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PubMed1990

Conceiving a child to save a child: reproductive and filial ethics.

I conclude that Mary and Abe's decision to conceive a child to save a child does not impose harm on persons or on relationships in the family. Nor does it evince a lack of respect for the child they have conceived. The ethical guidelines that support this conclusion can now be summarized. First, actions should not depersonalize or otherwise endanger personal relationships. Second, although ideally personal relationships are initiated and continued for their own sake, after a personal relationship has been established and sustained the motives for establishing it recede in importance. Third, the requirement of honesty looms especially large in the context of personal relationships. Fourth, privacy protects personal relationships in the family from intrusion by the state. Fifth, even if those with whom we stand in personal relationships are not fully rational or self-conscious, we should treat them with respect. Finally, persons often are called upon to make greater sacrifices in personal relationships. These principles represent only the barest beginnings of an ethics for filial relationships. Nonetheless, they mark progress in the direction of developing a more complete account. We should not suppose that ethics in the family always will be spontaneous or "natural". Over a century ago, Mill warned that nature and natural are "one of the most copious sources of false taste, false philosophy, false morality, and even bad law". Especially in the wake of medical advances, such as recombinant DNA and new reproductive technologies, the complexity of filial ethics will only increase. The demographics of an aging society will add further complexity to filial contexts.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Adult↗
PubMed1987

The ethical options in transplanting fetal tissue.

Fetal tissue transplants have now been successful in primates, raising the possibility of treatment for Parkinson's disease and other chronic illnesses. Whether or not abortion is morally justified, use of human fetal tissue for research or therapy is justified in certain circumstances. The rationale, both for permitting transplantation of fetal tissue and for limitations in exercising the technology, is based on the same set of ethical principles that supported restrictive legislation in the past: respect for autonomy and a balancing of harms and benefits that gives priority to those most affected.

Aborted Fetus↗
PubMed2005

Practising virtue: a challenge to the view that a virtue centred approach to ethics lacks practical content.

A virtue centred approach to ethics has been criticized for being vague owing to the nature of its central concept, the paradigm person. From the perspective of the practitioner the most damaging charge is that virtue ethics fails to be action guiding and, in addition to this, it does not offer any means of act appraisal. These criticisms leave virtue ethics in a weak position vis-à-vis traditional approaches to ethics. The criticism is, however, challenged by Hursthouse in her analysis of the accounts of right action offered by deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. It is possible to defend the action guiding nature of virtue ethics: there are virtue rules and exemplars to guide action. Insights from Aristotle's practical approach to ethics are considered alongside Hursthouse's analysis and it is suggested that virtue ethics is also capable of facilitating action appraisal. It is at the same time acknowledged that approaches to virtue ethics vary widely and that the challenges offered here would be rejected by those who embrace a radical replacement virtue approach.

Ethical Theory↗
PubMed1990

Integrating medical ethics with normative theory: patient advocacy and social responsibility.

It is often assumed that the chief responsibility medical professionals bear is patient care and advocacy. The meeting of other duties, such as ensuring a more just distribution of medical resources and promoting the public good, is not considered a legitimate basis for curtailing or slackening beneficial patient services. It is argued that this assumption is often made without sufficient attention to foundational principles of professional ethics; that once core principles are laid bare this assumption is revealed as largely unwarranted; and, finally, that these observations at the level of moral theory should be reflected, in various ways, in medical practice. Specifically, this essay clarifies a tension that exists between different kinds of moral principles and explores the possibility of dissipating that tension by shoring up foundational principles. The paper begins by setting out three alternative models of how best to balance patient advocacy responsibilities with broader social responsibilities. It then turns to critically assess these models and argue that one has several advantages over the others.

Ethical Theory↗
PubMed1993

Age rationing, the virtues, and wanting more life.

The goal of this paper is to show that Callahan's reasons for withholding life extending care cannot be made out exclusively in terms of contemporary notions of distributive justice and fair allocation. I argue that by relying on a notion of justice which links the merit of the individual with the fairness of a social pattern of shares, Callahan imputes vice to the elderly as he denies them eligibility for life-prolonging care. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is a useful tool for character evaluation. One can speak meaningfully of a proper disposition of a person of a certain type (an elderly person) with respect to the good of continued life. I claim that the mean of one's disposition with respect to the good of continued life would be relative to one's age group, and would be determined by that principle by which an elderly person of practical wisdom would determine it. This leads to very different conclusions than those drawn by Callahan.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1986

Ethics and resource allocation: an economist's view.

