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The purpose of this paper has been to examine the age patterns of Indian women at marriage, cohabitation, and first birth. This task is complicated by features of the Indian marriage institution that differentiate it from the institution of marriage in Western cultures. It is also complicated by the diversity of Indian marriage customs and by the possibility that Indian marriage patterns have changed over time. Nevertheless, our analysis of survey data for two districts in south central India support the following conclusions: Marriage and childbearing have been and continue to be universal. The timing of marriage and childbearing, which showed only a small increase over a fairly long period of time, appears more recently to be undergoing some changes in the direction of longer delays. The significant rural-urban differences in marriage and fertility timing are at least partly the result of the greater impact of education on age at marriage, cohabitation, and first birth in urban areas than in rural areas. Observed characteristics such as religion and education explain more variation in women's marriage and fertility timing in urban areas than in rural areas (i.e., education seems to generate new social norms that tend to displace norms derived from tradition. The incidence of childhood marriages and two-stage marriages has been on the decline, causing the small but noticeable rise in age at marriage to exceed somewhat the increase in age at cohabitation. Age patterns of marriage in India do not closely resemble Western patterns, although age patterns of cohabitation and first birth do. And socioeconomic variables appear to explain less variation in marriage and fertility timing within local communities than across communities. Most important, the results highlight the need for more recent and richer data on marriage and fertility behavior in India. In particular, they strongly suggest that marriage patterns in India are now in the midst of major changes. This conclusion is similar to that reached by Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell (1983), who adopted a more qualitative approach to analyzing marriage change than ours, but whose observations are also more recent than ours. Through the collection and analysis of more recent and geographically widespread data, we can begin to assess more fully the nature and magnitude of the demographic changes under way and speculate on their implications for population growth, economic development, and the formulation of public policy in India.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
The objective of this study was to explore the secular trend in consanguinity in Jordan and the subtypes of consanguineous marriages that may be undergoing a change. A total of 1032 individuals attending a diabetic clinic in Amman were interviewed. The questionnaire provided information on consanguinity status and date of marriage among three generations: the persons interviewed, their parents, parents of their spouses and their offspring. Data on consanguinity status among 5401 marriages was obtained. Generations were named generation 1 for marriages contracted before 1950, generation 2 for marriages contracted between 1950 and 1979, and generation 3 for marriages contracted after 1980. For generations 1, 2, and 3, first-cousin marriages constituted 20.2, 28.5 and 19.5% of all marriages, respectively, while the subtype of paternal parallel first-cousin marriages constituted 75.6, 60.3 and 43.3% of all first-cousin marriages, respectively. The offspring of first-cousin parents were significantly more prone to marry their relatives than the offspring of non-consanguineous parents, with rates of first-cousin marriages among offspring of first-cousin parents and non-related parents constituting 25.3 and 17.1% of all marriages, respectively. For generations 1, 2 and 3, the average coefficient of inbreeding was 0.0135, 0.02 and 0.0142, respectively. In conclusion, first-cousin marriage rate among a representative population from Amman showed a significant decline among marriages contracted after 1980 compared to marriages contracted between 1950 and 1979, but not to marriages contracted before 1950. The proportion of paternal parallel first cousins among first-cousin marriages showed a steady decline from one generation to the next.
Place of residence has traditionally been an important factor in Korea in mate selection. This study examines the local marriage network in Korean society, its variation by year of marriage, and general characteristics of the married women. Data are drawn from the 1986 national sample survey on the family life cycle implemented by the Korea Institute for Population and Health. Questionnaires were administered to 3013 wives aged 15-64. Major study findings follow. 1) The local marriage rate within the same region by birthplace is strikingly high in Kyongsangdo and Chonla-do. Local marriage rates are 79.5% in both of these regions, 33.5% in Seoul, 35.2% in Busan, 50% in Kyonggi-do, 48.1% in Kangwon-do, and 60.7% in Chungchung-do. 2) The local marriage rate within the same county or the same city be residence before marriage has rapidly been declining in rural areas since 1960. This is largely due to industrialization, urbanization, and better transportation. The marriage rate in rural areas was 62% among marriages in the 1940s, 47.1% in the 1960s, 43% in the 1980s, and 70.9%, 88.4%, and 70.7% respectively in urban areas. 3) The proportion of local marriages within the same city or county is 55.1% among arranged marriages and 72.3% among romantic marriages. 4) Pre-marital employment seems to have some effects on the extent of mate-selection. Wives who worked before marriage were more likely to marry men in the same city or county. The local marriage rate within the same city or county is 63.2% among wives with work experience, and 58.5% among wives without work experience. 5) The more educated the woman, the higher the local marriage rate within the same city or county. 56.6% of those who attended middle school married men in the same city or county as theirs, 61.4% of wives with a high school education, and 76.6% of wives with college or more education. 63.8% of wives who never attended school married men in the same city or county. In summary, restrictions on marriage between couples of different status has been diminishing due to introduction of democratic thought based on freedom and equality; the marriage network has also narrowed due to industrialization, urbanization, migration, and women's higher educational attainment.
