PubMed2000
In sum, there are four sets of social factors that help us understand why juvenile violence appears when, and where, it does, and why some communities and entire societies are persistently wracked by youth violence whereas others are largely spared its worst expressions. When it comes to the first three factors in particular--deprivation, disorganization, and brutalization--the evidence for these links is as strong as anything in social science, and that evidence is supported by a variety of sources and a variety of methods of investigation. Such investigation includes the knowledge we gain through social intervention. Some of the most effective violence prevention programs are successful precisely because they confront and deflect the social forces that otherwise often lead to violence. Consider, for example, the home-visiting programs that work with poor parents in disorganized communities to lower the risks of child abuse; and some of the more "holistic" or "multisystemic" efforts to work with violent juvenile offenders. The best of these programs work by tackling the problems of social isolation and lack of supports in the community, as well as immediate issues of economic survival for vulnerable families and children. More generally, we know that the availability of steady and rewarding work in the future, of the kind that can reliably sustain a family, is one of the most important factors allowing some youths to "desist" from violence as they mature. These conclusions give us much to be encouraged about, and much to be alarmed about. On the one hand, understanding that youth violence often is rooted in a set of adverse social conditions that are identifiable, and potentially modifiable, is a fundamentally optimistic message. It reminds us that the level of juvenile violence we suffer in America today is neither fated nor inevitable. Other societies that are in many respects much like us suffer far less of it; so could we, and we increasingly understand some of the ways in which we could make that happen. We know that some programs designed to increase opportunities and supports for high-risk youth and families do work, and we know that there are broader social and economic policies--policies that are not abstract visions, but have actually been put into place in societies much like our own--that can significantly diminish the pressures toward violence that are bred by poverty and social insecurity among the young. But knowing what to do is one thing, and actually doing it is another. In this there is much reason for concern. The 7-year economic boom that began in the early 1990s has had salutary effects on youth violence, mainly by providing improved economic opportunities for low-income youth and, accordingly, diminishing the appeal of illegal activities. Despite that extraordinary burst of sustained prosperity, however, too many of America's youth remain impoverished, sometimes desperately so: the boom has had only limited effect on our disturbingly high rates of family poverty, which continue to tower above those of comparable industrial societies. And if the boom should come to an end, and we enter again into a period of rising joblessness for youth and young adults, then much, or all, of the recent gains could be quickly lost. The positive economic trends that have helped take the edge off serious juvenile violence in the past few years, in short, are both partial and fragile. Worse, some of our recent social and economic policies, at both state and federal levels, are working in the opposite direction. Some variants of welfare reform, for example, have tossed many vulnerable families off of public assistance without offering solid economic opportunities in its place. Many more families face this future as federal time limits on public welfare increasingly come into play. Given what we know about the links between deprivation and youth violence, this is not a development we can celebrate. (ABSTRACT TRUNCATED)