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PubMed2000

Consciousness.

Until recently, most neuroscientists did not regard consciousness as a suitable topic for scientific investigation. This reluctance was based on certain philosophical mistakes, primarily the mistake of supposing that the subjectivity of consciousness made it beyond the reach of an objective science. Once we see that consciousness is a biological phenomenon like any other, then it can be investigated neurobiologically. Consciousness is entirely caused by neurobiological processes and is realized in brain structures. The essential trait of consciousness that we need to explain is unified qualitative subjectivity. Consciousness thus differs from other biological phenomena in that it has a subjective or first-person ontology, but this subjective ontology does not prevent us from having an epistemically objective science of consciousness. We need to overcome the philosophical tradition that treats the mental and the physical as two distinct metaphysical realms. Two common approaches to consciousness are those that adopt the building block model, according to which any conscious field is made of its various parts, and the unified field model, according to which we should try to explain the unified character of subjective states of consciousness. These two approaches are discussed and reasons are given for preferring the unified field theory to the building block model. Some relevant research on consciousness involves the subjects of blindsight, the split-brain experiments, binocular rivalry, and gestalt switching.

Animals↗
PubMed1993

Spatial attention and two modes of visual consciousness.

The relationship between spatial attention and visual consciousness was critically examined in an attempt to show the operation of two simultaneously available modes of visual consciousness (i.e., object consciousness, which concerns the conscious identification of objects, and background consciousness, which deals with conscious monitoring of the background scene). The traditional view seems to pay attention only to object consciousness, which is a product of spatial attention. To substantiate the hypothesis, five topics from varied fields of human experimental psychology were chosen: iconic storage, stabilized retinal image disappearance, stable perception of external space, texture segregation and attention, and spatial frequency sensitivity in a figure-ground reversal figure. The findings of these studies suggest that there may be visual consciousness outside of focal attention and that background consciousness operates as a default mode for global scene analysis and early warning of anomalies. Finally, neural substrata for these two modes of consciousness are suggested.

Attention↗
PubMed1995

Visual perception and phenomenal consciousness.

In the (re-)animated debate on consciousness we focus on three questions: Who has consciousness? What is its neuronal basis? What is its function? Regarding the first, we suggest that consciousness is exclusive to living organisms able to distinguish self from non-self. It may be restricted further to organisms who possess a repertoire of overt and covert behaviour which can be voluntarily modified and suppressed. This requires an intermediary neuronal net mediating between sensory input and behavioural output. What are the properties of this net which distinguish unalloyed information processing per se from conscious representation? To tackle this second question, we use the visual system and the functional losses that result from lesions at its different levels, and differentiate a reflexive, a phenomenal, and a consciously accessible stage of visual processing. We suggest that the latter two represent two distinct aspects of consciousness. Blindsight, a neurological example of visual processing in the absence of phenomenal vision, could help to elucidate the neuronal basis of phenomenality, and the special role of striate cortex. Like the patients, our monkeys with unilateral striate cortical removal show evidence not just of residual visual processing, but of the same absence of phenomenal vision, opening routes to further exploring the details of its neuronal implementation. The second aspect, conscious access to presently or previously processed information, is likely to require higher cortical structures, and may depend on the stage of phenomenal representations. In patients with blindsight, both aspects are lost, and it is conceivable that a loss of phenomenality generally causes a loss of conscious accessibility. One important function of phenomenal representations, our third question, would then be to allow conscious retrieval and manipulation of currently processed or formerly stored information, enabling organisms to consciously think and plan.

Animals↗
PubMed2001

Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework.

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.

Brain↗
PubMed2001

Are we explaining consciousness yet?

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness.

Brain↗
PubMed2002

How many kinds of consciousness?

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental state's being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental state's being conscious. But the deeper problem is that Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.

Consciousness↗
PubMed2001

Consciousness.

