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PubMed2002

Likelihood judgment based on previously observed outcomes: the alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm.

Previous research has demonstrated that intuitive perceptions of certainty regarding a focal outcome are sensitive to variations in how evidence supporting nonfocal alternatives is distributed, even when such variations have no bearing on objective probability. We investigated this alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm in which participants made likelihood judgments on the basis of their memory for past observations of relevant outcomes. In Experiment 1, a manipulation of evidence (observed frequencies) across alternative outcomes influenced not only intuitive certainty estimates about a focal outcome but also numeric subjective probabilities. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that these effects were attributable to the influence of information loss on frequency estimations. The findings were consistent with the heuristic comparison account, which suggests that the judged likelihood of a focal outcome will be disproportionately influenced by the strength (frequency) of the strongest alternative outcome.

Humans↗
PubMed2001

Primacy in causal strength judgments: the effect of initial evidence for generative versus inhibitory relationships.

The order in which people receive information has a substantial effect on subsequent judgment and inference. Our focus is on the order of covariation evidence in causal learning. The first experiment shows that the initial presentation of evidence suggesting a generative causal relationship (the joint presence or joint absence of cause and effect) leads to higher judged causal strength than does the initial presentation of evidence suggesting an inhibitory relationship (the presence of cause or effect in the absence of the other). Additional studies show that this primacy effect is unlikely to be due to fatigue or to an insufficient number of learning trials. These results are not readily explained by current contingency-based or associative theories of causal induction.

Adult↗
PubMed2004

Cue interaction and judgments of causality: contributions of causal and associative processes.

In four experiments, the predictions made by causal model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model were tested by using a cue interaction paradigm that measures the relative response to a given event based on the influence or salience of an alternative event. Experiments 1 and 2 uncorrelated two variables that have typically been confounded in the literature (causal order and the number of cues and outcomes) and demonstrated that overall contingency judgments are influenced by the causal structure of the events. Experiment 3 showed that trial-by-trial prediction responses, a second measure of causal assessment, were not influenced by the causal structure of the described events. Experiment 4 revealed that participants became less sensitive to the influence of the causal structure in both their ratings and their predictions as trials progressed. Thus, two experiments provided evidence for high-level (causal reasoning) processes, and two experiments provided evidence for low-level (associative) processes. We argue that both factors influence causal assessment, depending on what is being asked about the events and participants' experience with those events.

Association Learning↗
PubMed2004

Causal judgment from contingency information: a systematic test of the pCI rule.

Contingency information is information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an effect when a possible cause is present or absent. Under the evidential evaluation model, instances of contingency information are transformed into evidence and causal judgment is based on the proportion of relevant instances evaluated as confirmatory for the candidate cause. In this article, two experiments are reported that were designed to test systematic manipulations of the proportion of confirming instances in relation to other variables: the proportion of instances on which the candidate cause is present, the proportion of instances in which the effect occurs when the cause is present, and the objective contingency. Results showed that both unweighted and weighted versions of the proportion-of-confirmatory-instances rule successfully predicted the main features of the results, with the weighted version proving more successful. Other models, including the power PC theory, failed to predict the results.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2003

Forward and backward blocking of causal judgment is enhanced by additivity of effect magnitude.

When two causes for a given effect are simultaneously presented, it is natural to expect an effect of greater magnitude. However many laboratory tasks preclude such an additivity rule by imposing a ceiling on effect magnitude-for example, by using a binary outcome. Under these conditions, a compound of two causal cues cannot be distinguished from a compound of one causal cue and one noncausal cue. Two experiments tested the effect of additivity on cue competition. Significant but weak forward blocking and no backward blocking were observed in a conventional "allergy" causal judgment task. Explicit pretraining of magnitude additivity produced strong and significant forward and backward blocking. Additivity pretraining was found to be unnecessary for another cue competition effect, release from overshadowing, which does not logically depend on additivity. The results confirm that blocking is constrained when effect magnitude is constrained and provide support for an inferential account of cue competition.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Context matching and judgments of recency.

An experiment was done to test a context-matching explanation of memory for recency under steady-state conditions. Subjects went through a list of 550 names, in which individual names were repeated at lags of 5-30 other items. The names were shown in two different styles or contexts. An old versus new recognition decision was made on each name, and each old response was followed by a numerical judgment of recency (JOR). When first- and second-presentation contexts were the same, recognition hit rates were higher, and mean JORs were shorter (more recent), than when the two contexts were different. The JOR result is as predicted by the context-matching hypothesis.

Association Learning↗
PubMed2002

Spatial location judgments: a cross-national comparison of estimation bias in subjective North American geography.

