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PubMedDate not supplied

After the slippery slope: Dutch experiences on regulating active euthanasia.

"When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward." If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands--where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001--may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear of the slippery slope. The conclusion is that Dutch experiences justify some caution.

Empirical Research↗
PubMed1994

Debunking the slippery slope argument against human germ-line gene therapy.

This paper attempts to debunk the slippery-slope argument against human germ-line gene therapy by showing that the downside of the slope--genetic enhancement--need not be as unethical or unjust as some people have supposed. It argues that if genetic enhancement is governed by proper regulations and is accompanied by adequate education, then it need not violate recognized principles of morality or social justice.

Civil Rights↗
PubMed1998

Compulsory sterilisation in Sweden.

In the Fall of 1997 the leading Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, created a media hype over the Swedish policy of compulsory sterilisation that had been in operation between 1935 and 1975. In the discussion that followed, the moral condemnation of our medical past was unanimous. However, the reasons for rejecting what had gone on were varied and mutually inconsistent. Three strands of criticism were common: the argument from autonomy, the argument from caution, and the argument from biological scepticism. In the paper it is argued that what point of departure you choose in your criticism of the past should be of consequence also for your ideas about present and future medical practice. In particular, if you rely on the argument from autonomy, you should be prepared to accept a liberal (present and future) use of reproductive techniques.

Abortion, Eugenic↗
PubMed1997

Physician-assisted suicide in Alzheimer's disease.

This paper takes up the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in Alzheimer's disease (AD), reviewing arguments for and against in a broad interdisciplinary context. Preemptive PAS-AD involving competent patients raises the further question of AD-euthanasia. The author concludes, after thorough assessment of the literature, that caution in moving toward AD-PAS is necessary. However, where PAS is legalized, it may be difficult to justify precluding people with AD from access.

Aged↗
PubMed1990

Brain death and the anencephalic newborn.

We will set the stage for our analysis by reviewing selected medical aspects of anencephaly, outlining the history of the use of anencephalics as organ sources, and summarising the results of an important study recently completed at Loma Linda University. We will then employ some of the arguments and justifications underlying the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) to claim that anencephaly is morally equivalent to brain death, i.e., the reasons for considering brain-dead patients to be dead also apply to anencephalics. Finally, we will critique our proposal and discuss its implications.

Aborted Fetus↗
PubMed1990

Moral intuition, good deaths and ordinary medical practitioners.

Debate continues over the acts/omissions doctrine, and over the concepts of duty and charity. Such issues inform the debate over the moral permissibility of euthanasia. Recent papers have emphasised moral sensitivity, medical intuitions, and sub-standard palliative care as some of the factors which should persuade us to regard euthanasia as morally unacceptable. I argue that these lines of argument are conceptually misdirected and have no bearing on the bare permissibility of voluntary euthanasia. Further, some of the familiar slippery slope arguments against voluntary euthanasia compromise the principle of autonomy to which both supporters and opponents of euthanasia adhere. I discuss a model for doctor/patient relationships which can be applied to cases which would be seen by all disputants as strong prima facie cases for euthanasia. I argue that in certain cases it will be ordinary medical practitioners who are duty-bound to assist death.

Aged↗
PubMed1999

Right to die or duty to live? The problem of euthanasia.

Argument about euthanasia in Australia intensified following the world's first legal euthanasia death of Bob Dent under the Northern Territory's short-lived Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995. This paper takes stock of the implacably opposed positions on euthanasia following Bob Dent's death, which provides a focus for the controversy, and identifies the key doctrines which separate adversaries in the euthanasia debate and their associated incommensurable intuitions.

Advance Directive Adherence↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Autonomy and assisted suicide. The execution of freedom.

Proponents of assisted suicide who base their arguments on autonomy err in ways that are little attended to. In the absence of a substantive theory of the good, in neither a descriptive nor an ascriptive sense can the concept of autonomy distinguish those acts that should be morally prohibited from those that may be permitted. And to impose a particular theory of the good, whether individual liberty or the sanctity of life, violates the autonomy of those who do not share a commitment to that theory.

Beneficence↗
PubMed1997

The morality of human gene patents.

This paper discusses the morality of patenting human genes and genetic technologies. After examining arguments on different sides of the issue, the paper concludes that there are, at present, no compelling reasons to prohibit the extension of current patent laws to the realm of human genetics. However, since advances in genetics are likely to have profound social implications, the most prudent course of action demands a continual reexamination of genetics laws and policies in light of ongoing developments in science and technology.

Commodification↗
PubMed1994

Active euthanasia--time for a decision.

There has been renewed interest in the moral arguments surrounding euthanasia. Some patients are now apprehensive of advanced medical technology which they fear may result in a prolonged and undignified death. In the current situation of scarce resources for health care, both patients and doctors could be coerced into considering active euthanasia if it was legally available. In this paper it is argued that doctors now need to make a clear statement rejecting active euthanasia but affirming that in certain cases passive euthanasia, or letting die, may be morally justifiable.

Decision Making↗
PubMed1996

Arguing along the slippery slope of human embryo research.

One frequent argument in the debate over federal funding of human embryo research is the slippery slope argument. Slope arguments can be of several types: either logical, empirical, or full (a combination of logical and empirical slope arguments, with an additional psychological premise). A full slope argument against human embryo research suggests that funding embryo research could undermine current protections for human subjects research, erode respect for persons with disabilities, and encourage eugenics practices. While the Panel commissioned by the National Institutes of Health to issue funding guidelines regarding human embryo research acknowledges some slippery slope concerns, the Panel's final report fails to address such concerns in any depth. Given this failure seriously to address these valid concerns, federal funding of embryo research should not proceed at this time.