Consciousness is topical, for reasons including its renewed respectability among psychologists, rapid progress in the neuroscience of perception, memory and action, advances in artificial intelligence and dissatisfaction with the dualistic separation of mind and body. Consciousness is an ambiguous term. It can refer to (i) the waking state; (ii) experience; and (iii) the possession of any mental state. Self-consciousness is equally ambiguous, with senses including (i) proneness to embarrassment in social settings; (ii) the ability to detect our own sensations and recall our recent actions; (iii) self-recognition; (iv) the awareness of awareness; and (v) self-knowledge in the broadest sense. The understanding of states of consciousness has been transformed by the delineation of their electrical correlates, of structures in brainstem and diencephalon which regulate the sleep-wake cycle, and of these structures' cellular physiology and regional pharmacology. Clinical studies have defined pathologies of wakefulness: coma, the persistent vegetative state, the 'locked-in' syndrome, akinetic mutism and brain death. Interest in the neural basis of perceptual awareness has focused on vision. Increasingly detailed neuronal correlates of real and illusory visual experience are being defined. Experiments exploiting circumstances in which visual experience changes while external stimulation is held constant are tightening the experimental link between consciousness and its neural correlates. Work on unconscious neural processes provides a complementary approach. 'Unperceived' stimuli have detectable effects on neural events and subsequent action in a range of circumstances: blindsight provides the classical example. Other areas of cognitive neuroscience also promise experimental insights into consciousness, in particular the distinctions between implicit and explicit memory and deliberate and automatic action. Overarching scientific theories of consciousness include neurobiological accounts which specify anatomical or physiological mechanisms for awareness, theories focusing on the role played by conscious processes in information processing and theories envisaging the functions of consciousness in a social context. Whether scientific observation and theory will yield a complete account of consciousness remains a live issue. Physicalism, functionalism, property dualism and dual aspect theories attempt to do justice to three central, but controversial, intuitions about experience: that it is a robust phenomenon which calls for explanation, that it is intimately related to the activity of the brain and that it has an important influence on behaviour.

Animals↗
PubMed2000

Cardiovascular and sympathetic effects of L-glutamate and glycine injected into the rostral ventrolateral medulla of conscious rats.

The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of L-glutamate and glycine microinjected into the rostral ventrolateral medulla (RVLM) in conscious unrestrained rats. Microinjection of 2 nmol of L-glutamate increased the mean arterial pressure (MAP) and renal sympathetic nerve activity (RSNA) in the conscious rats. The RSNA responses were significantly larger in the conscious rats than in anesthetized rats, while the magnitude of the pressor responses was similar in conscious and urethane-anesthetized rats. L-Glutamate injection significantly decreased heart rate in the conscious rats, whereas it increased the heart rate slightly but not significantly in the anesthetized rats. Microinjection of 100 nmol of glycine into the RVLM of conscious rat decreased MAP and RSNA. In 2 of the 6 rats examined, the depressor and sympathoinhibitory responses were preceded by a few seconds of a pressor and sympathoexcitatory phase. The decreases of RSNA in response to glycine injection were significantly larger in the conscious rats than in the anesthetized rats, whereas the magnitude of the depressor responses was similar in the two groups of rats. Heart rate decreased in response to glycine injection into the RVLM in the conscious and the anesthetized rats. In conclusion, in conscious unrestrained rats, as well as in urethane-anesthetized rats, L-glutamate acts as a sympathoexcitatory agent and glycine acts as a sympathoinhibitory agent in the RVLM. The sympathetic responses to these amino acids are larger in conscious rats than in anesthetized rats.

Anesthesia, General↗
PubMed2005

Individual effect-site concentrations of propofol are similar at loss of consciousness and at awakening.

Reported effect-site concentrations of propofol at loss of consciousness and recovery of consciousness vary widely. Thus, no single concentration based on a population average will prove optimal for individual patients. We therefore tested the hypothesis that individual propofol effect-site concentrations at loss and return of consciousness are similar. Propofol effect-site concentrations at loss and recovery of consciousness were estimated with a target-control infusion system in 20 adults. Propofol effect-site concentrations were gradually increased until the volunteers lost consciousness (no response to verbal stimuli); unconsciousness was maintained for 15 min, and the volunteers were then awakened. This protocol was repeated three times in each volunteer. Our major outcomes were the concentration producing unconsciousness and the relationship between the estimated effect-site concentrations at loss and recovery of consciousness. The target effect-site propofol concentration was 2.0 +/- 0.9 at loss of consciousness and 1.8 +/- 0.7 at return of consciousness (P <0.001). The average difference between individual effect-site concentrations at return and loss of consciousness was only 0.17 +/- 0.32 microg/mL (95% confidence interval for the difference 0.09-0.25 microg/mL). Our results thus suggest that individual titration to loss of consciousness is an alternative to dosing propofol on the basis of average population requirements.

