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On the ideal market structure for third-party purchasing of health care.

The ideal market structure would give each medical care organization effective incentives to produce maximum value for money for enrolled subscribers. It should be based on integrated financing and delivery systems--partnerships that link doctors, hospitals and insurers--with per capita prepayment, with providers at risk for cost of care and cost of poor quality, publicly accountable for quality and per capita costs. The ideal market structure must be managed by active intelligent collective purchasing agents, called sponsors, that contract with health care systems and set the rules of competition. Sponsors structure and manage the enrollment process; they create price-elastic demand; they manage risk selection; and they create and administer equitable rules of coverage. Microeconomic theory tells us what sponsors should do to get the market incentives right. There is no comparable political theory to tell us how their boards of directors should be constituted. The paper offers a list of undesirable political arrangements to be avoided and some desirable features of sponsor constitutions.

Delivery of Health Care↗

The performance measurement manifesto.

The leading indicators of business performance cannot be found in financial data alone. Quality, customer satisfaction, innovation, market share--metrics like these often reflect a company's economic condition and growth prospects better than its reported earnings do. Depending on an accounting department to reveal a company's future will leave it hopelessly mired in the past. More and more managers are changing their company's performance measurement systems to track nonfinancial measures and reinforce new competitive strategies. Five activities are essential: developing an information architecture; putting the technology in place to support this architecture; aligning bonuses and other incentives with the new system; drawing on outside resources; and designing an internal process to ensure the other four activities occur. New technologies and more sophisticated databases have made the change to nonfinancial performance measurement systems possible and economically feasible. Industry and trade associations, consulting firms, and public accounting firms that already have well-developed methods for assessing market share and other performance metrics can add to the revolution's momentum--as well as profit from the business opportunities it presents. Every company will have its own key measures and distinctive process for implementing the change. But making it happen will always require careful preparation, perseverance, and the conviction of the CEO that it must be carried through. When one leading company can demonstrate the long-term advantage of its superior performance on quality or innovation or any other nonfinancial measure, it will change the rules for all its rivals forever.

Economic Competition↗

Consumer and provider evaluation of rural pharmacy services.

This paper compares consumer and provider perceptions regarding access to pharmacy services in rural Illinois, given a decrease in the number of pharmacies. Consumer data are from the Illinois Rural Life Panel in which more than 1,800 respondents answered questions about availability and use of pharmacy services and about insurance coverage and cost. A survey of all licensed retail pharmacies in 74 rural Illinois counties and in seven non-rural counties provided pharmacy background information and was the source of data on changes in profitability and payment sources. The data provided insight on factors that affect access. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze data from both groups to compare perceptions about access. The objective was to evaluate current access to pharmacy services and implications for future access from the perspective of consumers and pharmacists. Results from rural consumers show access is currently good; 77 percent have a local pharmacy, and 64 percent prefer this source. Future access is of more concern. Pharmacy survey results show 81.5 percent of rural pharmacies are experiencing declining profits from drug sales. Restricted reimbursements from third-party payers, demands of managed care and expanded competition are seen as threats to retention of local pharmacies and continued good access. An important finding, especially given survey evidence of increased managed care penetration, is the difference in views of pharmacists and consumers regarding the effects of managed care on access. Pharmacy survey data also revealed differences between rural and non-rural pharmacies.

Adult↗

Avoiding the pitfalls of for-profit diversification: a case study.

The development of centralized materials management systems in more and more hospitals has resulted in increased operating efficiencies. Hospital administrators have thus been prompted to market these materials management services to outside businesses on a contract basis. The trend is toward the creation of a free-standing supply subsidiary, as a separate, for-profit corporation from the hospital. The following hypothetical case concerns a fictitious hospital which is entering the for-profit supply business. The case sets forth the business plans of the hospital and the legal questions of the materials manager who will run the supply business.

Economic Competition↗

Managing hybrid marketing systems.

As competition increases and costs become critical, companies that once went to market only one way are adding new channels and using new methods - creating hybrid marketing systems. These hybrid marketing systems hold the promise of greater coverage and reduced costs. But they are also hard to manage; they inevitably raise questions of conflict and control: conflict because marketing units compete for customers; control because new indirect channels are less subject to management authority. Hard as they are to manage, however, hybrid marketing systems promise to become the dominant design, replacing the "purebred" channel strategy in all kinds of businesses. The trick to managing the hybrid is to analyze tasks and channels within and across a marketing system. A map - the hybrid grid - can help managers make sense of their hybrid system. What the chart reveals is that channels are not the basic building blocks of a marketing system; marketing tasks are. The hybrid grid forces managers to consider various combinations of channels and tasks that will optimize both cost and coverage. Managing conflict is also an important element of a successful hybrid system. Managers should first acknowledge the inevitability of conflict. Then they should move to bound it by creating guidelines that spell out which customers to serve through which methods. Finally, a marketing and sales productivity (MSP) system, consisting of a central marketing database, can act as the central nervous system of a hybrid marketing system, helping managers create customized channels and service for specific customer segments.

Advertising↗

The economic functions of carve outs in managed care.

This paper considers the economic functions of contracting separately for a portion of the insurance risk, offering both the payer's (i.e., employer's) and the health plan's perspective. Four major forms of carve outs are discussed: (1) payer specialty carve outs from all health plans; (2) payer specialty carve outs from only indemnity and preferred provider organization arrangements; (3) individual health plan carve outs to specialty vendors; and (4) group practice carve outs to specialty organizations. The paper examines whether carving out care fosters the payer's goal of delivering reasonable healthcare efficiently, how adverse selection affects the provision of healthcare, and the costs of providing this specialized care.

Capitation Fee↗