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At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources
PubMed2001

Risk structure compensation in Germany's statutory health insurance.

In 1996 insurees in Germany's statutory health insurance system were given a right to choose their sickness fund. To ensure that all funds had an equal starting position, a risk structure compensation scheme based on income and average expenditure by age and sex was introduced. From an analysis of expenditure and transfers, data on sickness fund membership and a published survey, the following effects can be identified: sickness funds merged, with a reduction in number from 1,221 to 420 between 1993 and 2000; the risk compensation scheme narrowed differences in contribution rates; insurees left the more expensive funds for cheaper ones; and increasing transfer sums indicate further risk segregation. Thus, the compensation mechanism will have to be retained permanently, although modifications are likely.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed2001

Implementing prospective budgeting for Dutch sickness funds.

Most if not all social policies entail redistribution of scarce public resources from central government to regional and local authorities, to individual citizens or non-government agencies. Governments use a wide variety of instruments to allocate public funds, including direct state provision of subsidies and goods and services, setting budgets at different levels, and regulation of social insurance schemes. Most industrialised countries have developed budget models based on implicit or explicit allocation criteria. Governments usually start by determining global budgets for an entire category of public spending and then specifying the amounts allocated for categories of spending, and next, the budgets for individual agencies. Within such a 'cascading' model, the lower level budgets may be more controversial than the global budgets, as they directly affect the amounts available to individual actors in the system, e.g. hospitals or health insurance agencies. Setting budgets not only shifts decision-making authority but also financial risks from the central government to decentralised actors. The introduction of the prospective budgeting model for the Dutch sickness funds illustrates why determining budgets is not merely a matter of choosing objective allocation criteria, but also, of interaction between state and stakeholders. In the typical Dutch neocorporatist policy arena, where organised interests share responsibilities with government for the shaping and implementation of social policies, the health insurance agencies actively participated in the development of the budget model.

Budgets↗
PubMed2002

Inside the sausage factory: improving estimates of the effects of health insurance expansion proposals.

The fate of a proposal to expand health insurance is influenced by predictions of the proposal's effects on the number of newly insured and the cost of new coverage. Estimates vary widely, for reasons that are often hard to discern and evaluate. This article describes and compares the frameworks and parameters used for insurance modeling. It examines conventions and controversies surrounding a series of modeling parameters: how individuals respond to a change in the price of coverage, the extent of participation in a new plan by those already privately insured, firms' behavior, and the value of public versus private coverage. The article also suggests ways of making models more transparent and proposes "reference case" guidelines for modelers so that consumers can compare modeling results.

Fees and Charges↗
PubMed2003

Stakeholder views on flood risk management in Hungary's Upper Tisza Basin.

With escalating costs of flood mitigation and relief, a challenge for the Hungarian government is to develop a flood mitigation and insurance/relief system that is viewed as efficient and fair by the many stakeholders involved. To aid policymakers in this task, this article reports on a recent study to elicit stakeholder views on flood risk management in the Upper Tisza Basin, including views on appropriate means of reducing losses and for transferring the residual losses from the direct victims to taxpayers or an insurance pool. This study is part of a project to develop an integrated approach to flood risk management coordinated by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in collaboration with Swedish and Hungarian researchers. The discussion begins by describing the background of flood risk management problems in the Upper Tisza Basin. The results of interviews carried out with selected key stakeholders and the results of a public survey eliciting views on flood risk management are reported. The final section draws conclusions on incorporating stakeholder views into a flood risk management model, which will be used to illustrate policy paths at an upcoming stakeholder workshop. The conclusions are also of direct interest to Hungarian policymakers.

Journal Article↗
PubMed1990

The escalating health care cost of AIDS: who will pay?

AIDS is a crisis that has been imposed on an imperfect healthcare system. The flaws are easy to recognize but difficult to treat. Difficult choices about who pays for the medical care for AIDS patients will be made by upper-class and upper middle-class policymakers who are influenced by their own sense of vulnerability and by an aroused public. Social prejudice and moral judgment must be set aside. While the public ethic speaks the language of social justice, public activity often speaks the language of market justice. Beauchamp (1984) cites the philosophy of Anthony Downs when he states that solving social problems "requires painful losses, the restructuring of society and the acceptance of new burdens by the most powerful and the most numerous on behalf of the least powerful or the least numerous" (p. 306). It is characteristic of the public to attend to social problems until "it becomes clear that solving these problems requires painful costs that the dominant interests in society are unwilling to pay" (p. 306). The problem of AIDS care will require painful costs; but unlike many social problems, it will refuse to be hidden, refuse to be contained, refuse to be silenced, and refuse to be equitable in the marketplace and in the social system.

Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome↗
PubMed1994

The Oregon Health Plan and public health.

The Oregon Health Plan would provide all Oregonians with health insurance through a combination of Medicaid expansion, employer mandates and high-risk coverage, with services delivered largely through managed care. The role of public health in a managed care environment is an important national issue, and one which has received much attention in Oregon. "Cultural" differences between Medicaid and public health have arisen over issues such as whether eligibility assures access, whether the private medical model will provide integrated care, the potential for exploitation of vulnerable populations in a capitated system, and the loss of cost-based Medicaid reimbursement to public clinics. In 1991, legislation required that Oregon's Medicaid managed care plans enter agreements with local health departments to assure their continued participation in providing certain public health services; these agreements are now being implemented. Oregon's experience suggests that any national health system will require a continuum of community and individual health services, with an important role for public health departments.

Health Benefit Plans, Employee↗