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PubMed2000

The ethics of medical marijuana: government restrictions vs. medical necessity.

Marijuana is listed by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as an illegal Schedule I drug which has no currently accepted medical use. However, on March 17, 1999, 11 independent scientists appointed by the Institute of Medicine reported that medical marijuana was effective in controlling some forms of pain, alleviating nausea and vomiting due to chemotherapy, treating wasting due to AIDS, and combating muscle spasms associated with multiple sclerosis. There was also no evidence that using marijuana would increase illicit drug use or that it was a "gateway" drug. Despite this evidence the DEA refuses to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II drug, which would allow physicians to prescribe unadulterated and standardized forms of marijuana. After reviewing the pertinent scientific data and applying the principle of double effect, there is a proportionate reason for allowing physicians to prescribe marijuana. Seriously ill patients have the right to effective therapies. To deny patients access to such a therapy is to deny them dignity and respect as persons.

Cannabis↗
PubMed2005

Euthanasia and assisted suicide: a liberal approach versus the traditional moral view.

Within the context of the debate over the recent suspended sentence given to John Stuart Godfrey by Underwood J in the Supreme Court of Tasmania for assisting his elderly mother with her suicide, this article examines some of the more popular arguments for and against the moral acceptability of euthanasia and assisted suicide. This article considers the arguments put forward on the "difference principle" by Rachels and Nesbitt before critically examining the liberal approach to the euthanasia issue as proposed by Kuhse. It is argued that whilst Kuhse is correct to reject the difference principle, she does so for the wrong reasons. The penultimate section of the article provides an overview of the traditional moral view against killing. The final part assesses whether the arguments put forward by proponents of the liberal approach are capable of overcoming this view.

Aged↗
PubMed1991

Ethical decision-making in the care of the dying and its applications to clinical practice.

In caring for dying patients, physicians and health team members face a number of decisions about how best to proceed with treatment. Many of these decisions carry implications for the life of the patient, either directly or indirectly. Recent discussions about the morality and wisdom of euthanasia provide an excellent stimulus to reexamine the ethical nature of these decisions. This paper reviews five ethical principles, and describes a process of decision-making that can result in two broad paths of action in relation to life-prolonging treatment. Case examples are presented for illustration. Appropriate ethical practice can be differentiated from acting with the primary intent to take life (euthanasia).

Adult↗
PubMed2004

Ethics and conjoined twins.

INTRODUCTION: The birth of live conjoined twins in a community can draw considerable attention to the appropriate ethical issues. DISCUSSION: The management requires the skills of a multi-disciplinary team of clinicians who have seldom faced the challenge. The team leader must draw together principles of a medical, social, cultural, religious and legal nature in reaching the best outcome. Often the basic question is whether one child should die or both? At times the question is raised whether it is justifiable to sacrifice one life to save the other. In these days of high technology, surgeons can be tempted to go a bridge too far. In reaching this decision there can be numerous hidden conflicts of interest. Increasingly the final decision needs to be made and approved by the courts so as to protect the rights of the twins and to ensure surgical intervention is not an unlawful act.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed2001

Moral absolutism and ectopic pregnancy.

If one accepts a version of absolutism that excludes the intentional killing of any innocent human person from conception to natural death, ectopic pregnancy poses vexing difficulties. Given that the embryonic life almost certainly will die anyway, how can one retain one's moral principle and yet adequately respond to a situation that gravely threatens the life of the mother and her future fertility? The four options of treatment most often discussed in the literature are non-intervention, salpingectomy (removal of tube with embryo), salpingostomy (removal of embryo alone), and use of methotrexate (MXT). In this essay, I review these four options and introduce a fifth (the milking technique). In order to assess these options in terms of the absolutism mentioned, it will also be necessary to discuss various accounts of the intention/foresight distinction. I conclude that salpingectomy, salpingostomy, and the milking technique are compatible with absolutist presuppositions, but not the use of methotrexate.

Abortion, Therapeutic↗
PubMed1998

Ethical care at the end of life.

In treating dying patients, who by virtue of their physical and emotional situation are frail and vulnerable, physicians must meet a high standard of professional, ethical care. Such a standard is based upon a philosophy of care that recognizes the patients' inherent worth as human beings and their uniqueness as individuals. The ethical and virtuous physician will practice in accordance with the principles of biomedical ethics that form the foundations of thought and treatment approaches in this area and will seek to do the best for the patient and the family. "Doing the best" includes respecting autonomy through gentle truth-telling, helping the patient and family to set treatment goals, and providing for symptom control, continuing attentive care and accompaniment throughout the course of the illness. Total care includes physical, emotional and spiritual aspects, is sensitive to cultural values and is best provided by an interdisciplinary team. Practices of symptom control in routine care and in crisis situations, as well as the cessation and non-initiation of treatment, will have as their goals the relief and comfort of the patient. The ethical physician will not act with the intention of bringing about the death of the patient, whether by ordering medication in excess of that required for symptom control, administering a lethal injection or any other means.

