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PubMed2002

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks--United States, 1999-2000.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for the occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs).This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning the scope and effects of waterborne diseases on persons in the United States. REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data regarding outbreaks occurring during January 1999-December 2000 and previously unreported outbreaks occurring in 1995 and 1997. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM: The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated with drinking water and recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The unit of analysis for the WBDO surveillance system is an outbreak, not an individual case of a waterborne disease. Two criteria must be met for an event to be defined as a WBDO. First, > or = 2 persons must have experienced a similar illness after either ingestion of drinking water or exposure to water encountered in recreational or occupational settings. This criterion is waived for single cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis and for single cases of chemical poisoning if water-quality data indicate contamination by the chemical. Second, epidemiologic evidence must implicate water as the probable source of the illness. RESULTS: During 1999-2000, a total of 39 outbreaks associated with drinking water was reported by 25 states. Included among these 39 outbreaks was one outbreak that spanned 10 states. These 39 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 2,068 persons and were linked to two deaths. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 22 (56.4%) of the 39 outbreaks; 20 of the 22 identified outbreaks were associated with pathogens, and two were associated with chemical poisoning. Of the 17 outbreaks involving acute gastroenteritis of unknown etiology, one was a suspected chemical poisoning, and the remaining 16 were suspected as having an infectious cause. Twenty-eight (71.8%) of 39 outbreaks were linked to groundwater sources; 18 (64.3%) of these 28 groundwater outbreaks were associated with private or noncommunity wells that were not regulated by EPA. Fifty-nine outbreaks from 23 states were attributed to recreational water exposure and affected an estimated 2,093 persons. Thirty-six (61.0%) of the 59 were outbreaks involving gastroenteritis. The etiologic agent was identified in 30 (83.3%) of 36 outbreaks involving gastroenteritis. Twenty-two (61.1%) of 36 gastroenteritis-related outbreaks were associated with pools or interactive fountains. Four (6.8%) of the 59 recreational water outbreaks were attributed to single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) caused by Naegleria fowleri. All four cases were fatal. Fifteen (25.4%) of the 59 outbreaks were associated with dermatitis; 12 (80.0%) of 15 were associated with hot tubs or pools. In addition, recreational water outbreaks of leptospirosis, Pontiac fever, and chemical keratitis, as well as two outbreaks of leptospirosis and Pontiac fever associated with occupational exposure were also reported to CDC. INTERPRETATION: The proportion of drinking water outbreaks associated with surface water increased from 11.8% during 1997-1998 to 17.9% in 1999-2000. The proportion of outbreaks (28) associated with groundwater sources increased 87% from the previous reporting period (15 outbreaks), and these outbreaks were primarily associated (60.7%) with consumption of untreated groundwater. Recreational water outbreaks involving gastroenteritis doubled (36 outbreaks) from the number of outbreaks reported in the previous reporting period (18 outbreaks). These outbreaks were most frequently associated with Cryptosporidium parvum (68.2%) in treated water venues (e.g., swimming pools or interactive fountains) and by Escherichia coli O157:H7 (21.4%) in freshwater venues. The increase in the number of outbreaks probably reflects improved surveillance and reporting at the local and state level as well as a true increase in the number of WBDOs. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION: CDC and others have used surveillance data to identify the types of water systems, their deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks and evaluated current technologies for providing safe drinking water and safe recreational water. Surveillance data are used also to establish research priorities, which can lead to improved water-quality regulations. Only the groundwater systems under the influence of surface water are required to disinfect their water supplies, but EPA is developing a groundwater rule that specifies when corrective action (including disinfection) is required. CDC and EPA are conducting epidemiologic studies to assess the level of waterborne illness attributable to municipal drinking water in nonoutbreak conditions. Rules under development by EPA--the Ground Water Rule (GWR), the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR), and Stage 2 Disinfection Byproduct Rules (DBPR)--are expected to further protect the public from contaminants and disinfection byproducts in drinking water. Efforts by EPA under the Beaches Environmental Assessment, Closure, and Health (BEACH) program are aimed at reducing the risks for infection attributed to ambient recreational water by strengthening beach standards and testing; providing faster laboratory test methods; predicting pollution; investing in health and methods research; and improving public access to information regarding both the quality of the water at beaches and information concerning health risks associated with swimming in polluted water. EPA's Beach Watch (available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches) provides online information regarding water quality at U.S. beaches, local protection programs, and other beach-related programs. CDC partnered with a consortium of local and national pool associations to develop a series of health communication materials for the general public who attend treated recreational water venues and to staff who work at those venues. CDC has also developed a recreational water outbreak investigation toolkit that can be used by public health professionals. All of the CDC materials are accessible at the CDC Healthy Swimming website (http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming).