A strictly maintained patrilineal family system makes virilocal marriage almost universal and uxorilocal marriage rare in the history of rural China. Uxorilocal marriage can be divided into two types that may be termed, respectively, contingent and institutional. The former preserves family lineages in families without a son and occurs when uxorilocal marriage is uncommon. The latter serves practical economic purposes in families with sons and occurs when uxorilocal marriage is relatively prevalent. Using data from a survey in two counties of Shaanxi--Lueyang, where both kinds of uxorilocal marriage are prevalent, and Sanyuan, where uxorilocal marriage is rare and usually contingent--this paper employs logistic regression models in a quantitative comparative study of determinants of uxorilocal marriage in rural China. We show that the purposes and prevalence of the two types of uxorilocal marriage differ and that their determinants are also different in the two counties. In Sanyuan, the determinants are only a couple's sibling composition, membership in a large family clan, and educational level. In Lueyang, in addition to those determinants in Sanyuan, important contributions to the type of uxorilocal marriage include a couple's parental marriage type, age at marriage, adoption status, marriage arrangement, and their attitudes toward uxorilocal marriage. The results indicate the potential importance of encouraging uxorilocal marriage in rural areas as a means of mitigating demographic and social problems related to son preference, such as high sex ratio at birth and lack of old-age security, which are projected for China's future.
Over the past fifty years, powerful cultural and social forces have made marriage less central to Americans' family lives. In reaction, the United States is now engaged in a wide-ranging debate about the place of marriage in contemporary society. In this article, Steven Nock examines the national marriage debate. He begins by reviewing the social and demographic trends that have changed the role of marriage and the family: the weakening link between marriage and parenthood caused by the contraceptive revolution, the declining significance of marriage as an organizing principle of adult life, and the increasingly accepted view that marriage and parenthood are private matters, relevant only to the individuals directly involved. He then considers the abundant scientific evidence on the positive consequences of marriage for both the economic well-being and the health of American adults. He notes that based partly on the evidence that marriage is good for adults and children, numerous public and private groups, including religious activists, therapeutic professionals, family practitioners, educators, and federal and state government officials, have initiated programs to strengthen marriage, lower divorce rates, reduce out-of-wedlock births, and encourage responsible fatherhood. He then reviews some of those programs. Nock observes that although large cultural and social forces are driving the decline in marriage, most of the new programs attempting to restore or strengthen marriage in the United States focus on changing individuals, not their culture or society. He argues that the problem cannot be addressed solely at the individual level and cautions that given how little researchers and professionals know about how to help couples get or stay married, expectations of policies in these areas should be modest. But despite the shortage of effective strategies to promote marriage, he notes, a political, cultural, and scientific consensus appears to be emerging that the best arrangement for children is to live in a family with two loving parents. He believes that the contemporary marriage debate is an acknowledgment of the cultural nature of the problem, and views it as a crucial national conversation among Americans struggling to interpret and make sense of the place of marriage and family in today's society.
The "marriage squeeze," or the effect on marriage of an imbalance between the numbers of males and females, has been seen as having a great influence on contemporary marriage behavior. Nonetheless, the literature does not contain a clear definition of exactly what a marriage squeeze is and contains few quantitative estimates of its impact on marriage. The present article provides a precise definition of the marriage squeeze in equation (2), and applies it to measure both artificially produced marriage squeezes in two-sex nuptiality stable populations and the experience of the United States during the period 1950-1990. The marriage squeeze is shown to be capable of producing significant changes in both the level and distribution of marriage, and it appears to be having such an impact in some contemporary Third World societies. For developed countries in general and for the United States in particular, the marriage squeeze exerts little influence on the level of marriage but has a considerable effect on the distribution of marriages. The U.S. age-sex composition of the year 1978, compared to that of the year 1951, is shown to imply a 0.54 year decrease in the male mean age at marriage and a 0.53 year increase in the female mean age at marriage, as well as an 18 percent reduction in the variance of the male ages at marriage and a 33 percent increase in the variance of the female ages. The social and economic implications of such changes have yet to be fully explored.
