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Two varieties of executive theories may be distinguished: emergence accounts and expression accounts. The meta-analytic findings are fully consistent with emergence accounts of theory of mind and do not entirely rule out expression accounts.
This research examined the relation between individual differences in inhibitory control (IC; a central component of executive functioning) and theory-of-mind (ToM) performance in preschool-age children. Across two sessions, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 107) were given multitask batteries measuring IC and ToM. Inhibitory control was strongly related to ToM, r = .66, p < .001. This relation remained significant controlling for age, gender, verbal ability, motor sequencing, family size, and performance on pretend-action and mental state control tasks. Inhibitory tasks requiring a novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response (Conflict scale) and those requiring the delay of a prepotent response (Delay scale) were significantly related to ToM. The Conflict scale, however, significantly predicted ToM performance over and above the Delay scale and control measures, whereas the Delay scale was not significant in a corresponding analysis. These findings suggest that IC may be a crucial enabling factor for ToM development, possibly affecting both the emergence and expression of mental state knowledge. The implications of the findings for a variety of executive accounts of ToM are discussed.
Two studies addressed whether children consider speakers' knowledge states when establishing initial word-referent links. In Study 1, forty-eight 3- and 4-year-olds were taught two novel words by a speaker who expressed either knowledge or ignorance about the words' referents. Children showed better word learning when the speaker was knowledgeable. In Study 2, forty-eight 3- and 4-year-olds were taught two novel words by a speaker who expressed uncertainty about their referents. Whether the uncertainty truly reflected ignorance, however, differed across conditions. In one condition, the speaker said he made the object himself and thus, he was knowledgeable. In the other condition, the speaker stated that the object was made by a friend and thus, expressed ignorance about it. Four-year-olds learned better in the speaker-made than in the friend-made condition; 3-year-olds, however, showed relatively poor learning in both conditions. These findings suggest that theory-of-mind developments impact word learning.
Possession of a "theory of mind" (ToM)--as demonstrated by an understanding of the false beliefs of others--is fundamental in children's cognitive development. A key question for debate concerns the effect of language input on ToM. In this respect, comparisons of deaf native-signing children who are raised by deaf signing parents with deaf late-signing children who are raised by hearing parents provide a critical test. This article reports on two studies (N = 100 and N = 39) using "thought picture" measures of ToM that minimize verbal task-performance requirements. These studies demonstrated that even when factors such as syntax ability, mental age in spatial ability, and executive functioning were considered, deaf late signers still showed deficits in ToM understanding relative to deaf native signers or hearing controls. Even though the native signers were significantly younger than a sample of late signers matched for spatial mental age and scores on a test of receptive sign language ability, native signers outperformed late signers on pictorial ToM tasks. The results are discussed in terms of access to conversation and extralinguistic influences on development such as the presence of sibling relationships, and suggest that the expression of a ToM is the end result of social understanding mediated by early conversational experience.
Cognitive complexity and control theory and relational complexity theory attribute developmental changes in theory of mind (TOM) to complexity. In 3 studies, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds performed TOM tasks (false belief, appearance-reality), less complex connections (Level 1 perspective-taking) tasks, and transformations tasks (understanding the effects of location changes and colored filters) with content similar to TOM. There were also predictor tasks at binary-relational and ternary-relational complexity levels, with different content. Consistent with complexity theories: (a) connections and transformations were easier and mastered earlier than TOM; (b) predictor tasks accounted for more than 80% of age-related variance in TOM; and (c) ternary-relational items accounted for TOM variance, before and after controlling for age and binary-relational items. Prediction did not require hierarchically structured predictor tasks.
Several branches of cognitive science now focus on the nature of the unconscious. This paper explores some of the findings and models from this research. By introducing formulations based on non-clinical data, the cognitive scientists--in neural linguistics, computational modelling, and neuroscience--may depart from the older psychoanalytic formulations. An understanding of unconscious neural processes is nevertheless emerging showing how synapses are modified by experience and how learning, conscious and unconscious, is due to this important aspect of brain plasticity. Freud and Jung's formulations about the unconscious psyche, representing the main tenets of depth psychology, are also based on a conception of the mind as extending beyond immediate awareness. However, their models are more hypothetical in that their data, almost exclusively, come from treatments of psychotherapy patients and their verbal accounts. So how do these two conceptions of the unconscious match, where do they differ? And how does the neural understanding in the present research support theories and practices of analytic treatments?
In this paper it is argued that, if mental health nurses are to integrate the skills necessary to accomplish the diverse tasks that comprise their professional role, then what is required is a conception of mind independent of any particular paradigm in the biophysical and psychosocial sciences. This is proposed as a necessary condition of articulating the professional autonomy of mental health nurses. A four-part model of mental functioning is presented and developed, drawing on the ordinary language of folk psychology. Objections to this strategy are anticipated and answered. The utility of the model is demonstrated by deploying it to analyse emotional states and to show how subjective experience is a necessary component of mental ill-health, which is why empathic understanding is a necessary skill for mental health nurses. Finally, the major research paradigms associated with scientific approaches to the care and treatment of mental ill-health are aligned with the elements of the model to demonstrate the potential of that model for clarifying the rationale of theoretically divergent treatment approaches for the benefit of both nurses and their clients. It is emphasized that the proposed model is 'theory' only in the weak sense of being a 'systematic account' of the mental life.