Communicable Diseases↗
PubMed1998

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks--United States, 1995-1996.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and periodically reporting data that relate to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs). REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data for January 1995 through December 1996 and previously unreported outbreaks in 1994. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM: The surveillance system includes data about outbreaks associated with drinking water and recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and for voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. RESULTS: For the period 1995-1996, 13 states reported a total of 22 outbreaks associated with drinking water. These outbreaks caused an estimated total of 2,567 persons to become ill. No deaths were reported. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 14 (63.6%) of the 22 outbreaks. Giardia lamblia and Shigella sonnei each caused two (9.1%) of the 22 outbreaks; Escherichia coli O157:H7, Plesiomonas shigelloides, and a small round structured virus were implicated for one outbreak (4.5%) each. One of the two outbreaks of giardiasis involved the largest number of cases, with an estimated 1,449 ill persons. Seven outbreaks (31.8% of 22) of chemical poisoning, which involved a total of 90 persons, were reported. Copper and nitrite were associated with two outbreaks (9.1% of 22) each and sodium hydroxide, chlorine, and concentrated liquid soap with one outbreak (4.5%) each. Eleven (50.0%) of the 22 outbreaks were linked to well water, eight in noncommunity and three in community systems. Only three of the 10 outbreaks associated with community water systems were caused by problems at water treatment plants; the other seven resulted from problems in the water distribution systems and plumbing of individual facilities (e.g., a restaurant). Six of the seven outbreaks were associated with chemical contamination of the drinking water; the seventh outbreak was attributed to a small round structured virus. Four of the seven outbreaks occurred because of backflow or backsiphonage through a cross-connection, and two occurred because of high levels of copper that leached into water after the installation of new plumbing. For three of the four outbreaks caused by contamination from a cross-connection, an improperly installed vacuum breaker or a faulty backflow prevention device was identified; no protection against backsiphonage was found for the fourth outbreak. Thirty-seven outbreaks from 17 states were attributed to recreational water exposure and affected an estimated 9,129 persons, including 8,449 persons in two large outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis. Twenty-two (59.5%) of these 37 were outbreaks of gastroenteritis; nine (24.3%) were outbreaks of dermatitis; and six (16.2%) were single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis caused by Naegleria fowleri, all of which were fatal. The etiologic agent was identified for 33 (89.2%) of the 37 outbreaks. Six (27.3%) of the 22 outbreaks of gastroenteritis were caused by Cryptosporidium parvum and six (27.3%) by E. coli O157:H7. All of the latter were associated with unchlorinated water (i.e., in lakes) or inadequately chlorinated water (i.e., in a pool). Thirteen (59.1%) of these 22 outbreaks were associated with lake water, eight (36.4%) with swimming or wading pools, and one(4.5%) with a hot spring. Of the nine outbreaks of dermatitis, seven (77.8%) were outbreaks of Pseudomonas dermatitis associated with hot tubs, and two (22.2%) were lake-associated outbreaks of swimmer's itch caused by Schistosoma species. INTERPRETATION: WBDOs caused by E. coli O157:H7 were reported more frequently than in previous years and were associated primarily with recreational lake water. This finding suggests the need for better monitoring of water quality and identification of sources of

Communicable Disease Control↗
PubMed1996

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks--United States, 1993-1994.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and periodically reporting data that relate to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs). REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data for January 1993 through December 1994 and for previously unreported outbreaks in 1992. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM: The surveillance system includes data about outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking (i.e., drinking water) and those associated with recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. RESULTS: For the 2-year period 1993-1994, 17 states and one territory reported a total of 30 outbreaks associated with drinking water. These outbreaks caused an estimated 405,366 persons to become ill, including 403,000 from an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee, the largest WBDO ever documented in the United States, and 2,366 from the other 29 outbreaks. No etiologic agent was identified for five (16.7%) of the 30 outbreaks. The protozoan parasites Giardia lamblia and Cryptosporidium parvum caused 10 (40.0%) of the 25 outbreaks for which the etiologic agent was identified. Two outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis occurred in large metropolitan areas (i.e., Milwaukee and Las Vegas/Clark County) and were associated with deaths among immunocompromised persons. The waterborne nature of these two outbreaks was not recognized until at least 2 weeks after the onset of the Milwaukee outbreak and until after the end of the Las Vegas outbreak. Campylobacter jejuni was implicated for three outbreaks and the following pathogens for one outbreak each: Shigella sonnei, Shigella flexneri, non-O1 Vibrio cholerae (in a U.S. territory; the vehicle was commercially bottled water), and Salmonella serotype Typhimurium (the outbreak was associated with seven deaths). Eight outbreaks of chemical poisoning were reported: three were caused by lead (one case each), two by fluoride, two by nitrate and one by copper. Twenty (66.7%) of the 30 outbreaks were associated with a well-water source. Fourteen states reported a total of 26 outbreaks associated with recreational water, in which an estimated 1,714 persons became ill. Fourteen (53.8%) of these 26 were outbreaks of gastroenteritis. The etiologic agent in each of these 14 outbreaks was identified; 10 (71.4%) were caused by G. lamblia or C. parvum. Six of these 10 were associated with chlorinated, filtered pool water, and three with lake water. One of the latter was the first reported outbreak of cryptosporidiosis associated with the recreational use of lake water. Four outbreaks of lake water-associated bacterial gastroenteritis were reported, two caused by S. sonnei, one by S. flexneri, and one by Escherichia coli O157:H7. Nine outbreaks of hot tub- whirlpool-, or swimming pool-associated pseudomonas dermatitis were reported. Two outbreaks of swimming pool-associated dermatitis had a suspected chemical etiology. The child who had the one reported case of primary amebic meningoencephalitis, caused by infection with Naegleria fowleri, died. INTERPRETATION: The number of WBDOs reported annually has been similar for each year during 1987-1994, except for an increase in 1992. Protozoan parasites, especially C. parvum and G. lamblia, remain important etiologic agents of WBDOs. The outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee and Las Vegas demonstrate that WBDOs can occur in large metropolitan areas. Surveillance methods are needed that expedite the detection of WBDOs and the institution of preventive measures (e.g., boil-water advisories). ACTIONS TAKEN: Surveillance data that identify the types of water systems, their deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks are used to evaluate the adequacy of current technologies for prov