Adult↗
PubMed1991

[Consciousness and the electroencephalogram].

In the course of 12 years the authors subjected to clinical EEG and stereo-EEG (SEEG) 72 patients (66 epileptics with the diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy and grand mal) and six psychotic patients suffering from schizophrenia. With the exception of five epileptics and two psychotic patients all subjects had epileptic foci in the amygdalohippocampal complex (AHK). After coagulation of these foci marked improvement of the fits and the mental state occurred in half the patients. During EEG and SEEG recording the authors used different activation methods (hyperventilation through the nose and mouth, sleep, listening to music) and above all direct electric stimulation (ES) of one of the AHK. Secondary epileptic foci had, as a rule, more spikes and a lower threshold for ES than primary ones which contained more delta and slow theta waves. The ES led as a rule to an emotional response, such as anxiety and fear, more rarely to illusions, depersonalization and oneiroid hallucinations and twice to a hedonic response of non-sexual character. The purpose of ES was to assess the site from where it is possible to start the original aura or typical parox. The authors considered these foci, consistent with data in the literature, as the leading focus and it was subsequently coagulated. The authors investigated the reactivity and vigility by the patient's response to sound (the patient had to press a button) and by an interview with the patient. It was revealed that in isolated discharges of the spikes and waves in the scalp electrodes, i.e. in the neocortex, reactivity is lacking. In isolated discharges in the AHK the reactivity was satisfactory, but as a rule anxiety developed. It is thus possible to divide consciousness into emotional consciousness with its site in the AHK, i.e. in the limbic system, and rational consciousness which is a function of the neocrotical system. Congenital changes of consciousness such as vigility or sleep are described as "states" of consciousness. The rational or emotional aspect of behaviour is described as "type" of consciousness. Under normal conditions the states of consciousness alternate periodically and are sharply defined, the types of consciousness are closely linked and are difficult to separate. Under pathological conditions the "states" of consciousness differ less markedly and the "types" of consciousness are in dissociation. Thus obnubilation, depersonalization, illusions, pathic affects etc. develop, as a rule as part of the epileptiform or psychotiform syndrome.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1983

Treatment of children with posttraumatic transient loss of consciousness.

Recommendations for the treatment of asymptomatic children who have had a brief period of loss of consciousness due to blunt head trauma are anecdotal and vary greatly. The purpose of this study is to define the range of practice in treating children with uncomplicated loss of consciousness by determining: (1) the frequency of "routine" hospitalization for observation and (2) those criteria which, when present, result in hospitalization. A total of 957 pediatricians representing five groups of physicians responded to a nationwide questionnaire survey to determine current treatment practices for uncomplicated loss of consciousness. Of all directors of pediatric emergency rooms and pediatric chief residents, 44% routinely hospitalize all patients who have had loss of consciousness. Academic child neurologists and child neurologists in private practice hospitalize these patients least frequently, 29% and 31%, respectively (P less than 0.05). Of pediatricians in private practice, 38% admit all children with loss of consciousness. Pediatricians from all groups who do not routinely hospitalize all children with uncomplicated loss of consciousness showed similarity in the criteria they use for admission. These variables include: abnormal vital signs (97% to 100%), skull fracture (96% to 100%), suspicion of child abuse (93% to 100%), observation of a change in level of consciousness (92% to 99%), unreliable caretaker at home (91% to 98%), vomiting (90% to 99%), history of a change in level of consciousness (88% to 100%), duration of loss of consciousness (88% to 96%), seizure (77% to 94%), age of child (62% to 75%), child nearly back to normal (32% to 48%), dizziness (22% to 49%), witness of loss of consciousness not reliable (24% to 36%), headache (9% to 16%), and decision deferred to neurosurgeon (2% to 7%).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Adult↗
PubMed2003

New evidence of animal consciousness.

This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Animal Communication↗
PubMed2003

Changes in MRI signal intensity during hypercapnic challenge under conscious and anesthetized conditions.

