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PubMed2006

The role of perceptually represented structure in analogical problem solving.

Current models of analogical reasoning assume that representations of source examples and target problems occur in an amodal format--that is, a representation whose construction and processing are independent of activity in the perceptual and motor cortices of the brain. We examined the possible use of kinesthetic information--perceptual structures associated with the sensation of space and force--in the representation of source examples and target problems. Participants who recreated a source story while acting out the key elements were more likely to access the story when later working on the target problem than were participants who only verbally recreated the story or who verbally recreated it as well as sketched it. We argue that enactment made kinesthetic and spatial features more salient in participants' source story representations and that this aided performance. These results suggest that current models of analogical reasoning might be improved by including perceptual information as part of their representational schemes.

Humans↗
PubMed2005

Expertise in ill-defined problem-solving domains as effective strategy use.

Expertise consists of many different cognitive structures. Lemaire and Siegler (1995) have proposed a four-layered account of expertise from a strategies perspective: Experts have better strategies, tend to use strategies that are better overall more often, are better able to select the circumstances to which a strategy best applies, and are better able to execute a given strategy. Originally, this account came from work in simple, well-defined domains. We explored this account in the complex, ill-defined domain of platoon leadership. In Experiment 1A, we elicited free-text responses to leadership scenarios from novices, intermediates, and experts, finding expertise effects for strategy base rates and choice, but not for strategy existence or the number of strategies used. In Experiment 1B, we used a new group of experts to gather ratings of the execution accuracy of the responses in Experiment 1A and found expertise differences in the ability to execute the same strategies. We propose several elaborations to the original four-layered strategies account of expertise on the basis of these results.

Adult↗
PubMed2001

The use of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of speech.

The present investigation addresses the possible utility of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of spoken language. In a series of five word- spotting and two control lexical decision experiments, high- versus low-probability consonant-vowel (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7) and vowel-consonant (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6) strings were presented either in the nonsense contexts of target words (Experiments 1-3) or within the target words themselves (Experiments 4-7). The results suggest that listeners, at least for sequences in the onset position, indeed use sequential probabilities as cues for segmentation. The probability of a sound sequence influenced segmentation more when the sequence occurred within the target words (Experiments 4-7 vs. Experiments 1-3). Furthermore, the effects were reliable only when the sequences occurred in the onset position (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7 vs. Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6).

Humans↗
PubMed2004

Inhibition of return and nonspecific preparation: separable inhibitory control mechanisms in space and time.

I examined the relation between two inhibitory processes operating on spatial and temporal representations. In two experiments, participants had to detect a peripheral target that was presented after a variable interval following the onset of an uninformative peripheral cue. For the shortest cue-target interval, target detection was faster at the cued than at the uncued location, but this effect was reversed for the longer cue-target intervals. This finding has been taken to reflect a buildup of space-related inhibition over time, known as inhibition of return. Also, target detection was slower when the cue-target interval of the preceding trial was longer than that of the current trial than when this was not so. This sequential effect has been taken to reflect an intertrial carryover of time-related inhibition. Crucially, the spatial and temporal effects were additive in both experiments, suggesting a modular organization of the underlying inhibitory processes.

Attention↗
PubMed2005

Chronometric evidence for entrained attention.

Recent theories of dynamic attention have renewed the interest in temporal context as a determinant of attention. The mechanism of dynamic attention remains unclear, and both stochastic time perception processes and deterministic oscillators are possible. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that attention can be guided by isochronous series of warning stimuli and that elapsed time cannot fully account for this effect. Experiment 2 indicates that temporal structure can be used over a limited range of time. The results of Experiment 3 indicate that temporal pattern, rather than variability, is a determinant of temporally focused attention. The results of Experiment 4 demonstrate that a coupled oscillator is a better predictor of reaction time than a stochastic timing mechanism is, under certain assumptions.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

Co-reference and reasoning.

Co-reference occurs when two or more noun phrases refer to the same individual, as in the following inferential problem: Mark is kneeling by the fire or he is looking at the TV but not both. / Mark is kneeling by the fire. / Is he looking at the TV? In three experiments, we compared co-referential reasoning problems with problems referring to different individuals. Experiment 1 showed that co-reference improves accuracy. In Experiment 2, we replicated that finding and showed that co-reference speeds up both reading and inference. Experiment 3 showed that the effects of co-reference are greatest when the premises and the conclusion share co-referents. These effects led the participants to make illusory inferences--that is, to draw systematically invalid conclusions. The results are discussed in terms of the mental model theory of reasoning.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2003

Counterexamples in sentential reasoning.

How do logically naive individuals determine that an inference is invalid? In logic, there are two ways to proceed: (1) make an exhaustive search but fail to find a proof of the conclusion and (2) use the interpretation of the relevant sentences to construct a counterexample--that is, a possibility consistent with the premises but inconsistent with the conclusion. We report three experiments in which the strategies that individuals use to refute invalid inferences based on sentential connectives were examined. In Experiment 1, the participants' task was to justify their evaluations, and it showed that they used counterexamples more often than any other strategy. Experiment 2 showed that they were more likely to use counterexamples to refute invalid conclusions consistent with the premises than to refute invalid conclusions inconsistent with the premises. In Experiment 3, no reliable difference was detected in the results between participants who wrote justifications and participants who did not.

Concept Formation↗
PubMed2001

Why is p = .90 better than p = .70? Preference for definitive predictions by lay consumers of probability judgements.