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water--United States, 2001-2002.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and periodically reporting data related to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs). This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning the scope and effects of waterborne disease outbreaks on persons in the United States. REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data on WBDOs associated with drinking water that occurred during January 2001-December 2002 and on three previously unreported outbreaks that occurred during 2000. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and the Freely Associated States are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated with both drinking water and recreational water; only outbreaks associated with drinking water are reported in this summary. RESULTS: During 2001-2002, a total of 31 WBDOs associated with drinking water were reported by 19 states. These 31 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 1,020 persons and were linked to seven deaths. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 24 (77.4%) of the 31 outbreaks. Of the 24 identified outbreaks, 19 (79.2%) were associated with pathogens, and five (20.8%) were associated with acute chemical poisonings. Five outbreaks were caused by norovirus, five by parasites, and three by non-Legionella bacteria. All seven outbreaks involving acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology were suspected of having an infectious cause. For the first time, this MMWR Surveillance Summary includes drinking water-associated outbreaks of Legionnaires disease (LD); six outbreaks of LD occurred during 2001-2002. Of the 25 non-Legionella associated outbreaks, 23 (92.0%) were reported in systems that used groundwater sources; nine (39.1%) of these 23 groundwater outbreaks were associated with private noncommunity wells that were not regulated by EPA. INTERPRETATION: The number of drinking water-associated outbreaks decreased from 39 during 1999-2000 to 31 during 2001-2002. Two (8.0%) outbreaks associated with surface water occurred during 2001-2002; neither was associated with consumption of untreated water. The number of outbreaks associated with groundwater sources decreased from 28 during 1999-2000 to 23 during 2001-2002; however, the proportion of such outbreaks increased from 73.7% to 92.0%. The number of outbreaks associated with untreated groundwater decreased from 17 (44.7%) during 1999-2000 to 10 (40.0%) during 2001-2002. Outbreaks associated with private, unregulated wells remained relatively stable, although more outbreaks involving private, treated wells were reported during 2001-2002. Because the only groundwater systems that are required to disinfect their water supplies are public systems under the influence of surface water, these findings support EPA's development of a groundwater rule that specifies when corrective action (including disinfection) is required. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION: CDC and EPA use surveillance data 1) to identify the types of water systems, their deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks and 2) to evaluate the adequacy of technologies for providing safe drinking water. Surveillance data are used also to establish research priorities, which can lead to improved water-quality regulations. CDC and EPA recently completed epidemiologic studies that assess the level of waterborne illness attributable to municipal drinking water in nonoutbreak conditions. The decrease in outbreaks in surface water systems is attributable primarily to implementation of provisions of EPA rules enacted since the late 1980s. Rules under development by EPA are expected to protect the public further from microbial contaminants while addressing risk tradeoffs of disinfection byproducts in drinking water.

Disease Outbreaks↗
PubMed2004

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with recreational water--United States, 2001-2002.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and periodically reporting data related to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) related to drinking water; tabulation of recreational water-associated outbreaks was added to the surveillance system in 1978. This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning the scope and effects of waterborne disease outbreaks on persons in the United States. REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data on WBDOs associated with recreational water that occurred during January 2001-December 2002 and on a previously unreported outbreak that occurred during 1998. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and the Freely Associated States are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated with both drinking water and recreational water; only outbreaks associated with recreational water are reported in this summary. RESULTS: During 2001-2002, a total of 65 WBDOs associated with recreational water were reported by 23 states. These 65 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 2,536 persons; 61 persons were hospitalized, eight of whom died. This is the largest number of recreational water-associated outbreaks to occur since reporting began in 1978; the number of recreational water-associated outbreaks has increased significantly during this period (p<0.01). Of these 65 outbreaks, 30 (46.2%) involved gastroenteritis. The etiologic agent was identified in 23 (76.7%) of these 30 outbreaks; 18 (60.0%) of the 30 were associated with swimming or wading pools. Eight (12.3%) of the 65 recreational water-associated disease outbreaks were attributed to single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis caused by Naegleria fowleri; all eight cases were fatal and were associated with swimming in a lake (n = seven; 87.5%) or river (n = one; 12.5%). Of the 65 outbreaks, 21 (32.3%) involved dermatitis; 20 (95.2%) of these 21 outbreaks were associated with spas or pools. In addition, one outbreak of Pontiac fever associated with a spa was reported to CDC. Four (6.1%) of the 65 outbreaks involved acute respiratory illness associated with chemical exposure at pools. INTERPRETATION: The 30 outbreaks involving gastroenteritis comprised the largest proportion of recreational water-associated outbreaks during this reporting period. These outbreaks were associated most frequently with Cryptosporidium (50.0%) in treated water venues and with toxigenic Escherichia coli (25.0%) and norovirus (25.0%) in freshwater venues. The increase in the number of outbreaks since 1993 could reflect improved surveillance and reporting at the local and state level, a true increase in the number of WBDOs, or a combination of these factors. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION: CDC uses surveillance data to identify the etiologic agents, types of aquatics venues, water-treatment systems, and deficiencies associated with outbreaks and to evaluate the adequacy of efforts (e.g., regulations and public awareness activities) for providing safe recreational water. Surveillance data are also used to establish public health prevention priorities, which might lead to improved water-quality regulations at the local, state, and federal levels.

Dermatitis↗
PubMed2006

Surveillance for foodborne-disease outbreaks--United States, 1998-2002.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1973, CDC has maintained a collaborative surveillance program for collection and periodic reporting of data on the occurrence and causes of foodborne-disease outbreaks (FBDOs) in the United States. REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: 1998-2002. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: The Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System reviews data on FBDOs, defined as the occurrence of two or more cases of a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a common food. State and local public health departments have primary responsibility for identifying and investigating FBDOs. State, local, and territorial health departments use a standard form to report these outbreaks to CDC. In 1998, CDC implemented enhanced surveillance for FBDOs by increasing communication with state, local, and territorial health departments and revising the outbreak report form. Since 2001, reports of FBDOs are submitted through a web application on the Internet called the electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS). RESULTS: During 1998-2002, a total of 6,647 outbreaks of foodborne disease were reported (1,314 in 1998, 1,343 in 1999, 1,417 in 2000, 1,243 in 2001, and 1,330 in 2002). These outbreaks caused a reported 128,370 persons to become ill. Among 2,167 (33%) outbreaks for which the etiology was determined, bacterial pathogens caused the largest percentage of outbreaks (55%) and the largest percentage of cases (55%). Among bacterial pathogens, Salmonella serotype Enteritidis accounted for the largest number of outbreaks and outbreak-related cases; Listeria monocytogenes accounted for the majority of deaths of any pathogen. Viral pathogens, predominantly norovirus, caused 33% of outbreaks and 41% of cases; the proportion of outbreaks attributed to viral agents increased from 16% in 1998 to 42% in 2002. Chemical agents caused 10% of outbreaks and 2% of cases, and parasites caused 1% of outbreaks and 1% of cases. INTERPRETATION: Following implementation of measures to enhance outbreak surveillance, the annual number of FBDOs reported to CDC increased during this period compared with previous years. Viral pathogens accounted for an increased proportion of outbreaks each year during this reporting period and a higher proportion of outbreaks of known etiology during this reporting period than preceding reporting periods, probably reflecting the increased availability of improved viral diagnostic tests. S. Enteritidis continued to be a major cause of illness and L. monocytogenes was a major cause of death. In addition, multistate outbreaks caused by contaminated produce and outbreaks caused by Escherichia coli O157:H7 remained prominent. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIONS: Methods to detect FBDOs are improving, and several changes to improve the ease and timeliness of reporting FBDO data have been implemented (e.g., a revised form to simplify FBDO reporting by state health departments and improved electronic reporting methods). State and local health departments continue to investigate and report FBDOs as part of efforts to better understand and define the epidemiology of foodborne disease in the United States. At the regional and national levels, surveillance data provide an indication of the etiologic agents, vehicles of transmission, and contributing factors associated with FBDOs and help direct public health actions to reduce illness and death caused by FBDOs.