Advisory Committees↗
PubMed1994

The history of euthanasia debates in the United States and Britain.

Debates about the ethics of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide date from ancient Greece and Rome. After the development of ether, physicians began advocating the use of anesthetics to relieve the pains of death. In 1870, Samuel Williams first proposed using anesthetics and morphine to intentionally end a patient's life. Over the next 35 years, debates about the ethics of euthanasia raged in the United States and Britain, culminating in 1906 in an Ohio bill to legalize euthanasia, a bill that was ultimately defeated. The arguments propounded for and against euthanasia in the 19th century are identical to contemporary arguments. Such similarities suggest four conclusions: Public interest in euthanasia 1) is not linked with advances in biomedical technology; 2) it flourishes in times of economic recession, in which individualism and social Darwinism are invoked to justify public policy; 3) it arises when physician authority over medical decision making is challenged; and 4) it occurs when terminating life-sustaining medical interventions become standard medical practice and interest develops in extending such practices to include euthanasia.

Beneficence↗
PubMed1998

Pulling up the runaway: the effect of new evidence on euthanasia's slippery slope.

The slippery slope argument has been the mainstay of many of those opposed to the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. In this paper I re-examine the slippery slope in the light of two recent studies that examined the prevalence of medical decisions concerning the end of life in the Netherlands and in Australia. I argue that these two studies have robbed the slippery slope of the source of its power--its intuitive obviousness. Finally I propose that, contrary to the warnings of the slippery slope, the available evidence suggests that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide might actually decrease the prevalence of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.

Australia↗
PubMedDate not supplied

A good death: is euthanasia the answer?

Euthanasia--particularly active voluntary euthanasia--and assisted suicide are subjects of continuing controversy. Historical attitudes, current concerns, the situation in the Netherlands, and the positions of various medical associations are reviewed. Major arguments for and against active euthanasia are presented, with special consideration to the role that health care providers might be asked to perform should active euthanasia and assisted suicide be given societal sanction. The authors conclude that better pain management and A willingness to provide care within already established ethical and legal guidelines, not the legalization of active euthanasia and assisted suicide, are the appropriate responses to current proposals for assistance in dying.

Attitude↗
PubMed1996

Not a slippery slope or sudden subversion: German medicine and national socialism in 1933.

The history of medicine this century is darkened by the downfall of the German medical profession, exposed during the doctors' trial at Nuremberg in 1946. Relying largely on documents published during 1933 in German medical journals, this paper examines two widely accepted notions of those events, metaphorically termed "slippery slope" and "sudden subversion." The first connotes a gradual slide over infinitesimal steps until, suddenly, all footing is lost; the second conveys forced take over of the profession's leadership and values. Both concepts imply that the medical profession itself became the victim of circumstances. The slippery slope concept is a prominent figure of argument in the current debate on bioethics. The evidence presented here, however, strongly suggests that the German medical community set its own course in 1933. In some respects this course even outpaced the new government, which had to rein in the profession's eager pursuit of enforced eugenic sterilizations. In 1933 the convergence of political, scientific, and economic forces dramatically changed the relationship between the medical community and the government. That same convergence is occurring again and must be approached with great caution if medicine is to remain focused on the preservation of physical and medical integrity.

Complicity↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The moral case against euthanasia. Catholics must articulate persuasive arguments to counter the cultural rush toward assisted suicide.

Catholics who adhere to a consistent ethic of life are going to face tougher opposition as they struggle to defend society's most vulnerable members. The major ethical contention will concern the ethics of dying. Unfortunately, there have not been well-articulated moral arguments to counter society's rush toward physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Catholics must articulate a persuasive ethical ideal for dying a truly good death. It is crucial to achieve a balance: between valuing individual autonomy and protecting the common good; between affirming the goodness of life and accepting death as a reality of the life cycle. Another challenging piece of the moral argument lies in convincing people that the means and processes used to achieve a goal are rarely neutral. Another serious problem with permitting the killing of self or others is that one cannot ever be certain of the agent's motivation. And when an individual's subjective determination of a need to choose death is given ultimate validity, there is no way to call a halt. If medical mercy killing becomes acceptable, social pressure can mount for an ill person to ask for death to relieve the family burdens. Maintaining an absolute prohibition against actively taking a human life--self or other, with or without consent, dying or not--is necessary to protect human communal bonds.

Catholicism↗
PubMed1995

Protecting elderly people: flaws in ageist arguments.

Some form of rationing is necessary in medicine, and to use age as a criterion for rationing seems initially appealing. Many of the criteria currently being used for deciding the distribution of funds depend on subjective judgments. Age, however, is objective and therefore negates the need for value judgments. Justice and fairness, it is sometimes suggested, require that finite resources should be directed at young people, who have not had a chance to live their lives, rather than at elderly people, who have already lived most of theirs. The adoption of ageist policies, however, may not result in the implied savings unless care is also withdrawn. Furthermore, ageist policies, which deny elderly people treatment on the sole grounds of their age, are both unfair and discriminatory and should therefore be resisted.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2002

Paying for kidneys: the case against prohibition.

We argue that healthy people should be allowed to sell one of their kidneys while they are alive--that the current prohibition on payment for kidneys ought to be overturned. Our argument has three parts. First, we argue that the moral basis for the current policy on live kidney donations and on the sale of other kinds of tissue implies that we ought to legalize the sale of kidneys. Second, we address the objection that the sale of kidneys is intrinsically wrong because it violates the Kantian duty of respect for humanity. Third, we address a range of consequentialist objections based on the idea that kidney sales will be exploitative. Throughout the paper, we argue only that it ought to be legal for an individual to receive payment for a kidney. We do not argue that it ought to be legal for an individual to buy a kidney.

Blood Donors↗