What do people regard as an informative and valuable probability statement? This article reports four experiments that show participants to have a clear preference for more extreme and higher probabilities over less extreme and lower ones. This pattern emerged in Experiment 1, in which no context was provided, and was further explored in Experiment 2 within a positive and a negative context. The findings were further confirmed in Experiment 3, which employed a Bayesian framework with revisions of opinions. Finally, Experiment 4 showed how preference for high probabilities can lead people to prefer an overconfident to a more well-calibrated (accurate) forecaster. The results are interpreted as manifestations of a search for definitive predictions principle, which asserts that high probabilities are preferred to medium ones and often favored over the corresponding complementary low probabilities on the basis of their capacity to predict the occurrence of single outcomes.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Dissociation between priming and recognition in the expression of sequential knowledge.

Exposure to a repeating sequence of target stimuli in a speeded localization task can support both priming of sequence-consistent responses and recognition of sequence components. Here, a task is introduced in which measures of priming and recognition are obtained concurrently, and it is demonstrated that priming of sequence-consistent responses occurs even when test stimuli are not recognized. The results show that sequence knowledge can be expressed in the absence of conscious recognition. However, we also show that this result is consistent with a simple model in which priming and recognition depend on exactly the same underlying memory strength variable.

Attention↗
PubMed2002

When wrong predictions provide more support than right ones.

Correct predictions of rare events are normatively more supportive of a theory or hypothesis than correct predictions of common ones. In other words, correct bold predictions provide more support than do correct timid predictions. Are lay hypothesis testers sensitive to the boldness of predictions? Results reported here show that participants were very sensitive to boldness, often finding incorrect bold predictions more supportive than correct timid ones. Participants were willing to tolerate inaccurate predictions only when predictions were bold. This finding was demonstrated in the context of competing forecasters and in the context of competing scientific theories. The results support recent views of human inference that postulate that lay hypothesis testers are sensitive to the rarity of data. Furthermore, a normative (Bayesian) account can explain the present results and provides an alternative interpretation of similar results that have been explained using a purely descriptive model.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

MDFT account of decision making under time pressure.

In this paper, decision making under time pressure for multiattribute choice alternatives in a risky environment is investigated. A model, multiattribute decision field theory (MDFT), is introduced that describes both the dynamic and the stochastic nature of decision making and accounts for the observed changes in choice probabilities, including preference reversals as a function of time limit. An experiment in which five different time limits were imposed on the decision maker is presented to test the predictions of the model. It is shown that MDFT is able to account for the complex decision behavior observed in the data. Furthermore, MDFT is compared with the predictions of decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001).

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Syllogistic reasoning time: disconfirmation disconfirmed.

Models of deductive reasoning typically assume that reasoners dedicate more logical analysis to unbelievable conclusions than to believable ones (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). When the conclusion is believable, reasoners are assumed to accept it without much further thought, but when it is unbelievable, they are assumed to analyze the conclusion, presumably in an attempt to disconfirm it. This disconfirmation hypothesis leads to two predictions, which were tested in the present experiment: Reasoners should take longer to reason about problems leading to unbelievable conclusions, and reasoners should consider more models or representations of premise information for unbelievable conclusions than for believable ones. Neither prediction was supported by our data. Indeed, we observed that reasoners took significantly longer to reason about believable conclusions than about unbelievable ones and generated the same number of representations regardless of the believability of the premises. We propose a model, based on a modified version of verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995), that does not depend on the disconfirmation assumption.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2003

Decision-making in state lotteries: half now or all of it later?

Many state lotteries offer players a choice between receiving roughly half of the jackpot immediately and receiving the entire jackpot over 25 annual payments. This requires players to make a decision that involves uncertainty, delay, and large amounts of real money. Archival data on lottery players' jackpot payment decisions were collected from seven state and three multistate lotteries. Players' jackpot payment preferences were assessed at the time of ticket purchase and after winning a jackpot. Preference for the annuity payment option significantly decreased as jackpot size increased, both at the time of ticket purchase and after winning. Furthermore, a significant proportion of winners who selected the annuity payment option at ticket purchase switched to the cash payment option after winning, whereas no winners switched from the cash to the annuity option after winning. These findings suggest that real-world choices involving large sums of money may be subject to diminishing marginal utility and probability and delay discounting.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed2004

Dilution and confirmation of probability judgments based on nondiagnostic evidence.

Previous research has shown that probability judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic information alone. Results of the present experiments suggest that this dilution effect holds only under a limited set of conditions. When judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are compared with separately elicited judgments based on the diagnostic information alone, the dilution effect is consistently observed. When judgments based on the diagnostic evidence are revised in light of additional, nondiagnostic evidence, by contrast, the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed (yielding a confirmation effect) depending on the type of nondiagnostic evidence under evaluation.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1993

Choosing versus rejecting: why some options are both better and worse than others.

A previously unobserved pattern of choice behavior is predicted and corroborated. In line with the principle of compatibility, according to which the weighting of inputs is enhanced by their compatibility with output, the positive and negative dimensions of options (their pros and cons) are expected to loom larger when one is choosing and when one is rejecting, respectively. Subjects are presented with pairs of options, one of which--the enriched option--has more positive as well as more negative dimensions than does the other, impoverished, option. Because positive dimensions are weighted more heavily in choosing than in rejecting, and negative dimensions are weighted more heavily in rejecting than in choosing, the enriched option tends to be chosen and rejected relatively more often than the impoverished option. These findings are extended to nonbinary decision problems, and their implications for the rational theory of choice and for everyday decisions are discussed.

Adult↗