Disease Outbreaks↗
PubMed1993

Surveillance for waterborne disease outbreaks--United States, 1991-1992.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have maintained a collaborative surveillance program for collection and periodic reporting of data on the occurrence and causes of waterborne disease outbreaks. REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: January 1991 through December 1992. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: The surveillance system includes data about outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking and also about those associated with recreational water. State and local public health departments are the agencies with primary responsibility for the detection and investigation of outbreaks. State and territorial health departments report these outbreaks to CDC on a standard form. RESULTS: For the 2-year period 1991-1992, 17 states and territories reported 34 outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking. The outbreaks caused an estimated 17,464 persons to become ill. A protozoal parasite (Giardia lamblia or Cryptosporidium) was identified as the etiologic agent for seven of the 11 outbreaks for which an agent was determined. Five (71%) of the outbreaks caused by protozoa were associated with a surface-influenced groundwater source. One outbreak of cryptosporidiosis was associated with filtered and chlorinated surface water. Shigella sonnei and hepatitis A virus were implicated in one outbreak each; both were linked to consumption of contaminated well water. Two outbreaks due to acute chemical poisoning were reported; one had an associated fatality. No etiology was established for 23 (68%) of the 34 outbreaks, including the largest one reported during this period, in which an estimated 9,847 persons using a filtered surface water supply developed gastroenteritis. Most (76%) of the 34 outbreaks were associated with a well water source. Twenty-one states reported 39 outbreaks associated with recreational water, in which an estimated 1,825 persons became ill. The most frequently reported illness was hot tub- or whirlpool-associated Pseudomonas dermatitis (12 outbreaks). Of 11 outbreaks of swimming-associated gastroenteritis, six were caused by Giardia or Cryptosporidium, including three outbreaks associated with chlorinated, filtered pool water. The first reported outbreak of Escherichia coli O157:H7 infection associated with recreational exposure occurred during this period. Primary amebic meningoencephalitis, caused by Naegleria fowleri infection, resulted in six deaths. INTERPRETATION: The number of waterborne disease outbreaks reported per year has not changed substantially in the past 5 years. However, etiologic agents only recently associated with waterborne disease, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Cryptosporidium, are being reported more frequently and from new settings. Water quality data for outbreaks during the period 1991-1992 indicate that available water disinfection technology is not always in place or used reliably.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

Animals↗
PubMed2026

The 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola Outbreak: A Warning for Global Preparedness for Future Epidemics.

