as well qualified as a woman applicant was passed over in favor of the woman applicant. The Court upheld the plan and its practice of taking sex into consideration as one factor in promotion. It ruled that the plan represented a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the defendant's work force and was not in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
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