In this paper, we have traced changes in the patterns of first marriage in the United States for cohorts of men and women born in 1880 through 1965 and for the years from 1900 through 1983. There were striking changes in marriage rates associated with each of the world wars and with the depression of the 1930s. In addition to these short-term fluctuations, a long-term shift in marriage rates is observed over the period from after World War II until about 1970. By the end of the 1970s, however, marriage rates had returned to levels similar to those observed before the war. The basic similarity in the timing of changes in marriage rates across age levels and for both men and women, blacks and whites, is a striking characteristic of these marriage curves. There are also, however, important differences among these groups with respect to the magnitude and slopes of the shifts. The postwar marriage boom was strongest among the young (those under age 24) and among whites. Similarly, the declines in marriage rates observed in the 1970s were greatest among the young. The marriage rates for teenagers display trends that diverge in many respects from those of older persons. For example, the marriage rates of male teenagers did not show the "peaks" and "valley" associated with World War II for older age groups and female teenagers. Moreover, there is little sign of the postwar marriage boom among black teenagers of either sex. Indeed, the marriage rates of black teenagers began to decline soon after the war, and by the 1970s the marriage rates of both male and female black teenagers had fallen below those of their white counterparts, reversing the pattern that had existed through the first half of this century. During the twenty-five or so years of the postwar marriage boom, which we believe can be characterized best as a period phenomenon, there were trends-eddies within the mainstream-which are probably most easily interpreted as the consequence of a cohort effect.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
[Text of the "Xinjiang Uygur Region's additional regulations governing the enforcement of the marriage law of the People's Republic of China" promulgated December 14 at the Xinjiang Uygur Regional People's Congress] [Text] On December 14, 1980, the 3rd Session of the 5th Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Congress adopted the regulations. Article 1: These regulations are enacted in accordance with article 36 of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China; Article 2: As regards marriage ages, a man under 20 shall not get married, nor shall a woman under 18 get married; Article 3: According to the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, no one shall marry a collateral relative within the 3rd degreee of relationship; Article 4: A widow shall be left free to remarry, and no one shall be allowed to intervene in it on any pretext; Article 5: A mercenary marriage shall be prohibited, and no one shall be allowed to extort property in a marriage; Article 6: A legal procedure shall be required for a marriage and a divorce, and the way of substantiating a divorce by a notice in verbal or written form sent from 1 party to the other shall be prohibited; Article 7: Religion shall not be allowed to intervene in a marriage or family, nor shall a religious rite be allowed to replace a marriage registration; Article 8: Men and women under the prescribed marriage ages shall be prohibited from becoming engaged; Article 9: Planned parenthodd shall not be advocated among national minorities, and whether or not to practice family planning shall be at their own discretion; Article 10: These regulations shall only apply to various minority nationalities in this region; Article 11: Subject to the approval of the Standing Committee of the regional People's Congress, people's congresses at autonomous prefectures and counties or the congresses' standing committees shall be allowed to enact some modifications or additional regulations in light of actual conditions in marriages and families among local minorities and in accordance with the principles of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China and these regulations; Article 12: Like the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, these regulations shall come into force beginning on January 1, 1981.
A comparison of intra- and inter-ethnic divorce rates in Hawaii showed that inter-ethnic marriages resulted in a higher proportion of divorces than did intra-ethnic marriages when the marriage data used had to do with all marriages occurring in Hawaii. However, a sizeable portion of marriages in Hawaii are of nonresidents who, if they divorce, probably divorce elsewhere. Nonresident marriages are chiefly intra-ethnic marriages of Caucasians. When examining the proportions of divorces to resident marriages, within-group marriages are more at risk than inter-ethnic marriages. As in prior research, persons who marry members of other racial/ethnic groups tend to marry persons from groups with income levels similar to their own. As in previous reports, some cross-ethnic combinations appeared more at risk for divorce than did others. Group income appeared to be a predictor of risk. When considering only resident marriages as related to divorces, those marriages in which the bride was from a higher income group than the groom were at a significantly greater risk for divorce than marriage in which the bride came from an income group lower than that of the groom.