Dear Editor, The 2026 Bundibugyo Ebolavirus (BDBV) outbreak has once again demonstrated that the threat of emerging diseases remains a major global health challenge. The outbreak, first detected in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and spread to Uganda, is not only a regional crisis but also a test of the world's preparedness for pathogens with epidemic potential. Unlike Zaire Ebolavirus (EBOV), which has benefited from effective vaccines and treatments in recent years, BDBV still lacks a licensed vaccine or specific treatment[1]. As of June 6, a total of 515 laboratory-confirmed cases and 91 deaths have been reported in DRC, while Uganda has reported 19 laboratory-confirmed cases and two deaths. The occurrence of unexplained deaths among both the community and healthcare workers, along with prior reports of an unidentified hemorrhagic fever, suggest that the outbreak has been likely originated in March 2026 or even earlier. Accordingly, the virus is believed to have spread unnoticed for several weeks before being identified through genomic sequencing in mid-May 2026[2]. The resurgence of Ebola in Africa results from a complex interaction of environmental, social, and political factors. Deforestation, the development of mining activities, the expansion of agriculture, and increased human contact with wildlife have elevated the likelihood of spillovers from wildlife reservoirs, particularly fruit bats, which are considered the most likely natural hosts of ebolaviruses. Moreover, weak disease surveillance systems and limited access to health services have delayed the identification of early cases. The similarity of the initial symptoms of Ebola to other endemic diseases in the region, such as malaria, makes early diagnosis difficult and provides ample opportunity for transmission to spread. Insecurity, misinformation, attacks on healthcare facilities, and armed conflict in the region have also posed serious challenges to the implementation of contact tracing programs and rapid response to the epidemic[3,4]. One of the most critical challenges highlighted by this outbreak is the weakness of diagnostic capacities in the affected areas. The initial 2007 outbreak of BDBV proved that delayed lab confirmation paralyzes public health responses[5]. Now, dealing with a much larger outbreak in 2026, the persistence of this challenge highlights a dangerous failure to invest in diagnostic infrastructure over the last 19 years. Many health facilities do not have access to molecular laboratories, rapid sample transport systems, and biosafety infrastructure[6]. These limitations delay the diagnosis and isolation of patients, thus perpetuating disease transmission. Investment in the development of mobile laboratories, rapid point-of-care diagnostic tests, and digital reporting systems can dramatically reduce the time to diagnosis and response to an outbreak. The BDBV outbreak shows that laboratory preparedness must be considered an essential part of global health security. Furthermore, the early detection of emerging pathogens depends not only on diagnostic technologies but also on the expertise of local scientists who are able to recognize unusual epidemiological and laboratory patterns. During the current outbreak, suspected Ebola cases initially tested negative using common diagnostic tests (designed for Zaire Ebola Virus), which delayed the identification of the BDBV. Specifically, field-based diagnostics in Bunia were calibrated exclusively to detect the EBOV responsible for recent Congolese outbreaks. Consequently, patient samples collected throughout late April and early May yielded negative results, requiring cross-country transport to Kinshasa for genomic confirmation[2]. This experience revealed a major vulnerability in outbreak preparedness: diagnostic tools designed for known threats may be ineffective in detecting less common or unexpected pathogens. Therefore, strengthening local scientific capacities, developing genomic surveillance, and expanding access to flexible and adaptable diagnostic platforms should be considered as a top priority for global health security. The lack of a licensed vaccine for BDBV was one of the most significant challenges of this epidemic. While the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine has played a significant role in controlling Zaire ebolavirus, there is no licensed vaccine for BDBV. In response to this outbreak, efforts to develop mRNA-based vaccines, adenoviral vectors, rVSV-based vaccines, and multipotent vaccines have been accelerated[7]. However, the experience of this epidemic has shown that the development of medical products for rare diseases continues to face financial and investment constraints. This challenge highlights the need for sustained support from governments and international institutions for research and development of pathogens with epidemic potential. The 2026 Bundibugyo outbreak provides several key lessons for the global community. First, early detection and rapid diagnosis are the most important factors in containing the epidemic. The 19-year interval between the 2007 BDBV outbreak and the 2026 outbreak underscores persistent shortcomings in investment toward decentralized, pan-ebolavirus diagnostic infrastructure, with diagnostic delays hindering timely outbreak identification in both instances. Second, the trust and active participation of local communities are as important as medical interventions. Additionally, the rapid cross-border transmission dynamics between the DRC and Uganda demonstrate that blanket travel restrictions and border closures are impractical. As communities in the Great Lakes region routinely cross national borders for trade and healthcare, coordinated regional surveillance and timely information sharing are likely to be more effective than broad border closures in mitigating disease transmission[8]. Third, the protection of health workers must be a priority in preparedness plans. Fourth, a "One Health" approach is essential for simultaneous monitoring of humans, animals, and the environment. Although BDBV is not a new pathogen, the lack of licensed medical interventions and limited investment in research reflect many of the vulnerabilities associated with the concept of "Disease X."[9]. Unlike Zaire Ebola Virus, for which licensed vaccines and monoclonal antibody therapies are available, BDBV forces public health responses to rely almost entirely on non-pharmaceutical interventions such as isolation and infection control[10]. This gap reflects the structural inequity in global health research and development funding, with pathogens affecting resource-limited regions receiving insufficient attention until they spark an international emergency[2]. The BDBV outbreak proves that global epidemic preparedness cannot be pathogen-selective; it requires proactive investment in broad-spectrum countermeasures and resilient frontline health systems[8]. In conclusion, the 2026 BDBV outbreak is a serious wake-up call for the global health system. The epidemic revealed that gaps in surveillance systems, diagnostic capacities, vaccine development, and preparedness for emerging diseases persist. Investing in health infrastructure, developing Pan-Ebolavirus vaccines, strengthening laboratories, expanding the One-Health approach, and supporting research on emerging zoonotic pathogens must be at the top of global health security priorities. Otherwise, the BDBV outbreak may be just a prelude to larger crises to come.

Ebolavirus↗
PubMed2000

Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks--United States, 1997-1998.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Since 1971, CDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and periodically reporting data relating to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs). REPORTING PERIOD COVERED: This summary includes data from January 1997 through December 1998 and a previously unreported outbreak in 1996. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM: The surveillance system includes data regarding outbreaks associated with drinking water and recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. RESULTS: During 1997-1998, a total of 13 states reported 17 outbreaks associated with drinking water. These outbreaks caused an estimated 2,038 persons to become ill. No deaths were reported. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 12 (70.6%) of the 17 outbreaks; 15 (88.2%) were linked to groundwater sources. Thirty-two outbreaks from 18 states were attributed to recreational water exposure and affected an estimated 2,128 persons. Eighteen (56.3%) of the 32 were outbreaks of gastroenteritis, and 4 (12.5%) were single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis caused by Naegleria fowleri, all of which were fatal. The etiologic agent was identified for 29 (90.6%) of the 32 outbreaks, with one death associated with an Escherichia coli O157:H7 outbreak. Ten (55.6%) of the 18 gastroenteritis outbreaks were associated with treated pools or ornamental fountains. Of the eight outbreaks of dermatitis, seven (87.5%) were associated with hot tubs, pools, or springs. INTERPRETATION: Drinking water outbreaks associated with surface water decreased from 31.8% during 1995-1996 to 11.8% during 1997-1998. This reduction could be caused by efforts by the drinking water industry (e.g., Partnership for Safe Water), efforts by public health officials to improve drinking water quality, and improved water treatment after the implementation of EPA's Surface Water Treatment Rule. In contrast, the proportion of outbreaks associated with systems supplied by a groundwater source increased from 59.1% (i.e., 13) during 1995-1996 to 88.2% (i.e., 15) during 1997-1998. Outbreaks caused by parasites increased for both drinking and recreational water. All outbreaks of gastroenteritis attributed to parasites in recreational water were caused by Cryptosporidium, 90% occurred in treated water venues (e.g., swimming pools and decorative fountains), and fecal accidents were usually suspected. The data in this surveillance summary probably underestimate the true incidence of WBDOs because not all WBDOs are recognized, investigated, and reported to CDC or EPA. ACTIONS TAKEN: To estimate the national prevalence of waterborne disease associated with drinking water, CDC and EPA are conducting a series of epidemiologic studies to better quantify the level of waterborne disease associated with drinking water in nonoutbreak conditions. The Information Collection Rule implemented by EPA in collaboration with the drinking water industry helped quantifythe level of pathogens in surface water. Efforts by CDC to address recreational water outbreaks have included meetings with the recreational water industry, focus groups to educate parents on prevention of waterborne disease transmission in recreational water settings, and publications with guidelines for parents and pool operators.

Communicable Diseases↗
PubMed1996

Preventable disease in correctional facilities. Desmoteric foodborne outbreaks in the United States, 1974-1991.

