Search PubMed⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search PubMed

Results for “Philosophical Approach”

Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,333 records · Page 74Linked to original sources
PubMed1990

The ethics of ex utero research on spare 'non-viable' IVF human embryos.

In this paper, the focus is not on some particular developmental feature of the human embryo, but rather on the embryo's potential for development tout court. To this end, the moral relevance of the difference between human embryos that have the potential for continued human growth and development and human embryos that do not have this potential is explored and a distinction between viable and non-viable IVF human embryos is introduced. This is followed by a discussion of what is morally wrong with killing to show that none of the concerns associated with the act of killing apply to the destruction of non-viable IVF human embryos. On this basis, it is argued that scientifically and ethically sound research on spare non-viable IVF human embryos may proceed.

Abortion, Eugenic↗
PubMed1999

Should you clone your dog? An animal rights perspective on somacloning.

This paper use the Missyplicity Project's detailed Code of Bioethics as a starting point for discussion of animal rights perspectives on cloning. Although funded by a couple in order to clone their pet dog, the project has more important collateral goals and forms part of a general line of research, that, if successful, promises enormous clinical benefits to humans. A particular type of animal rights perspective is described and used to evaluate this project. This perspective accepts a 'principle of axiological anthropocentrism' (PAA), according to which only human beings have certain interests, or a kind of value, which is of pre-eminent moral significance. The best-known animal rights views (those of Singer and Regan) are shown to be consistent with the PAA. This perspective also denies that potential characteristics qualify their possessors for the same type of moral respect as actualized characteristics. The balancing of potential benefits against risks to research subjects is discussed and it is concluded that, from the particular ethical perspective adopted in this paper, cloning research of this general type is not particularly problematic; and, given its stringent Code of Bioethics, only an abolitionist perspective could condemn the Missyplicity Project in particular.

Animal Experimentation↗
PubMed2001

Pragmatism, bioethics and the grand American social experiment.

There is tension in bioethics between two strains of pragmatism. The most prominent strain, following John Dewey, proposes a content-rich ethos of controlled, collective moral inquiry. A second strain, descending from Charles Peirce and Josiah Royce, favors an open-ended approach where diverging moral communities evolve without extensive inter-communal oversight. This essay defends the second strain. The Deweyan approach, I argue, exhibits a problematic quasi-foundationalist character insofar as it canonizes a dubious constellation of "liberal" political values and seeks to establish these values by interposing a consensus of moral experts where genuine inter-communal dialogue, and compromise, would be more fruitful. I hold that the alternative approach of Peirce and Royce is preferable, and truer to the fundamental commitments of classical American pragmatism. Recognizing the epistemic fallibility of various content-rich moral-political formulations, Peirce and Royce hope to cultivate and sustain moral inquiry by allowing each moral community (1) to generate and test its own moral system (as long as it does so peaceably) and (2) to freely make or refuse to make collaborative arrangements with other moral communities. This approach is illustrated in a brief discussion of the Oregon Medical Experiment.

Bioethics↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Playing God? Moral agency in an emerging world.

Arguments against intervening in nature's ways have been used against many new technologies in the last century. Many of these arguments have employed the metaphor of "playing God." In this essay I briefly review the use of the term "playing God" in recent decades. I then examine the cosmology that lies implicit in this language. My thesis is that the language of "playing God" (or not) overlooks the dynamic, evolutionary nature of world process--the role played by the interdeterminacy of statistical probabilities. I review the notion of "emergent probability" (Lonergan) in order, in the end, to advocate an ethic of risk that both recognizes the dangers of hubris and includes an open and emergent view of creation.

Biotechnology↗
PubMed1983

Is there a biological person?

Most biologists are dissatisfied with attempts to understand complex organisms simply by reducing them to their physical and chemical elements. They may hypothesize that the whole transcends its parts, and pursue philoso- phical efforts to find in personhood the presumptive but crucial difference between Homo sapiens and other species. But personhood is not a biological property; rather, man's creative nervous system invents and elaborates personhood with its sanctification of rights and protections. Others may hold different transcendental views, but men of good will often agree on what to do while disagreeing on why they agree.

Beginning of Human Life↗