Beneficence↗
PubMed1997

Assisted suicide and equal protection: in defense of the distinction between killing and letting die.

The author argues that the distinction between intentionally killing oneself and intentionally letting oneself die is both coherent "as a matter of principle" and morally relevant. This principled distinction then provides a benchmark for courts considering equal protection arguments to distinguish one patient seeking to commit suicide from another wishing to free herself of unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment, and to conclude that these two individuals are not similarly situated for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. These two situations are morally distinct--the deaths are caused by different means and those involved have different intentions. The intention of the doctor and patient to hasten the patient's death is material, and the intention relates to understanding what it means to treat people equally. Doctors who participate in assisted suicide intend their patients to die by their own acts, i.e., intentional killing. The author concludes that those who ask their doctors to commit assisted suicide and those who forego treatment are not similarly situated for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. The afterward comments on the Supreme Court's recent assisted suicide decision. It affirms the author's analysis.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed1995

Sacrificing one to save many.

Attempts to solve the Trolley Problem by means of a single principle have proved unpersuasive. Nor can the intuition about Transplant be adequately grounded in the hypothetical dissent of rational contractors. It is explained by the initial liability principle, that loss should lie where it falls unless there is sufficient reason to shift it. If we did not think we should accept misfortune in such cases and thought that minimising loss of life was sufficient reason to shift the loss we should not be according others the minimum respect and treatment we feel is their due. The intuition about Trolley is explained by the affinity of that case to the pure case where the choice is between saving many and saving fewer, where minimising misfortune is the only credible option. But these considerations are not yet enough to accommodate the cases that lie between the extremes of Trolley and Transplant. We can handle the intermediate cases by attempting to assimilate them to one or other paradigm and to one another with a sensitivity to morally relevant and irrelevant differences that seeks initially to be faithful to the values reflected by our moral intuitions. Those intuitive judgements are unlikely to survive such an examination wholly unmodified.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Removing life support: motivations, obligations. An opinion on NCCB Committee for Pro-Life Activities' statement on artificial hydration and nutrition.

In April 1992 the Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a resource paper titled "Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections." At best, this document and its conclusions may be viewed as a pastoral statement, offering some tentative reasoning and conclusions to be considered in cases that concern the use of medically assisted nutrition and hydration. When discussing the question, is the withholding or withdrawing of medically assisted hydration and nutrition always direct killing? the document applies two principles--"no reasonable hope of benefit" and "involving excessive burdens." The document's crucial part is its admission that artificial hydration and nutrition may be removed without the intention of causing death, and that "this kind of decision should not be equated with a decision to kill or with suicide." The committee assigns decision-making responsibility to patients, families, and healthcare professionals, but continues its discussion for 20 pages and offers cautions conclusions concerning removal of such therapy. Two assumptions seem to underlie the document's overly cautious conclusions, the first being that mere vegetative function mandates continued life support. The first assumption overemphasizes the value of physiological functioning insofar as the purpose of human life is concerned. It also is contrary to the goal of medicine, which envisions restoration of cognitive-affective function as an element of successful therapy. The second assumption is that withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition from persons in PVS may lead to euthanasia. But mandating the continuation of nonbeneficial therapy simply because it prolongs physiological function seems to lead people to favor euthanasia rather than reject it.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Catholicism↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The Supreme Court addresses physician-assisted suicide. Can its rulings improve palliative care?

In June 1997, the US Supreme Court unanimously decided that competent, terminally ill patients have no general constitutional right to commit suicide or to obtain assistance in committing suicide. Thus, the broad prohibitions against any kind of suicide assistance that almost every state has enacted do not violate the constitution. While many of the rulings and the bulk of the reaction to them focused on the Supreme Court's resolution of important legal controversies regarding physician-assisted suicide, this article focuses on the resulting potential for change in physicians' opinions on palliative care. The Court's reasoning may help physicians resolve substantial ethical dilemmas regarding the provision of narcotics given in high dosages, the care of incompetent patients, and the suffering caused by symptoms other than pain. For example, the Court concluded that a physician's intent can distinguish permissible acts of aggressive pain relief from impermissible acts of hastening death. This distinction has clinical uses and can help physicians develop ethical guidelines and practice standards to improve palliative care near the end of life.

