A law school forum on human cell-lines and frozen embryos.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search PubMed
Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Present U.S. policy on funding embryonic stem cell research evidently rests on the supposition that, because the policy's announcement on August 9, 2001 came as a surprise, no one initiating a stem cell line prior thereto could reasonably have been induced to do so by the government. Hence it has been suggested that without complicity in embryo destruction, the government may fund studies of lines created before that date. The escape from complicity is illusory. The historical facts belie the supposition of noninducement. What is more, if, in order to meet demand for more and newer cell lines, the government stipulates some later date as the creation time of the oldest eligible cell line, that move will explode the policy's purported justification. The policy is as unavailing as a moral position as it is constringent for scientific progress.
BACKGROUND: The huge potential of human embryonic stem cells has been a subject of wide discussion as regards the ethical and legal justification of using human embryos for establishing such cell lines. The opinions of infertile couples and their willingness to donate their supernumerary embryos for stem cell research have not been investigated earlier. METHODS: We conducted an analysis of the answers of couples who were asked to give informed consent as regards donating their embryos for stem cell research in our IVF unit in 2001-2002. RESULTS: Ninety-two percent of the couples gave informed consent as regards establishing and characterizing embryonic stem cell lines from the embryos which could not be used in their infertility treatment. Discussion in the Swedish media during May to December, 2001 regarding the importance and ethical justification of stem cell research made informing the couples easier. CONCLUSION: A high proportion, 92%, of couples who underwent infertility treatment in Sweden preferred donating their supernumerary embryos for stem cell research rather than letting them be discarded.
The present review examines recent publications concerned with the issue of the number of embryos to replace in an in-vitro fertilization cycle, and concentrates on the proposed selection methods that may allow us to transfer one or two embryos. A number of techniques that improve our selection criteria for deciding which is the most viable embryo are discussed, including blastocyst culture. It is proposed that the next step in assessing which embryos to transfer is to combine these techniques by performing assessment at the pronuclear stage, cleavage stages, and then after development to the blastocyst stage, when the number of embryos is sufficient. In so doing our embryo selection processes will be more critical, allowing us to limit the number of embryos replaced without detriment to pregnancy rates.
Testing embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities gives us the capacity to predict whether and to what extent people will exist with disease and disability. Moreover, the freezing of embryos for long periods of time enables us to alter the length of a normal human lifespan. After highlighting the shortcomings of somatic-cell gene therapy and germ-line genetic alteration, I argue that the testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos is the only medically and morally defensible way to prevent the existence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering that make their lives not worth living for them on the whole. In addition, I consider the possible harmful effects on children born from frozen embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. I also explore whether embryos have moral status and whether the prospects for disease-preventing genetic alteration can justify long-term cryopreservation of embryos.
When does benefiting from others' wrongdoing effectively make one a moral accomplice in their evil deeds? If stem cell research lives up to its therapeutic promise, this question (which has previously cropped up in debates over fetal tissue research or the use of Nazi research data) is likely to become a central one for opponents of embryo destruction. I argue that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima facie morally wrong under any of three conditions: (1) when the wrongdoing is one's agent; (2) when acceptance of benefit directly encourages the repetition of the wrongful deed (even though no agency relationship is involved); and (3) when acceptance of a benefit legitimates a wrongful practice. I conclude by showing that, because of the ways in which most embryonic stem cell lines come into being, people who oppose embryo destruction may use human embryonic stem cells without incurring moral blame.
Beyond the well-known ethical issues involved in medical experimentation on human subjects, experimenting with embryos raises unique and particularly hard problems. Besides the psychological obstacles connected with the fear of "playing God" and the awe with which we hold the process of the creation of human beings, there are three philosophical problems which are the main subject of the article: 1. The logical problem of circularity: the morality of experimenting on embryos is dependent on the status of the embryo, which in turn is partly decided by experimentation; 2. The metaphysical problem: experiments are justified by the benefits they bring to human subjects; but it is doubtful whether an early embryo is a "subject" and whether coming into being is a "benefit"; 3. The moral problem: the standard constraint on medical experiments is that they benefit either the individual subject or at least members of a relevantly defined group of patients suffering from the same syndrome. But embryo experimentation is often associated with potential cure to people of a completely different category (like geriatric patients). Finally, the article discusses the limits of the force of philosophical arguments in the formation of actual policies for regulating such practices as experimenting with embryos. The widely-shared fourteen-day limit is shown to be a sound practical compromise despite the difficulties in justifying it philosophically.
Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos ('discarded-created-distinction', from now on d-c-d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main focus is that the 'revealed beliefs' of its defenders are inconsistent with their 'professed beliefs', more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering.
With the controversial ethical issues on the creation of human embryos through cloning for therapeutic research, which holds more promise of medical breakthroughs that the world could ever imagine and the acknowledgement by many scientists that this technology may not lead in the near future to therapies; this country report discusses the approach Singapore takes on human stem cell research, interjected with the authors' own arguments and suggestions especially on research compensation injuries, an often neglected important issue. International comparative viewpoints taken by the major countries in the world are also included in the appendix.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Judge Christian Byk renders service to the Steering Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe (CDBI) by proposing a draft of the protocol destined to fill in a gap in international law on the status of the human embryo. This proposal, printed in a previous issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics deserves nevertheless to be questioned on important points. Is Christian Byk proposing to legalise research on human embryos not only in vitro but also in utero?
Replying to the criticisms of Lebech, the author tries, regarding the issue of embryo research, to draw a line between what could be an international legal approach and what is a philosophical ontological quest. It is then up to the reader to decide if, and how far, these two different approaches can be complementary.
This essay will address the ethical issues that have emerged in the first considerations of the newly emerging stem cell technology. Many of us in the field of bioethics were deliberating related issues as we first learned of the new science and confronted the ethical issues it raised. In this essay, I will draw on the work of colleagues who were asked to reflect on the early stages of the research (members of the IRBs, the Geron Ethicist Advisory Board, and the National Bioethics Advisory Commission) as the field debated the issues of consent, moral status, use of animal tissues, abortion, use of fetal tissue, and the nature and goals of entrepreneurial research. In this new capacity, ethicists weighed the problem of privacy, the role of justice considerations, and the issues of the marketplace in science. At this point, it is clear that far more issues remain unresolved than are settled, that there is largely unexplored territory ahead, and that the single most important task that faces us as a field is a steady call for ongoing conversation and public debate.
In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.