Most functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in animals are conducted under anesthesia to minimize motion artifacts. However, methods and techniques have been developed recently for imaging fully conscious rats. Functional MRI studies on conscious animals report enhanced BOLD signal changes as compared to the anesthetized condition. In this study, rats were exposed to different concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO(2)) while conscious and anesthetized to test whether cerebrovascular reactivity may be contributing to these enhanced BOLD signal changes. Hypercapnia produced significantly greater increases in MRI signal intensity in fully conscious animals (6.7-13.3% changes) as when anesthetized with 1% isoflurane (3.2-4.9% changes). In addition, the response to hypercapnia was more immediate in the conscious condition (< 30s) with signal risetimes twice as fast as in the anesthetized state (60s). Both cortical and subcortical brain regions showed a robust, dose- dependent increase in MRI signal intensity with hypercapnic challenge while the animals were conscious but little or no change when anesthetized. Baseline variations in MRI signal were higher while animals were conscious but this was off set by greater signal intensity changes leading to a greater contrast-to-noise ratio, 13.1 in conscious animals, as compared to 8.0 in the anesthetized condition. In summary, cerebral vasculature appears to be more sensitive to hypercapnic challenge in the conscious condition resulting in enhanced T2* MRI signal intensity and the potential for better BOLD signal changes during functional imaging.

Anesthesia↗
PubMed1998

Investigating the biology of consciousness.

The fact that consciousness is a private, first-person phenomenon makes it more difficult to study than other cognitive phenomena that, although being equally private, also have characteristic behavioural signatures. Nonetheless, by combining cognitive and neurobiological methods, it is possible to approach consciousness, to describe its cognitive nature, its behavioural correlates, its possible evolutionary origin and functional role; last but not least, it is possible to investigate its neuroanatomical and neurophysiological underpinnings. In this brief essay I distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core consciousness corresponds to the transient process that is incessantly generated relative to any object with which an organism interacts, and during which a transient core self and transient sense of knowing are automatically generated. Core consciousness requires neither language nor working memory, and needs only a brief short-term memory. Extended consciousness is a more complex process. It depends on the gradual build-up of an autobiographical self, a set of conceptual memories pertaining to both past and anticipated experiences of an individual, and it requires conventional memory. Extended consciousness is enhanced by language.

Biological Evolution↗
PubMed1983

The effects of apomorphine upon local cerebral glucose utilization in conscious rats and in rats anesthetized with chloral hydrate.

The effects of the dopaminergic agonist apomorphine (1 mg . kg-1 i.v.) upon local cerebral glucose utilization in 43 anatomically discrete regions of the CNS were examined in conscious, lightly restrained rats and in rats anesthetized with chloral hydrate by means of the quantitative autoradiographic [14C]2-deoxyglucose technique. In animals anesthetized with chloral hydrate, glucose utilization was reduced throughout all regions of the CNS from the levels observed in conscious animals, although the magnitude of the reductions in glucose use displayed considerable regional heterogeneity. With chloral hydrate anesthesia, the proportionately most marked reductions in glucose use (by 40-60% from conscious levels) were noted in primary auditory nuclei, thalmaic relay nuclei, and neocortex, and the least pronounced reductions in glucose use (by 15-25% from conscious levels) were observed in limbic areas, some motor relay nuclei, and white matter. In conscious, lightly restrained rats, the administration of apomorphine (1 mg . kg-1) effected significant increased in glucose utilization in 15 regions of the CNS (e.g., subthalamic nucleus, ventral thalamic nucleus, rostral neocortex, substantia nigra, pars reticulata), and significant reductions in glucose utilization in two regions of the CNS (lateral habenular nucleus and anterior cingulate cortex). In rats anesthetized with chloral hydrate, the effects of apomorphine upon local glucose utilization were less widespread and less marked than in conscious animals. In only two of the regions (the globus pallidus and septal nucleus), which displayed increased glucose use following apomorphine in conscious rats, were significant increases in local glucose utilization observed with this agent in chloral hydrate-anesthetized rats. In the pars compacta of the substantia nigra, in which apomorphine increased glucose utilization in conscious animals, significant reductions in glucose utilization were observed following apomorphine in rats anesthetized with chloral hydrate. The profound effects of chloral hydrate anesthesia upon local cerebral glucose use, and the modification by this anesthetic regime of the local metabolic responses to apomorphine, emphasize the difficulties which exists in the extrapolation of data from anesthetized animals to the conditions which prevail in the conscious animal.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

Making sense of self-conscious emotion: linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism.