Coma↗
PubMed1994

Euthanasia. Historical, ethical, and empiric perspectives.

Debates about the ethics of euthanasia date from ancient Greece and Rome. In 1870, S. D. Williams, a nonphysician, proposed that anesthetics be used to intentionally end the lives of patients. Between 1870 and 1936, a debate about the ethics of euthanasia raged in the United States and Britain. These debates predate and invoke different arguments than do debates about euthanasia in Germany. Recognizing the increased interest in euthanasia, this article reviews the definitions related to euthanasia, the historical record of debates concerning euthanasia, the arguments for and against euthanasia, the situation in the Netherlands, and the empirical data regarding euthanasia in the United States.

Beneficence↗
PubMed2003

Sedative use in the last week of life and the implications for end-of-life decision making.

BACKGROUND: The use of sedation at the end of life has aroused ethical controversy, attracting accusations of hastening death by gradually increasing sedative doses. The doctrine of double effect has been introduced as an ethical defense. This study aimed to determine how sedative doses change at the end of life and how often the doctrine of double effect might be relevant. METHODS: Case note review was performed of 237 consecutive patients who died in a specialist palliative care unit. Sedative dose changes during the last week of life were noted and survival from admission was compared between groups of patients receiving no sedation, sedation for 7 days, or a commencement of sedation in the last 48 hours of life. There was detailed review of notes from patients who received a marked increase in sedative dose to explore the applicability of the doctrine of double effect. RESULTS: Sedation was given to 48% of patients. Of these, 13% received sedatives for 7 days or more, while 56% commenced sedative use only in the last 48 hours of life. The groups receiving no sedation or sedation for less than 48 hours had the shortest survival from admission (mean, 14.3 and 14.2 days), whereas the 7-day sedation group survived for a mean of 36.6 days (P<.001). Sedative use and dose increased toward the end of life, but the detailed case note review disclosed only 2 cases where the doctrine of double effect may have been implicated. CONCLUSION: Sedative dose increases in the last hours of life were not associated with shortened survival overall, suggesting that the doctrine of double effect rarely has to be invoked to excuse sedative prescribing in end-stage care.

Adult↗
PubMed1997

Deciding life and death in the courtroom. From Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco--a brief history and analysis of constitutional protection of the 'right to die'.

This article analyzes judicial determinations on the "right to die" from Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco. The body of law known as right-to-die cases extends ordinary treatment refusal doctrine to end-of-life decisions. The courts, having affirmed a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, held that certain categorical distinctions that had been drawn lacked a rational basis. No rational distinction could be made between competent vs incompetent patients, withholding vs withdrawing treatment, and ordinary vs extraordinary treatment. The courts, however, had persistently affirmed one categorical distinction: between withdrawing life-sustaining treament on the one hand and active euthanasia or physician-assisted dying on the other. In Washington v Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill, the Supreme Court unanimously held that physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution. Notably, five members of the Court wrote or joined in concurring opinions that took a more liberal view. The Court powerfully approved aggressive palliation of pain. The Supreme Court, hinting that it would find state legalization of physician-assisted suicide constitutional, invited the nation to pursue an earnest debate on physician assistance in the dying process.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed1997

Palliative options of last resort: a comparison of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide, and voluntary active euthanasia.

Palliative care is generally agreed to be the standard of care for the dying, but there remain some patients for whom intolerable suffering persists. In the face of ethical and legal controversy about the acceptability of physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, voluntarily stopping eating and drinking and terminal sedation have been proposed as ethically superior responses of last resort that do not require changes in professional standards or the law. The clinical and ethical differences and similarities between these 4 practices are critically compared in light of the doctrine of double effect, the active/passive distinction, patient voluntariness, proportionality between risks and benefits, and the physician's potential conflict of duties. Terminal sedation and voluntarily stopping eating and drinking would allow clinicians to remain responsive to a wide range of patient suffering, but they are ethically and clinically more complex and closer to physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia than is ordinarily acknowledged. Safeguards are presented for any medical action that may hasten death, including determining that palliative care is ineffective, obtaining informed consent, ensuring diagnostic and prognostic clarity, obtaining an independent second opinion, and implementing reporting and monitoring processes. Explicit public policy about which of these practices are permissible would reassure the many patients who fear a bad death in their future and allow for a predictable response for the few whose suffering becomes intolerable in spite of optimal palliative care.

Beneficence↗