BACKGROUND: Various disease outbreaks have been reported among prisoners. Recent foodborne outbreaks in correctional facilities in Georgia and Delaware prompted us to review the epidemiological characteristics of such outbreaks reported in the United States. METHODS: Foodborne outbreaks reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as part of routine surveillance from 1974 to 1991 were examined to identify outbreaks in jails, prisons, correctional facilities, and juvenile detention centers. Outbreak sizes, temporal trends, food vehicles, pathogens, and hygienic transgressions were analyzed. RESULTS: Eighty-eight desmoteric foodborne outbreaks involving 14307 cases of illness were reported from 31 states and territories. The mean outbreak size was 163 cases, compared with a mean of 31 cases for the 9107 reported outbreaks not involving prisoners. No fatalities among prisoners were reported. No pathogen was identified in 47 (53%) of the 88 outbreaks Salmonella species accounted for 15 (37%) of 41 outbreaks of known cause from 1974 to 1991, Clostridium perfringens for 14 (34%), and Staphylococcus aureus for 9 (22%). Fourteen of 15 Salmonella outbreaks occurred from 1984 to 1991. Food vehicles were reported for 63 (72%) of the outbreaks. Beef and poultry each were implicated in 9 (14%) of these, followed by fish or poultry salads and Mexican food, which accounted for 6 outbreaks (10%). Food-handling errors were reported for 69 (78%) of the 88 outbreaks. Improper food storage was reported in 62 (90%) of these. CONCLUSIONS: Foodborne outbreaks are reported regularly from correctional facilities in the United States. Outbreaks caused by Salmonella species, a special threat to prisoners with human immunodeficiency virus infection, seem to be increasing. Food production in correctional facilities should meet minimum safety standards, including sufficient refrigeration facilities, training of food handlers, and exemption of ill food handlers from work.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.↗
PubMed2003

Rotavirus detection and characterisation in outbreaks of gastroenteritis in aged-care facilities.

BACKGROUND: Although rotavirus is a major cause of gastroenteritis in children, its role in adult gastroenteritis and the sensitivity of different methods for its detection in specimens collected from adults are less well understood. OBJECTIVES: (1) To examine the frequency and seasonality of rotavirus-associated gastroenteritis outbreaks in aged-care facilities in Victoria, Australia. (2) To determine rotavirus type in these outbreaks. (3) To determine whether other enteropathogenic agents are present in specimens from these outbreaks. (4) To examine the sensitivity of different methods (electron microscopy (EM), reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), enzyme immunoassay (EIA) and latex agglutination (LA)) for the detection of rotavirus in specimens from adults. STUDY DESIGN: Specimens from gastroenteritis outbreaks in aged-care facilities forwarded to this laboratory for the years 1997-2000 were tested for enteropathogenic agents by various methods. Epidemiological, clinical and seasonal data from the rotavirus-positive outbreaks were analysed. RESULTS: Rotavirus was detected by EM in 18 out of 29 individuals associated with seven out of 53 (13%) gastroenteritis outbreaks in aged-care facilities; norovirus was detected in 22 outbreaks (42%) and astrovirus in one outbreak (2%). No mixed viral infection was found in any outbreak. All rotaviruses were typed as Group A by RT-PCR. The rotaviruses in the seven outbreaks were G-typed as follows: G2 (three outbreaks), G4 (two outbreaks), G1 (one outbreak) and G9 (one outbreak). The rotavirus-associated outbreaks were concentrated in mid-winter to mid-spring. The relative sensitivities of the Group A rotavirus detection methods (for the 29 specimens tested) were EM (18), first-round RT-PCR (11), second-round PCR (19), EIA-visual (19), EIA-photometric (19) and LA (13). CONCLUSIONS: In Victoria, Australia, outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with rotavirus are quite common in aged-care facilities. They involve Group A rotavirus and have a winter/spring seasonality. G-types G1, G2, G4 and G9 were all detected. EIA, second-round PCR and EM proved sensitive methods for rotavirus detection whereas first-round RT-PCR and LA did not.

Aged↗
PubMed2002

Epidemiology of Norwalk-like human caliciviruses in hospital outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis in the Stockholm area in 1996.

OBJECTIVES: Outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis associated with 'Norwalk-like viruses' (NLVs) cause significant health problems in hospitals. Hospital outbreaks in the Stockholm area in 1996 were investigated, in order to identify the magnitude of the problem, the mode of transmission, the effect of control measures and the genetic variability of outbreak strains. Determining the epidemiological and clinical significance involves a broad range of possibilities. METHODS: Ten hospitals, representing 66% of the hospitals in the Stockholm area, participated in the study, which included 211 wards. Of these, 18 were selected as control. A standardized protocol that included personal contacts was administered. Outbreak wards were visited between 5 and 10 times. Wards that had reported outbreaks in 1996 were prospectively followed through 1999 by personal contacts, and the available data from 1991 on outbreak reports were collected. A total of 253 stool samples from outbreaks in 1996 were analyzed by electron microscopy (EM) for the presence of NLVs. Positive samples were confirmed by the reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). RESULTS: In total, 4 326 patients and 1 119 staff were exposed on the 43 wards that reported 54 outbreaks. The mean attack rate was 13% for patients and 21% for staff. The number of outbreaks in 1996 outnumbered the reported outbreaks in the preceding years (4-70%) and later years (35-40%). Admission to 24 (56%) of the outbreak wards was stopped. The mean duration of illness for patients was 35 hours and for staff, 30 hours. The main symptoms were diarrhoea (80%) and vomiting (68%). Genotyping revealed that the majority of the hospital outbreaks in the Stockholm area in 1996 were caused by a single NLV strain. CONCLUSIONS: The study confirmed that outbreaks of NLV are an increasing public-health problem in hospitals. The risk of being affected by an outbreak was significantly greater on wards that had reported outbreaks in the previous year. It was not obvious which measures had helped to shorten the outbreaks to any appreciable extent. Different managements must therefore be carefully interpreted and adapted to the prevailing circumstances. Genotyping of strains is an important tool of getting a better insight into transmission routes and the mechanism behind the appearance of epidemic strains.

