Help tsunami victims--be a tourist!
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This report reviews the response of a regional burn center to the disaster that occurred in New York City at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In addition, it assesses that response in the context of other medical institutions in the region. There were facilities in the region that had 120 burn care beds; only two-thirds of the burn-injured patients who required hospital admission were admitted to designated burn centers, and only 28% of burn-injured victims initially were triaged to regional burn centers. The care rendered at this center was made possible by a "disaster-ready" facility and supplementation of personnel from the resources provided by The National Disaster Medical System. The patient outcomes at this center exceeded that as predicted by logistic regression analysis.
INTRODUCTION: The ongoing threat of a terrorist attack places public agencies under increasing pressure to ensure readiness in the event of a disaster. Yet, little published information exists regarding the current state of readiness, which would allow local and regional organizations to develop disaster preparedness plans that would function seamlessly across service areas. The objective of this study is to characterize state-level disaster readiness soon after September 2001 and correlate readiness with existing programs providing an organized response to medical emergencies. METHODS: During the first quarter of 2002, a cross-sectional survey assessing five components of disaster readiness was administered in all 50 states. The five components of disaster readiness included: (1) statewide disaster planning; (2) coordination; (3) training; (4) resource capacity; and (5) preparedness for biological/chemical terrorism. RESULTS: Most states reported the presence of a statewide disaster plan (94%), but few are tested by activation (48%), and still fewer contain a bioterrorism component (38%). All states have designated disaster operations centers (100%), but few states have an operating communications system linking health and medical resources (36%). Approximately half of states offer disaster training to medical professionals; about 10% of states require the training. Between 22-48% of states have various contingency plans to treat victims when service capacity is exceeded. Biochemical protective equipment for health professionals is lacking in all but one state, and only 10% of states indicate that all hospitals have decontamination capabilities. States with a functioning statewide trauma system were significantly more likely to possess key attributes of a functioning disaster readiness plan. CONCLUSION: These findings suggest that disaster plans are prevalent among states. However, key programs and policies were noticeably absent. Communication systems remain fragmented and adequate training programs and protective equipment for health personnel are markedly lacking. Statewide trauma systems may provide a framework upon which to build future medical disaster readiness capacity.
The caregiving team is the core of effective management practice. Home care managers need to remember that caring for the caregivers--seeing them as victims as well as care providers and allowing them the same time for shock, grief, and recovery--allows those folks to carry on with the business of home care.
This commentary on the World Trade Center attack is written from the perspective of a New York City critical care service, with a long history of activity in disaster management, which is located at the Montefiore Medical Center/Albert Einstein College of Medicine. The paper describes some of the local concerns of the service in the first hours, the reality of dispersal of victims throughout the New York City hospital system, and some of the resources made available and their utilization. In general, the US Critical Care Medicine System receives massive resources in terms of gross national product expenditure when compared with other developed countries. A large capacity is subsequently in place to provide care to critically ill patients resulting from manmade as well as natural disasters. It was the nature of the World Trade Center attack in terms of the ratio of injured survivors to dead victims that did not allow the full capacity and capability of the system to engage.
UNLABELLED: In a wedding celebration of 700 participants, the third floor of the hall in which the celebration was taking place suddenly collapsed. While the walls remained intact, all three floors of the building collapsed, causing Israel's largest disaster. OBJECTIVES: To study the management of a multicasualty event (MCE), in the out-of-hospital and in-hospital phases, including rescue, emergency medical services (EMS) deployment and evacuation of casualties, emergency department (ED) deployment, recalling staff, medical care, imaging procedures, hospitalization, secondary referral, and interhospital transfer of patients. METHODS: Data on all the victims who arrived at the four EDs in Jerusalem were collected through medical files, telephone interviews, and hospital computerized information. RESULTS: The disaster resulted in 23 fatalities and 315 injured people; 43% were hospitalized. During the first hour, 42% were evacuated and after seven hours the scene was empty. Ninety-seven basic life support ambulances, 18 mobile intensive care units, 600 emergency medical technicians, 40 paramedics, and 15 physicians took part in the out-of-hospital stage. At the hospitals, about 1,300 staff members arrived immediately, either on demand or voluntarily, a number that seems too large for this disaster. Computed tomography (CT) demand was over its capability. CONCLUSIONS: During this MCE, the authors observed "rotating" bottleneck phenomena within out-of-hospital and in-hospital systems. For maximal efficiency, hospitals need to fully coordinate the influx and transfer of patients with out-of-hospital rescue services as well as with other hospitals. Each hospital has to immediately deploy its operational center, which will manage and monitor the hospital's resources and facilitate coordination with the relevant institutions.
