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Results for “Right to Life Movement”

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At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources
PubMed1994

Bioethics and the limits of tolerance.

Since 1989 there has been an ongoing controversy about the limits of public discussion of bioethical issues in the German-speaking world. While a number of scholars have been involved, Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse have been the principal targets of those seeking to limit bioethical debates. Those who have supported silencing discussion of certain issues have argued that such public discussion leads to a loss of freedom. In the article we argue that toleration is not based on subjectivism but rather on reason. Furthermore, the efforts to suppress debate are often based on a failure to understand our position. Such efforts at suppression also rest on an elitist view of society that must assume that the general public cannot debate such topics.

Attitude↗
PubMed1997

Abortion, value and the sanctity of life.

In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Substantial areas of agreement are overlooked, while areas of disagreement are, mistakenly, seen as central. If we uncover a truer picture, then hope of a certain accord may no longer seem vain. I dispute many of these claims. Dworkin argues that both sides in the debate are united in believing that life is sacred, or intrinsically valuable. I disagree. I maintain that only in a very attenuated sense of intrinsic value will this be agreed upon. I consider how an account of such value might be further fleshed out, but suggest, if this is done on any plausible lines, agreement will fall away. Dworkin argues, also, that the issue of personhood, does not, contrary to widespread belief, keep the parties apart. Again I disagree. We need to distinguish the question of whether there is in fact dispute over this issue from that of whether there is, in truth, good reason for dispute. And I argue that, rightly or wrongly, the issue of personhood remains central. Dworkin suggests that the purported proximity between the two sides offers some hope of an eventual reconciliation. At least, they will agree to differ, accepting that in this area freedom of choice is paramount. I am sceptical. Even this measure of reconciliation depends upon conservatives giving up positions which, I argue, they will continue to maintain. There is a further point. Dworkin appears to be, in many ways, cautiously optimistic. I appear, in contrast, to be pessimistic. I argue, however, that only so long as we do disagree over matters of substance is there much hope that our differences might be resolved.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed2005

Controlling birth: science, politics, and public policy.

Reproductive technologies raise a host of social and legal issues that challenge basic values and create intense controversy. If researchers wish to inform public policies related to reproductive technologies, they must understand how the scientific enterprise is being manipulated and research findings are being misrepresented to justify a particular social agenda and restrict access to contraception and abortion. To counter these distortions, scientists must defend the science advisory process, be involved in dissemination of their research findings beyond simply publication in scientific journals, and actively work to ensure that the findings are not misrepresented to the public.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed1996

Dworkin and Casey on abortion.

This article responds to two important recent treatments of abortion rights. I will mainly discuss Ronald Dworkin's recent writings concerning abortion: his article "Unenumerated rights: whether and how Roe should be overruled," and his book Life's Dominion. In these writings Dworkin presents a novel view of what the constitutional and moral argument surronding abortion is really about. Both debates actually turn, he argues, on the question of how to interpret the widely shared idea that human life is sacred. At the heart of the abortion debate is the essentially religious notion that human life has value which transcends its value to any particular person; abortion is therefore at bottom a religious issue. Dworkin hopes to use this analysis to show that the religion clauses of the First Amendment provide a "textual home" for a woman's right to choose abortion. I wish to scrutinize this suggestion here; I want to probe the precise consequences for abortion rights of such an understanding of their basis. I will argue that the consequences are more radical than Dworkin seems to realize. The other work I will examine here is the important 1992 Supreme Court decision on abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The controlling opinion in that case, written jointly by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, strongly reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, but also upheld most of the provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that had mandated various restrictions on abortion. The justices' basis for upholding these restictions was their introduction of a new constitutional standard for abortion regulations, an apparently weaker standard than those that had governed previous Supreme Court abortion decisions. I think there is a flaw in Casey's new constitutional test for abortion regulations, and I will explain, when we turn to Casey, what it is and why it bears a close relation to Dworkin's reluctance to carry his argument as far as it seems to go.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed1992

Quality of life and the death of "Baby M": a report from Australia.

... While it is no secret that Victorian doctors, like their American counterparts, are frequently making decisions that result in a severely disabled infant's death, they are making these decisions without public guidance, against the backdrop of laws and traditional ethical precepts which uphold in spirit (although, as we shall see, not always in practice) the traditional "sanctity of life" view. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that doctors and parents will occasionally find themselves in a situation where zealous defenders of an infant's "right to life" will turn to the law in an attempt to prevent what they see as immoral and unlawful decisions. This was the case recently in Melbourne, where a severely disabled infant was born on July 14, 1989 and died twelve days later, on July 26.

Australia↗
PubMed1989

The pill of choice?

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Abortifacient Agents↗