OBJECTIVES: To examine the nature of executive deficits in euthymic patients with bipolar disorder (BD). METHODS: Fifteen euthymic BD patients and 13 controls were administered a battery of executive tasks including verbal fluency, Stroop, Theory of Mind (ToM) tests and selected subtests from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB). Self-report and clinician ratings of mood and social and occupational functioning were also obtained. RESULTS: There were no significant differences between BD patients and controls on the primary measures of the following executive tasks: verbal fluency, attentional set-shifting, problem solving or planning. On secondary measures of speed, BD patients were slower to complete the first trial of the Stroop task (p = 0.001). Patients with BD committed more errors across all secondary measures. Patients performed poorly when compared with controls on tests of verbal ToM (p = 0.02), and although they performed non-verbal ToM tasks at a level comparable to controls (p = 0.60), they were slower to initiate a response (p = 0.006). ToM was not significantly correlated with any measure of social and occupational functioning; however it correlated with the achievement scores of the CANTAB Stockings of Cambridge task (Pearson's r = 0.68, p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS: Deficits found in euthymic bipolar patients suggest fronto-subcortical pathway dysfunction. This is consistent with other neuropsychological and neuroimaging research that points to a trait deficit in BD. Further investigation is necessary perhaps using more real-world tests.
Although international opportunities are the hallmark of nursing education at a large private university, the meaning of participating in such clinical nursing electives has not been described. The purpose of this phenomenological study of nurses was to examine the personal and professional meaning of participating in international clinical nursing electives during their undergraduate nursing studies. Audiotaped interviews were conducted with 20 former nursing students who had had this opportunity. "Opening our hearts and minds" was described by the study's participants, with the following themes: increasing understanding of other cultures and peoples, increasing understanding of global sociopolitical and health issues, increasing the commitment to make a difference, experiencing personal and professional growth, contributing to professional development in the host country, making interpersonal connexions, and developing cultural competence. This study makes an important contribution to the documentation of the meaning of participating in international nursing clinical experiences. Data are being used for long-term curricular planning in the development and refinement of future international clinical nursing electives and to provide outcomes data for professional accreditation. There are broader implications for the movement beyond individual cultural competence to increasing global consciousness and the improvement of global health care.
Young children typically fail when asked to judge how objects would look if they moved or changed shape, and this has been taken to mean that they lack the competencies for dynamic imagery. We used a different approach to study young children's imagination and found evidence of much earlier competence. Across 6 experiments, people were asked to imagine familiar surroundings and anticipate their spatial orientation from different observation points there. In the first 2 experiments, children (2 1/2-9-year-olds) and their parents sat at home and were asked to call to mind knowledge of their (child's) classroom relative to the perspective at their (child's) seat at (pre)school. After this, subjects were asked to judge the perspective at the teacher's seat in each of 2 conditions. In the Locomotion Condition they were asked to imagine walking from their seat to the teacher's seat while physically walking a path that resembled the actual one in the remote classroom. In the Imagination-only Condition the instructions were the same but they were not accompanied with physical walking. Children 3 1/2 years of age and older, like the adults, were accurate and rapid in the Locomotion Condition. In the Imagination-only Condition the children almost never judged perspective correctly; the adults responded accurately but slowly. These findings were replicated and extended across 4 additional experiments designed to clarify the operating principles that link perceiving, imagining, and acting.
Prior research demonstrates that understanding theory of mind (ToM) is seriously and similarly delayed in late-signing deaf children and children with autism. Are these children simply delayed in timing relative to typical children, or do they demonstrate different patterns of development? The current research addressed this question by testing 145 children (ranging from 3 to 13 years) with deafness, autism, or typical development using a ToM scale. Results indicate that all groups followed the same sequence of steps, up to a point, but that children with autism showed an importantly different sequence of understandings (in the later steps of the progression) relative to all other groups.
Recent research has found that the acquisition of theory of mind (ToM) is delayed in children with specific language impairment (SLI). The present study used a battery of ToM and visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks to investigate whether the delayed acquisition of ToM in children with SLI is associated with delayed VPT development. Harris' (1992, 1996) simulation theory predicts that the development of VPT will be delayed. Participants were 20 children with SLI (M=62.9 months) and 20 typically developing children (M=61.2 months) who were matched for nonverbal ability, gender, and age. The results supported Harris' theory and a role for language in ToM and VPT development.