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment and shame are associated with 2 aspects of theory of mind (ToM): (a) the ability to understand that behavior has social consequences in the eyes of others and (b) an understanding of social norms violations. The present study aimed to link ToM with the recognition of self-conscious emotion. Children with and without autism identified facial expressions conscious of self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions from photographs. ToM was also measured. Children with autism performed more poorly than comparison children at identifying self-conscious emotions, though they did not differ in the recognition of non-self-conscious emotions. When ToM ability was statistically controlled, group differences in the recognition of self-conscious emotion disappeared. Discussion focused on the links between ToM and self-conscious emotion.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1998

Blindsight and shape perception: deficit of visual consciousness or of visual function?

Two people with homonymous right hemianopias were tested on a number of measures of non-conscious and conscious perception of shape in the blind field. Experiment 1 examined preparatory manual adjustments in grasping objects. Both subjects performed well above chance not only in three-dimensional location but also in preforming the hand to the shape, size and orientation of objects. In Experiment 2 single upper-case letters were briefly exposed in the blind field, and subjects made forced choices among 6 alternatives in the sighted field. Performance improved over blocks of trials and was above chance, but not dramatically. In Experiment 3 single upper-case words were briefly presented in the blind field, and subjects chose which of two words exposed after in the intact field was semantically closer. In Experiment 4 subjects had to give the meaning of single ambiguous words (e.g. BANK) presented both visually in the intact field and auditorily. Each ambiguous word was preceded by a single upper-case word briefly presented in the blind field, biasing each meaning on different blocks of trials (e.g. MONEY and RIVER). In Experiment 3, although results were in the appropriate direction, they were not consistently well above chance. By contrast, in Experiment 4 both subjects were consistently semantically biased to a high degree by words in the blind field. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 taken together suggest that indirect techniques (priming) are more sensitive to showing effects of non-conscious perception than direct ones (forced-choice). More importantly the experiments indicate that not only orientation but curvature, structural descriptions of component strokes and spatial ordering of letters are registered non-consciously in the blind field. Experiment 5 examined after-images in the blind and sighted fields, showing veridical conscious perception of shape in the blind field provided it was accompanied by a shape in the sighted field which together formed a good Gestalt. Experiment 6 showed conscious perception of illusory contours spanning the hemifields induced by Kanizsa figures. The experiments suggest that aspects of shape are much better perceived in blindsight than previously thought, that this is independent of their use in motor control, that the main deficit in blindsight is one of consciousness, and that the loss of conscious vision in the blind field is far from total. The effects and their relationship to those in other neuropsychological deficits suggest an intimate link between perceptual consciousness, attention and object perception.

Afterimage↗
PubMed1999

Ketamine preserves and propofol potentiates hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction compared with the conscious state in chronically instrumented dogs.

BACKGROUND: The authors tested the hypothesis that ketamine and propofol anesthesia would alter the magnitude of hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction compared with the conscious state. In addition, they assessed the extent to which cyclooxygenase pathway inhibition and adenosine triphosphate-sensitive potassium channel inhibition modulate hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction in the conscious state, and whether these pathways are altered during propofol anesthesia. METHODS: Twenty conditioned, male mongrel dogs were chronically instrumented to measure the left pulmonary vascular pressure-flow relationship. Pressure-flow plots were measured during normoxia and hypoxia (systemic arterial PO2 reduced to about 60 and about 50 mm Hg) on separate days in the conscious state, during ketamine anesthesia, and during propofol anesthesia. The effects of indomethacin and glibenclamide on the magnitude of hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction were also assessed in the conscious and propofol-anesthetized states. RESULTS: Neither ketamine nor propofol had an effect on the baseline pressure-flow relationship during normoxia compared with the conscious state. Hypoxia resulted in stimulus-dependent pulmonary vasoconstriction (P<0.01) in the conscious state. Compared with the conscious state, the magnitude of hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction was preserved during ketamine but was potentiated (P<0.01) during propofol anesthesia. Indomethacin enhanced (P<0.01) hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction in both the conscious and propofol-anesthetized states. In contrast, glibenclamide only enhanced (P<0.01) hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction in the conscious state and had no effect during propofol anesthesia. CONCLUSION: Hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction is preserved during ketamine anesthesia but is potentiated during propofol anesthesia. The potentiated response during propofol anesthesia appears to be caused by inhibition of adenosine triphosphate-sensitive potassium channel-mediated pulmonary vasodilation.

Anesthetics, Dissociative↗