Acute Disease↗
PubMed2006

Involvement of closely related strains of a new clonal group of Listeria monocytogenes in the 1998-99 and 2002 multistate outbreaks of foodborne listeriosis in the United States.

In 1998-99, a multistate outbreak of listeriosis in the United States was associated with contaminated hot dogs and was caused by a strain of Listeria monocytogenes serotype 4b that had been only rarely encountered before in the national PulseNet database. Upon further characterization, the strains from this outbreak were designated as Epidemic Clone II (ECII). ECII isolates exhibited diversification in a genomic region ("region 18") that was otherwise conserved among L. monocytogenes of serotype 4b. Additional unique genetic markers were identified through genome sequencing of one of the isolates from the 1998-99 outbreak. In 2002, another multistate outbreak of listeriosis also involved bacteria of serotype 4b and was attributed to contaminated turkey deli meats. Molecular subtyping data revealed that the macrorestriction patterns of the isolates from the 1998-99 and 2002 outbreaks were closely related. In addition, the 2002 outbreak isolates harbored chromosomal genetic markers found to be unique to, and typical of, the 1998-99 outbreak isolates, including diversification in genomic region 18. Macroarray- based subtyping using chromosomal sequences confirmed the close genetic relatedness between the isolates from the two outbreaks. Genomic content was highly conserved among isolates from each outbreak, with differences detected only in prophage and internalin-like gene sequences. However, since these differences were observed among isolates from each of the outbreaks, they did not differentiate the 1998-99 isolates as a group from those of the 2002 outbreak. Two of 15 randomly chosen serotype 4b clinical isolates from a non-outbreak period (calendar year 2003) appeared to be closely related to the 1998-99 and 2002 outbreak isolates. These findings suggest that both multistate outbreaks of listeriosis in the United States involved closely related members of a single clonal group (ECII) that had not been identified in outbreaks prior to 1998. Since the outbreaks involved different food vehicles and processing plants, the findings suggest establishment of ECII in a still unidentified reservoir in the United States, from which the organisms were introduced to different processing plants.

Animals↗
PubMed2006

Forest dynamics after successive spruce budworm outbreaks in mixedwood forests.

In order to assess the long-term spatiotemporal influence of the spruce budworm in sub-boreal mixedwood forests, we studied the effect of three successive outbreaks in a region of western Quebec, Canada. We used dendrochronology to detect past outbreaks in three areas (111-185 ha), based on the recruitment age of balsam fir (Abies balsamea) and on growth patterns of white spruce (Picea glauca), the two main host species of this defoliating insect. We also used a series of aerial photographs taken between 1935 and 2003 to evaluate overstory mortality and post-outbreak succession patterns in these same areas. Individual outbreaks had a spatially homogenous impact on host species throughout the region, but successive outbreaks differed in intensity: the two outbreaks around 1910 and 1980 caused widespread mortality in the overstory, but an outbreak around 1945 had little impact, probably because the forest mosaic had not yet recuperated from the 1910 outbreak. No clear outbreak was detected in the later part of the 19th century. In portions of the study areas where the 1910 outbreak had a major impact, between 36% and 50% of the stands were reoccupied by balsam fir stands in the period up to the 1980 outbreak (cyclic succession), the rest being at least partly replaced by nonhost species such as Betula spp. Changes in forest composition after the 1910 outbreak were mostly associated with upper-slope positions in all study areas. The 1980 outbreak also had a higher impact than earlier outbreaks in lower-slope positions dominated by black spruce (Picea mariana)-balsam fir mixtures. These results suggest that, at the regional scale, the abundance of mature or over-mature balsam fir stands does not determine the outbreak cycle. When an outbreak occurs, however, its impact will be strongly constrained by forest characteristics such as stand composition and structure, which are themselves influenced by previous disturbances and slope position.

Abies↗
PubMed2001

Experience with oseltamivir in the control of a nursing home influenza B outbreak.

Oseltamivir prophylaxis was very effective in protecting nursing home residents from ILI and in halting this outbreak of influenza B. A portion of the total ILI cases may have been due to influenza A, as this strain was isolated in one resident. The 10% attack rate in this facility, controlled with oseltamivir, compares favourably with another influenza B outbreak in a similar facility in the same region, over the same time frame (ILI onset 27 December to 17 January). Oseltamivir prophylaxis was not used to manage this second outbreak of laboratory-confirmed influenza B. Of the 236 residents, 45 developed ILI for an overall attack rate of 19%, nearly double the rate in the oseltamivir-controlled setting (10%). While oseltamivir was effective in controlling influenza B in this outbreak, further experience and evaluation is required before it can be routinely recommended for prophylaxis of influenza in nursing home outbreaks. Although earlier attempts by others using oseltamivir in the control of influenza A outbreaks have also met with success, it is not yet licensed for this purpose. Compared to amantadine, oseltamivir has a relatively high cost for the control of influenza A outbreaks and this may continue to limit its wider acceptance. The cost-effectiveness of oseltamivir in the control of influenza B outbreaks needs to be specifically addressed given the typically milder nature of influenza B strains. However, such a distinction is not clinically reliable and elderly residents of long-term care facilities remain vulnerable to serious complications associated with influenza infection in general. An alternate agent for influenza chemoprophylaxis that is effective against both influenza A and B, is easily administered and has few side effects, could greatly enhance current prevention and control measures and warrants serious assessment. The spread of this outbreak from the geographically separate ward to other areas of the facility in which residents had not received prophylaxis, underscores the likely role of staff as a vehicle for transmission during facility outbreaks. While accurate staff ILI rates could not be determined, their immunization rates were low, and many staff were ill during the outbreak. Isolation of residents with ILI and prophylaxis of non-ill residents on the initial outbreak wards was insufficient to prevent the spread of the outbreak, although it was subsequently halted once prophylaxis was extended to all residents. In view of the uncertainty over this medication's widespread use, in the absence of licensure or previous studies demonstrating its effectiveness in the prophylaxis and control of influenza B outbreaks, initiation of oseltamivir prophylaxis was staggered by ward. In a declared influenza A outbreak, the protocol in a long term care facility is to initiate amantadine prophylaxis on all residents, rather than ward-by-ward. While anti-viral prophylaxis may be an effective secondary control measure in the management of influenza outbreaks, optimal primary prevention would be more effective. This would require increased vaccine coverage of residents and particularly of staff, who play an important role in the importation and transmission of influenza within these facilities.