The development of episodic memory, its relation to theory of mind (ToM), executive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibition), and to suggestibility was studied. Children (n= 115) between 3 and 6 years of age saw two versions of a video film and were tested for their memory of critical elements of the videos. Results indicated similar developmental trends for all memory measures, ToM, and inhibition, but ToM and inhibition were not associated with any memory measures. Correlations involving source memory was found in relation to specific questions, whereas inhibition and ToM were significantly correlated to resistance to suggestions. A regression analysis showed that age was the main contributor to resistance to suggestions, to correct source monitoring, and to correct responses to specific questions. Inhibition was also a significant main predictor of resistance to suggestive questions, whereas the relative contribution of ToM was wiped out when an extended model was tested.
Two studies are reported in which the ability of people with Asperger's syndrome to understand problems of the type "Peter thinks that Jane thinks that ..." tested. The results showed that in contrast to younger or more handicapped autistic individuals, Asperger subjects were able to solve problems of the type just outlined, i.e. that they possessed a second-order theory of mind. When asked to explain their solutions however, they typically did not use mental state terms but did not differ in this respect either from non-handicapped or socially impaired, chronic schizophrenic controls. The implications of the results for current cognitive theories of autistic impairment are discussed.
The relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and rule use was explored in adults with Down's Syndrome (DS) and in non-handicapped pre-schoolers. Twelve low-functioning individuals with DS (mean mental age = 5.1 years, mean chronological age = 22.7) performed worse than 12 MA-matched non-handicapped children (mean MA = 5.1 years) on several standard ToM tasks and on a color-shape card-sorting task in which subjects were required to switch between two incompatible sets of rules. On the ToM tasks, people with DS tended to focus on a single state of affairs (e.g. the present situation). Likewise, on the card sort, these subjects tended to use a single set of rules on all trials. Performance in the two types of task was positively correlated when MA was partialed out. The results are inconsistent with the slaim that ToM reflects a domain-specific psychological function and the notion that deficits in ToM are unique to individuals with autism.
The aim of the present study was to test the reliability of theory of mind task performance by individuals with a learning disability. Across a series of three false belief tasks and two belief-desire reasoning tasks reliability was moderate--although it was no lower than has been found over a period of 3 weeks in normally developing children. The overall level of performance on the tasks was also only moderate, with approximately half the subjects passing on any one false belief task, and one quarter on any one belief-desire reasoning task. Reliable passers had higher VMA and NVMA than unreliable passers and subjects who failed. Given the important interpretations made regarding the representational skills of individuals on the basis of their responses in such experimental tasks, further work investigating the psychometric properties of the tasks is required with both typically and atypically developing individuals.
BACKGROUND: Previous research suggests that the phenotype associated with Asperger's syndrome (AS) includes difficulties in understanding the mental states of others, leading to difficulties in social communication and social relationships. It has also been suggested that the first-degree relatives of those with AS can demonstrate similar difficulties, albeit to a lesser extent. This study examined 'theory of mind' (ToM) abilities in the siblings of children with AS relative to a matched control group. METHOD: 27 children who had a sibling with AS were administered the children's version of the 'Eyes Test' (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford, 1999). The control group consisted of 27 children matched for age, sex, and a measure of verbal comprehension, and who did not have a family history of AS/autism. RESULTS: A significant difference was found between the groups on the Eyes Test, the 'siblings' group showing a poorer performance on this measure of social cognition. The difference was more pronounced among female siblings. DISCUSSION: These results are discussed in terms of the familial distribution of a neuro-cognitive profile associated with AS, which confers varying degrees of social handicap amongst first-degree relatives. The implication of this finding with regard to the autism/AS phenotype is explored, with some discussion of why this neuro-cognitive profile (in combination with corresponding strengths) may have an evolutionary imperative.
BACKGROUND: In the context of the established finding that theory-of-mind (ToM) growth is seriously delayed in late-signing deaf children, and some evidence of equivalent delays in those learning speech with conventional hearing aids, this study's novel contribution was to explore ToM development in deaf children with cochlear implants. Implants can substantially boost auditory acuity and rates of language growth. Despite the implant, there are often problems socialising with hearing peers and some language difficulties, lending special theoretical interest to the present comparative design. METHODS: A total of 52 children aged 4 to 12 years took a battery of false belief tests of ToM. There were 26 oral deaf children, half with implants and half with hearing aids, evenly divided between oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Comparison groups of age-matched high-functioning children with autism and younger hearing children were also included. RESULTS: No significant ToM differences emerged between deaf children with implants and those with hearing aids, nor between those in oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Nor did the deaf children perform any better on the ToM tasks than their age peers with autism. Hearing preschoolers scored significantly higher than all other groups. For the deaf and the autistic children, as well as the preschoolers, rate of language development and verbal maturity significantly predicted variability in ToM, over and above chronological age. CONCLUSIONS: The finding that deaf children with cochlear implants are as delayed in ToM development as children with autism and their deaf peers with hearing aids or late sign language highlights the likely significance of peer interaction and early fluent communication with peers and family, whether in sign or in speech, in order to optimally facilitate the growth of social cognition and language.