We examined alternate explanations for distortions in the subjective representation of North American geography. One explanation, based on physical proximity, predicts that bias in location estimates should increase with the distance from a participant's home city or region. An alternative is that biases arise from combining accurate and inaccurate beliefs about the cities and the superordinate regions to which they belong, including beliefs that may have social or cultural origins. To distinguish these, Canadians from Alberta and Americans from Texas judged the latitudes of cities in Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. The Texans' estimates of Mexican locations were 16" (approximately 1,120 miles) more biased than their estimates of Canadian locations that were actually about 840 miles farther away. This finding eliminates proximity as a primary source of geographic biases and underscores the role of categorical beliefs as an important source of biased judgments.

Geography↗
PubMed2005

Sources of confidence judgments in implicit cognition.

Subjective reports of confidence are frequently used as a measure of awareness in a variety of fields, including artificial grammar learning. However, little is known about what information is used to make confidence judgments and whether there are any possible sources of information used to discriminate between items that are unrelated to confidence. The data reported here replicate an earlier experiment by Vokey and Brooks (1992) and show that grammaticality decisions are based on both the grammatical status of items and their similarity to study exemplars. The key finding is that confidence ratings made on a continuous scale (50%-100%) are closely related to grammaticality but are unrelated to all of the measures of similarity that were tested. By contrast, confidence ratings made on a binary scale (high vs. low) are related to both grammaticality and similarity. The data confirm an earlier finding (Tunney & Shanks, 2003) that binary confidence ratings are more sensitive to low levels of awareness than continuous ratings are and suggest that participants are conscious of all the information acquired in artificial grammar learning.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Delaying judgments of learning affects memory, not metamemory.

Judgments of learning (JOLs) for cue-target word pairs correlate particularly well with later target recall when made under conditions that permit delayed attempts to retrieve the targets--the delayed-JOL effect. Metamemory theories claim that memory monitoring improves under these conditions. However, another theory--the memory hypothesis--claims that the correlation increases because retrieved items receive a boost in recall from spaced study and are assigned high JOLs, whereas unretrieved items receive no spaced study and, therefore, no boost in recall and, consequently, are assigned low JOLs. When we eliminated differences in spaced study by reexposing word pairs following their JOLs, the delayed-JOL effect disappeared, supporting the memory hypothesis.

Cues↗
PubMed2004

In defense of the signal detection interpretation of remember/know judgments.

Donaldson (1996) argued that remember/know judgments can be conceptualized within a signal detection framework by assuming that they are based on two criteria situated along a strength-of-memory decision axis. According to this model, items that exceed a high criterion receive a remember response, whereas items that only exceed a lower criterion receive a know response. Although a variety of findings have been presented in evidence against this idea, Dunn (2004) recently showed that detection theory is fully compatible with those findings. We present a variety of new results and new analyses that weigh strongly in favor of the detection interpretation. We further show that a dual-process account of recognition memory is compatible with a unidimensional detection model despite the common notion that such a model necessarily assumes a single process. The key assumption of this model is that individual recognition decisions are based on both recollection and familiarity (not on one process or the other).

Humans↗
PubMed2005

Memory strength and recency judgments.

Two experiments were done to examine the effect of memory strength on numerical judgment of recency (JOR). In one experiment, the strong versus weak manipulation was defined by stimulus type (pictures vs. names); and in the other, it was defined by long versus short study durations of pictures. Two hypotheses were contrasted: (1) that strong items seem more recent than weak items (the activation hypothesis), and (2) that JORs are more accurate for strong items than for weak items (the accuracy hypothesis). Results of both experiments supported the activation hypothesis. On the basis of these and previous results, it is argued that recency is inferred partly from a memory's strength or activation and partly from some other time-related clue to the age of the memory.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2004

Judgment of frequency versus recognition confidence: repetition and recursive reminding.

Judgments of presentation frequency (JOFs) were compared with recognition confidence ratings (RCRs) in a single memory experiment. Two differences were found: (1) Relative to the effect of exposure duration, frequency had a larger effect on JOF than it had on RCR. (2) Replicating a finding by Proctor (1977), normalized memory operating characteristic (zMOC) curves for JOF had slopes greater than 1.0, whereas those for RCR had slopes of less than 1.0. The slope difference was found to be attributable to the first study trial. The results are contrary to the hypothesis that a single strength or familiarity dimension underlies JOF and RCR. To explain both findings, a new hypothetical basis of JOF is proposed. Repetition is assumed to trigger study phase reminding, which, in turn, is encoded into memory. Remindings can be recursively embedded, and the depth of recursion, recollected at test, is the primary basis of JOF. The hypothesis appears consistent with a broad range of JOF findings.