Acetamides↗
PubMed1997

An outbreak of invasive group A streptococcal disease associated with high carriage rates of the invasive clone among school-aged children.

OBJECTIVES: To determine if a common strain of group A streptococcus was responsible for an outbreak of invasive streptococcal disease in southeastern Minnesota and to determine whether this strain was prevalent among residents of this area during the outbreak who either had streptococcal pharyngitis or were asymptomatic streptococcal carriers. DESIGN: Pharyngeal culture survey and case-contact evaluation. SETTING: Three adjacent counties in southeastern Minnesota defined as the outbreak area. Outbreak period, January 1 through March 31, 1995. PATIENTS: Seven patients with invasive streptococcal infection, 1249 patients (adults and children) with sore throat who resided in the outbreak area, children from an elementary school located in 1 community where the majority of invasive cases occurred, and 896 students from 3 schools located in Minnesota counties outside the outbreak area. MEASUREMENTS: Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (DNA fingerprinting) of group A streptococcal isolates obtained from patients with invasive disease, throat swabs of patients with sore throat, and throat swabs of asymptomatic school-aged children. RESULTS: All patients with outbreak-associated invasive disease had group A streptococcal isolates that were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Additional testing showed that these isolates carried significant virulence factors including pyrogenic exotoxin A and streptococcal superantigen. Five of these 7 patients with invasive disease had underlying medical conditions; 4 developed toxic shock syndrome and died (case fatality, 57%). The outbreak-associated group A streptococcal clone was found in 69 (26.5%) of the 260 patients with sore throat from whom group A streptococcus was isolated. The frequency of the outbreak clone among pharyngeal carriers from the 3 schools outside the outbreak area was significantly less (range, 0%-10%) than in children from the school in the outbreak area (78%; relative risk, 29; 95% confidence interval, 11.1-78.1; P<.001). Four of the 7 patients with outbreak-associated disease had contact with children who attended the school in the outbreak area. CONCLUSIONS: A single clone of group A streptococcus was responsible for 7 cases of invasive streptococcal disease during an outbreak in Minnesota and for a significant number of pharyngitis cases that also occurred during the outbreak. Invasive disease occurred most frequently in persons with underlying medical conditions. This outbreak was also associated with increased carriage rates of the invasive streptococcal clone among community school-aged children. Cases of invasive group A streptococcal infection may therefore reflect the tip of the iceberg with regard to the burden of colonization of a specific invasive streptococcal clone in a community.

Adult↗
PubMed2000

The molecular epidemiology of four outbreaks of porcine pasteurellosis.

Biochemical profiles, restriction endonuclease analysis (REA) and ribotyping were used to investigate a total of 38 Pasteurella multocida isolates from four separate outbreaks of pasteurellosis in Australian piggeries. Six isolates were obtained from Outbreak 1, 16 from Outbreak 2 and eight each from outbreaks 3 and 4. Outbreaks 1 and 2 were cases of pneumonic pasteurellosis while outbreaks 3 and 4 involved systemic pasteurellosis. Biochemical characterisation established that a number of different types of P. multocida were present in outbreaks 1 and 3 while outbreaks 2 and 4 were associated with a single type of P. multocida. Outbreaks 1 and 3 yielded isolates of P. multocida that belonged to the subspecies multocida and gallicida, with the subspecies multocida isolates being identified as biovar 3 (6 in total) or 12 (1 in total) and the subspecies gallicida isolates (7 in total) being identified as biovar 8. All 24 isolates from outbreaks 2 and 4 belonged to the subspecies multocida and were all biovar 3. REA and ribotyping showed that, in outbreaks 1 and 3, there were three different types of P. multocida in each outbreak with no common strains between the outbreaks. The molecular methods showed that only a single strain of P. multocida was associated with outbreaks 2 and 4, although the outbreaks were associated with strains that differed in REA profiles but shared a ribotype profile. This study has shown that both, systemic and pneumonic pasteurellosis can be associated with either a single strain or multiple strains of P. multocida. The results also indicate that the molecular typing methods of REA and ribotyping are superior to biochemical characterisation for epidemiological investigation of porcine pasteurellosis.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Evaluation of the impact of the source (patient versus staff) on nosocomial norovirus outbreak severity.

OBJECTIVE: To study the dependence of infection risk and outbreak size on the type of index case (i.e., patient or staff). METHODS: Nosocomial outbreaks were reviewed and categorized into those started by patients and those started by staff. Infection risks and outbreak sizes were evaluated taking into account the index case category. RESULTS: Of the 30 nosocomial outbreaks of norovirus with person-to-person transmission, 20 (67%) involved patients as the index cases. Patient-indexed outbreaks affected significantly more patients than did staff-indexed outbreaks (difference in means, 16.25; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 5.1 to 27.0). For the numbers of affected staff, no dependence on the index case category was detectable (difference in means, -1.05; CI95, -9.0 to 6.9). For patients exposed during patient-indexed outbreaks, the risk of acquiring a norovirus infection was approximately 4.8 times as high as the corresponding risk for patients exposed during staff-indexed outbreaks (odds ratio [OR], 4.79; CI95, 1.82 to 8.28). The infection risk for exposed staff during patient-indexed outbreaks was approximately 1.5 times as high as the corresponding risk during staff-indexed outbreaks (OR, 1.51; CI95, 0.92 to 2.49). CONCLUSIONS: Patient-indexed norovirus outbreaks generally affect more patients than do staff-indexed outbreaks. Staff appear to be similarly affected by both outbreak index category groups. This study demonstrates the importance of obtaining complete outbreak data, including the index case classification as staff or patient, during norovirus outbreak investigations. Such information may be useful for further targeting prevention measures

Australia↗