Lightning ranks first among natural disasters in terms of fatalities and property damage each year. If fortunate enough to survive, the victim of a lightning or electrical accident often presents with numerous complicated clinical manifestations. The astute nurse practitioner will be challenged to identify the immediate signs and symptoms of possible system disruption, and to institute the follow-up management necessary to prevent further complications. This article explores the nurse practitioner's role in the physical assessment of the client and the protocol for management and follow-up care. Case studies are presented to illustrate the various multisystem findings of clients struck either directly or indirectly by lightning. Environmental precautions to decrease the likelihood of lightning's harmful effects are also discussed. It is easier to prevent a lightning and/or electrical accident than to treat the victim.
The post-tsunami health and nutritional statuses of survivors were surveyed three months after the disaster struck. Non-participant observations and questionnaires were used to study the effects of the disaster on their lifestyles and health while residing in temporary shelters provided by the government and private donors. Anthropometrics were measured and dietary surveys conducted to elicit nutritional status. Our findings indicated good management of drinking water in the temporary shelters. Toilet construction and water supply were adequate, but wastewater and sewage systems were poorly managed. The study group still suffered from injuries after the disaster, and complained of back pain, stress, and sleep disorders. Most in the study group had unsatisfactory health behaviors, and obesity was an increasing problem among female participants.
OBJECTIVE: To establish the level of medical care provided in the emergency department of general hospitals to the victims of the Volendam café fire on 1 January 2001. METHODS: A retrospective review was done based on a standardized chart, for all victims seen at the emergency departments of 19 hospitals. Diagnostic findings and logistic aspects were inventoried. Treatment described in the Emergency Management of Severe Burns protocol was used as a gold standard against which the care provided to the victims was assessed. RESULTS: Data from 233 patients were included in the analysis. The documentation rate was low. Suspected inhalation injury and burns were the most frequently documented diagnoses. Most patients with suspected inhalation injury, for whom treatment records were available, received oxygen therapy (81%). Intubation was performed in 43% of patients with suspected inhalation injury and 14% of the remaining patients required intubation after admission to the intensive care unit. Most patients with circulatory problems (83%) and/or more than 15% of total body surface area burned (97%), for whom treatment records were available, received intravenous lines. Pain treatment seemed to have had low priority. Two patients (3%) were re-admitted after having been released earlier from the emergency department. CONCLUSION: Treatment and triage of the burn casualties after the Volendam café fire was adequate. The documentation rate was low. Not all steps in diagnosis and treatment may be of equal importance in disaster circumstances.
After an F-4 tornado destroyed a large section of our town, I gave 50 complementary energy treatments to tornado victims. I discovered that the same energetic, physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual disruption occurred in people directly and indirectly exposed to the tornado, and that the damage did not repair spontaneously over time. This article describes the energetic damage people sustained from the tornado and their physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual responses. It also describes the energetic treatment that effectively eliminated the trauma, returning the tornado victim to a stable state. The article concludes with clinical and research implications and relates the treatment of the tornado victims to holistic nursing. The treatment holds promise for victims of posttraumatic stress disorder.
The Omagh bombing in August 1998 produced many of the problems documented in other major incidents. An initial imbalance between the demand and supply of clinical resources at the local hospital, poor information due to telecommunication problems, the need to triage victims and the need to transport the most severely injured significant distances were the most serious issues. The Royal Group Hospitals Trust (RGHT) received 30 severely injured secondary transfers over a 5-hour period, which stressed the hospital's systems even with the presence of extra staff that arrived voluntarily before the hospital's major incident plan was activated. Many patients were transferred to the RGHT by helicopter, but much of the time the gained advantage was lost due to lack of a helipad within the RGHT site. Identifying patients and tracking them through the hospital system was problematic. While the major incident plan ensured that communication with the relatives and the media was effective and timely, communication between the key clinical and managerial staff was hampered by the need to be mobile and by the limitations of the internal telephone system. The use of mobile anaesthetic teams helped maintain the flow of patients between the Emergency Department and radiology, operating theatres or the intensive care unit (ICU). The mobile anaesthetic teams were also responsible for efficient and timely resupply of the Emergency Department, which worked well. In the days that followed many victims required further surgical procedures. Coordination of the multidisciplinary teams required for many of these procedures was difficult. Although only seven patients required admission to adult general intensive care, no ICU beds were available for other admissions over the following 5 days. A total of 165 days of adult ICU treatment were required for the victims of the bombing.
Disaster drills are an effective way to test a hospital's preparedness for real-life disasters, but an extensive amount of coordination and time is necessary to host a successful drill with a large number of victims. The lessons learned in this drill include a number of planning, education, orientation, and follow-up issues. It is not realistic to believe that a drill can be perfectly planned and practiced; therefore each drill provides another opportunity to improve on past experience.
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