Algorithms↗
PubMed1993

Evidence for implicit scaling in comparative judgment.

In two experiments, we examined the effects of manipulating the density of stimuli on comparison difficulty in a comparative judgment task. In Experiment 1, subjects was slower at judging the relative size of a pair when the members were adjacent items in the linear order than when the members were separated by items of intervening magnitudes. In Experiment 2, the advantage of choosing the larger rather than the smaller of two large stimuli (e.g., the congruity effect) increased when the linear order included many small items. In contrast, the advantage of choosing the smaller of two small items increased when the linear order included many large items. The applicability of the range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965) to these results is discussed.

Attention↗
PubMed2001

A group size effect on personal risk judgments: implications for unrealistic optimism.

In Experiments 1 and 2, college students (N = 32 and N = 18, respectively) read heart attack risk profiles (i.e., lists of risk factors) for each of several employees at a series of fictional companies and judged the heart attack risk of the typical employee at each company. In both experiments, subjects' risk judgments increased as a function of the number of employees at the companies. In Experiments 3A and 3B, college students (N = 56 and N = 33, respectively) judged the heart attack risk of the typical employee at a company and also judged the risk of each individual employee. In these experiments, the typical employee was generally judged to be at higher risk than the individual employees. This group size effect might help to explain unrealistic optimism--people's tendency to judge themselves to be at lower risk than their peers for negative life events. Furthermore, it can be modeled successfully within Fiedler's (1996) BIAS framework.

Adult↗
PubMed1996

Instability of individual differences in the association between confidence judgments and memory performance.

There are large individual differences in the degree of association between the accuracy of memories and subjective confidence in those memories. Are these differences stable within the same test, and between alternate forms of a test? In Experiment 1, college students were tested on 3 recognition memory tasks, then retested 2 weeks later on alternate forms of the same tasks. The relationship between confidence judgments and recognition performance displayed low split-half stability and low alternate-forms stability. A second experiment with elderly adults replicated these findings. In a third experiment, college students recalled answers to general knowledge questions and rated confidence in the correctness of each answer. Individual differences in the association between confidence and recall performance were not stable across the odd- and even-numbered items on the test. These data indicate the need for the development of procedures that will produce stable estimates of individuals' metacognitive accuracy.

Adult↗
PubMed1989

A semantic memory sentence verification model based on relative judgment theory.

A subjective referent model of sentence verification in semantic memory tasks based on the relative judgment theory of Link and Heath (1975), together with the derivation of a discriminability index, are presented in this paper. An attractive feature of the model is its consideration of both error rates and response times (RTs) in the calculation of the discriminability index. The model is also able to account for the frequent finding in semantic memory tasks that error RTs are longer than correct RTs. A partial replication of Experiment 2 of McCloskey and Glucksberg's (1979) sentence verification context effect studies, in which we employed 44 subjects and 28 categories, and controlled for item familiarity, revealed that error RTs were consistently longer than correct RTs--a finding inconsistent with the McCloskey and Glucksberg property comparison model, but in accord with the subjective referent model. An important fortuitous result was the detection of a context effect by the discriminability measure, an effect not detected by the RT data alone. The discriminability measures yielded a near perfect correlation with estimates of the mean step size of the random walk obtained by application of the parameter estimation program FITTRW (Heath, 1983).

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Test difficulty and judgment bias.

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that overconfidence in performance judgments is due to test- and person-driven errors. In Experiment 1, test difficulty accounted for the vast majority of variation in overconfidence when individuals judged items of varying difficulty within a homogeneous test. In Experiment 2, the severity of overconfidence did not differ between three unrelated tests once test difficulty was controlled. Both experiments supported the view that overconfidence is due largely to test difficulty. Some degree of overconfidence also occurred because individuals adopted a normatively high success criterion for judging their own test performance.

Humans↗
PubMed1994

The calibration and resolution of confidence in perceptual judgments.

Confidence rating based calibration and resolution indices were obtained in two experiments requiring perceptual comparisons and in a third with visual gap detection. Four important results were obtained. First, as in the general knowledge domain, subjects were underconfident when judgments were easy and overconfident when they were difficult. Second, paralleling the clear dependence of calibration on decisional difficulty, resolution decreased with increases in decision difficulty arising either from decreases in discriminability or from increasing demands for speed at the expense of accuracy. Third, providing trial-by-trial response feedback on difficult tasks improved resolution but had no effect on calibration. Fourth, subjects can accurately report subjective errors (i.e., trials in which they have indicated that they made an error) with their confidence ratings. It is also shown that the properties of decision time, conditionalized on confidence category, impose a rigorous set of constraints on theories of confidence calibration.

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