This paper debates some of the issues involved in attempting to apply economic analysis to the health care sector when medical ethics plays such an important part in determining the allocation of resources in that sector. Two distinct ethical positions are highlighted as being fundamental to the understanding of resource allocation in this sector -- deontological and utilitarian theories of ethics. It is argued that medical ethics are often narrowly conceived in that there is a tendency for the individual, rather than society at large, to form the focal point of the production of the service "health care'. Thus medical ethics have been dominated by individualistic ethical coded which do not fully consider questions relating to resource allocation at a social level. It is further argued that the structure of the health care sector augments these "individualistic' ethics. It is also suggested that different actors in the health care sector address questions of resource allocation with respect to different time periods, and that this serves to further enhance the influence of "individualistic' ethical codes in this sector.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗
PubMed1987

Medical ethics in the primary care setting.

Much popular and professional understanding of 'medical ethics' is nowadays located in quandary ethics, exotic life-and-death decision-making, and tertiary care settings. Medical ethics in the primary care setting is concerned with very different matters. Among these are issues having to do with basic self-understandings of health professionals and patients and their fiduciary relationships; with fundamental social, political and economic notions which will and do shape the allocation and distribution of health care resources; with the goals and purposes appropriate to medical interventions of various sorts; and with the care of the whole person rather than the limited attention to a particular illness or disease syndrome. The commitments of primary care medicine challenge in radical ways some cherished claims of modern liberal societies by questioning the limits of autonomous individualism and by affirming the indispensability of social justice.

Bioethical Issues↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Why "do no harm"?

Edmund Pellegrino has argued that the dramatic changes in American health care call for critical reflection on the traditional norms governing the therapeutic relationship. This paper offers such reflection on the obligation to "do no harm." Drawing on work by Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, I argue that the libertarian model of medical ethics offered by Engelhardt cannot adequately sustain an obligation to "do no harm." Because the obligation to "do no harm" is not based simply on a negative duty of nonmaleficence but also on a positive duty of beneficence, I argue that it is best understood to derive from the fiduciary nature of the healing relationship.

Beneficence↗
PubMed1998

Prescriptions: autonomy, humanism and the purpose of health technology.

My purpose is to examine two of the foundations of medical ethics: the principle of autonomy and the concept of the human. I also investigate the extent to which health technology makes autonomy and humanness possible. I begin by underlining Illich's point that the same health technology designed to promote health and autonomy also is pathogenic. I proceed to analyse the Kantian concept of autonomy, a concept which is closely associated with health and which continues to determine current ethical thinking. In so doing, I uncover an unexpected ontological function of health technology, a function described in Heidegger's work on technology. Based on this discovery, I suggest that calls for Kantian autonomy may often be self-defeating or even sometimes harmful. I conclude by calling for continued ethical vigilance, but also for a questioning of the hitherto virtually unquestionable concepts of ethics and humanness which may themselves play a role in our era's greatest problems.

Ethics, Medical↗
PubMed2003

The vulnerable and the susceptible.

Human beings are essentially vulnerable in the view that their existence qua humans is not given but constructed. This vulnerability received basic protection from the State, expressed in the form of the universal rights all citizens are meant to enjoy. In addition, many individuals fall prey to destitution and deprivation, requiring social action aimed at recognising the specific harms they suffer and providing remedial assistance to palliate or remove their plights. Citizens receive protection against their biologic vulnerability by means of an in rem right to health [care], which is more an attitude of protection than a specific programme. When individuals become susceptible, that is, biologically weak or diseased, they also increase their predisposition to additional harm, and require social actions to treat their demeaned condition. Such assistance takes the form of positive healthcare rights. Research on human beings has been slow to observe that the subjects recruited are susceptible, especially so if research is done in less developed countries. By mislabelling them as vulnerable--a characteristic they share with all humans--sponsors avoid registering the deprivation these people suffer, and the ethical obligation to offer them remedial help. The distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility also marks the difference between being intact but fragile--vulnerable--and being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm--susceptible. Awareness of this difference should give additional force to the rejection of double standards in research ethics.

Bioethics↗
PubMed2006

What is genetic information, and why is it significant? A contextual, contrastive, approach.

Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question (the 'genetic exceptionalism' debate). 'Genetic information' is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why 'genetic information' is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that 'genetic information' is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to the problem of 'significance creep' (i.e., where claims about the significance of certain kinds of genetic information in one context influence our thinking about the significance of other kinds of genetic information in other contexts). A contextual and contrastive methodology is proposed: evaluating the significance of genetic information requires us to be sensitive to the polysemy of 'genetic information' across contexts and then examine the contrast in significance (if any) of genetic, as opposed to nongenetic, information within contexts. This, in turn, suggests that a proper solution to the regulatory question requires us to pay more attention to how and why information, and its acquisition, possession and use, come to be of ethical significance.

Communication↗