To identify types of families, latent-class analysis was applied to (reported) marriage and (observed) parenting measures obtained during the infancy, toddler, and/or preschool years for 828 two-parent families participating in the NICHD Study of Child Care. Five types of families were identified: Consistently Supportive (i.e., good parenting, good marriage, 15% of sample), Consistently Moderate (i.e., moderate marriage, moderate parenting. 43%), Consistently Risky (i.e., poor parenting, poor marriage, 16%), Good Parenting/Poor Marriage (19%), and Poor Parenting/Good Marriage (7%). When groups were compared in terms of contextual antecedents (measured at child age 1 month) and child cognitive-academic and socioemotional functioning in first grade, results indicated (a) that contextual risks increased linearly and children's functioning decreased linearly as one moved across the first three aforementioned groups; and after controlling for group differences in background factors (b) that children in the Good-Parenting/Poor-Marriage families outperformed those in the Poor Parenting/Good Marriage; (c) that there was evidence of "added value" developmentally when children experienced two sources of support (i.e., good marriage and good parenting) rather than just one (i.e., good marriage or good parenting); but (d) that there was only modest evidence of protective buffering whereby children experiencing just good parenting (but not just good marriages) outperformed children experiencing poor parenting and poor marriages. Results are discussed in terms of the relative influence of marriage and parenting on child development and the potential benefits of applying typological approaches to the study of marriage-parenting family subsystems.
This paper examines age patterns of first marriage and motherhood and covariates of early marriage, delayed consummation of marriage and early motherhood in Nepal using data from the 2000 Nepal Adolescent and Young Adult Survey (NAYA). Both unmarried and married male and female youths (age 14-22) were included in the survey. The analysis is based on 2800 urban youths and 5075 rural youths with complete information on the variables examined. Proportional hazard models are used to estimate covariates of early marriage and early motherhood, and logistic regression models are used to estimate covariates of delayed consummation of marriage. The results show that early marriage and early motherhood are quite common among Nepalese women, especially in rural areas. Early marriage is much less common among men. Delayed consummation of marriage is common among very young brides, especially in rural areas. The main covariates associated with early marriage and early motherhood are respondent's education, region of residence and ethnicity. The main covariates of delayed consummation of marriage are age at first marriage, region of residence and ethnicity. The study highlights the need to focus on less educated female youths in the Terai region in order to reduce the reproductive and child health risks associated with early marriage and early childbearing.
During the past century the U.S. family system has seen vast changes--in marriage and divorce rates, cohabitation, childbearing, sexual behavior, and women's work outside the home. Andrew Cherlin reviews these historic changes, noting that marriage remains the most common living arrangement for raising children, but that children, especially poor and minority children, are increasingly likely to grow up in single-parent families and to experience family instability. Cherlin describes the economic and cultural forces that have transformed family life. Job market changes have drawn married women into the work force and deprived less-educated men of the blue-collar jobs by which they traditionally supported their families. And effective contraception and legalized abortion have eroded the norm of marriage before childbearing. Cherlin notes that sentiment in favor of marriage appears to be stronger in the United States than in other developed countries. The share of U.S. adults who are likely to marry is higher, but so is the share likely to divorce. U.S. children are also more likely to live in single-parent families at some time in their childhood. Although nearly all Americans, whether poor or well-to-do, hold to marriage as an ideal, today marriage is increasingly optional. To a greater extent than ever before, individuals can choose whether to form a family on their own, in a cohabiting relationship, or in a marriage. Given U.S. patterns of swift transitions into and out of marriage and high rates of single parenthood, American policymakers eager to promote marriage are unlikely to be able to raise U.S. family stability to levels typical of other developed countries. Consequently, a family policy that relies too heavily on marriage will not help the many children destined to live in single-parent and cohabiting families--many of them poor--during their formative years. Assistance must be directed to needy families, regardless of their household structure. Policymakers must craft a careful balance of marriage-based and marriage-neutral programs to provide adequate support to American children.
Attitudes about the primacy of marriage as a way of life have changed markedly over the past two decades. The legitimacy of singleness as a life-style is increasingly recognized by young people and their parents; most Americans no longer regard getting married as necessarily better than remaining single and do not disapprove of those who eschew marriage. Although most young people interviewed in the 1980 Study of American Families say that they would be bothered at least a little by failure to marry, relatively few say they would be greatly bothered by that outcome. It is somewhat surprising that the mothers of these young people also report fairly evenhanded attitudes regarding marriage for their children, suggesting that the younger generation will probably not experience much parental pressure to marry. Although the imperative to marry has weakened and the perceived advantages of marriage as compared to single life have declined, marriage continues to be valued by the majority of young Americans as shown in several studies of attitudes toward marriage. More than 90 percent expect to marry and there has been almost no decline in that proportion since 1960. What is more, despite the high levels of divorce, most young people say that they expect their marriages to be lasting. What has changed about marriage plans has been the rising age at which young people, especially young women, expect to marry--an expectation reflected in the increasing age at which Americans are actually marrying. There also seems to be a widespread desire not to let marriage interfere with education and to obtain some work experience before marriage. Marriage continues to be more important to young women than young men, despite recent trends toward more egalitarian sex roles. There is some evidence that experience with divorce increases negative attitudes about marriage and favorable ones about singleness as a way of life.