Search PubMed⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search PubMed

Results for “Insurance”

Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 703 records · Page 39Linked to original sources
PubMed2003

Insurance companies' access to genetic information: why regulation alone is not enough.

The background of this paper is the ongoing dismantling of the social insurance systems in favour of commercialisation and privatisation of insurances needed for illness, old age and premature death. This combined with the increased possibility of using genetic testing for differentiating personal insurance premiums has the potentiality of creating a 'genetic proletariat'--an uninsurable high-risk population. The common way of handling this problem in Sweden, and many other developed countries around the North Atlantic, has been to regulate insurance companies' right to ask for and use genetic information in various ways. There is a distinction between partial regulation (that allows insurance companies access to genetic information from genetic tests already made, sometimes only above a specified amount, but not to demand new tests) and total regulation (that forbids insurance companies to ask for or use any genetic information). I will argue that these forms of regulation probably will have adverse consequences given the dismantling of collective social insurance systems. If this is convincing, a better way to solve the problem of an uninsurable high-risk population (and other problems) is to resurrect the collective, obligatory insurance systems in which the individual risk profile does not constitute a basis for premium determination. Both arguments cast in terms of consequences and justice render support for this conclusion.

Genetic Predisposition to Disease↗
PubMed1993

Insurability for asymptomatic hematuria or proteinuria during childhood.

The objective of this survey was to describe life insurance underwriting practices concerning children with asymptomatic hematuria and proteinuria. A questionnaire was sent to 200 companies licensed to issue life insurance policies in the state of New York. The medical director of each company was asked to respond to the insurability of children with asymptomatic hematuria and proteinuria. Two case summaries were provided with the questionnaire. Of 97 companies, 66 would offer insurance to the patient with hematuria, although 38 (58%) would charge additional premiums. In response to the problem of proteinuria, 61 companies would offer life insurance, although 50 (82%) would require higher premium charges (P < 0.002 compared with hematuria). We conclude that children with asymptomatic hematuria and proteinuria can usually obtain life insurance, although often at higher cost. Invasive diagnostic tests are not necessary for insurers to offer insurance.

Child↗
PubMed1982

Dental insurance plans--boon or bane to the dental practitioner?

The dentist who participates in reimbursement pursuant to a dental insurance plan establishes a legal relationship to the insurance carrier, which is governed by third-party beneficiary concepts in law. The terms of the dental plan provide specific links to the provider of dental services, which include the right to review the quality of dental services rendered, the right to determine what are reasonable charges for the services rendered, and the right, through subrogation and indemnification, to recover what the insurance carrier determines to be improper payments to the insured and the dentist. The enforcement of those rights against the dentist can affect the manner in which he practices his profession. The failure of the dental practitioner to properly protect his interests when challenged by the insurance carrier under the plan can have adverse and far-reaching consequences upon his practice and upon his very license. It therefore behooves the dental practitioner to be fully knowledgeable of the potential pitfalls to his participation in dental insurance plan reimbursement programs. Unfortunately, the touting of the benefits accruing to the dental practitioner by participation in such plans tends to mask their dangers. It is hoped that this article will have shown that it is incumbent upon the dentist to ensure that his professional record with the insurance carrier and any dental review board accurately reflects proper professional judgement by him in participating in a dental insurance plan.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2005

The effect of premiums on the decision to participate in health insurance and other fringe benefits offered by the employer: evidence from a real-world experiment.

In this paper, we investigate the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the decision to enroll in employer health insurance and other benefits plans including dental insurance, vision care, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. Previous estimates of the effects of premium on takeup of health insurance could be biased toward zero due to a correlation between premium and unobservable demand or plan quality. We solve this problem using data representing hypothetical choices by employees under three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with either individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables. We find that workers are insensitive to price in health insurance takeup. Workers show much greater price sensitivity to decisions about dental insurance, vision plans, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. We conclude that premium subsidies are unlikely to have a substantial impact on increasing insurance rates of workers already offered employer insurance.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2002

Reforming China's urban health insurance system.

China's urban health insurance system is mainly consisted of labor insurance schemes (LIS) and government employee insurance scheme (GIS). LIS is a work unit-based self-insurance system that covers medical costs for the workers and often their dependents as well. GIS covers employees of the State institutions, is financed by general revenues. Since 1980s, China has implemented series of health insurance system reforms, culminating in the government's major policy decision in December of 1998 to establish a social insurance program for urban workers. Compared with the old insurance systems under LIS and GIS, the new system expands coverage to private sector employees and provides a more stable financing with its risk pool at the city level. Despite of these advantages, implementation of China's health insurance reform program is faced with several major challenges, including risk transfer from work units to municipal governments, diverse need and demand for health insurance benefits, incongruent roles of the central and regional governments. These challenges may reflect practical difficulties in policy implementation as well as some deficiencies in the original program design.

China↗
PubMed2003

Effects of an increase in patient copayments on medical service demands of the insured in Japan.

OBJECTIVES: To examine quantitatively the effects of an increase in patient copayments from 10% to 20% on the demand for medical services in Japan. METHODS: The subjects of the study were the employees insured by the 1,797 health insurance societies, belonging to the National Federation of Health Insurance Societies, in 1996 and 1998. Indicators of medical service demands analyzed include the inpatient, outpatient, and dental case rates, the number of serviced days per case, the medical cost per day and the medical cost per insured. RESULTS: When the effects of an increase in patient copayments from 10% to 20% were evaluated, taking into account the average age, the average monthly salary, the total number, the gender (male-to-female) ratio and the dependent ratio of the insured, the estimated change in the case rate was -6.96% for inpatient, -4.79% for outpatient, and -5.77% for dental care. The estimated change in the number of serviced day per case was -4.66% for inpatient, -5.67% for outpatient, and -1.82% for dental care. The estimated change in the medical cost per day was -3.15% for inpatient, -13.00% for outpatient, and -11.48% for dental care. The estimated change in the medical cost per insured was -14.08% for inpatient, -21.54% for outpatient, and -18.11% for dental care. CONCLUSIONS: The increase in patient copayments from 10% to 20% enabled insurers to substantially reduce medical costs by cost shifting from the insurer to the insured, with resultant changes in the case rate and the number of service days per case.

Adult↗
PubMed1991

[Possibilities for the involvement of social health insurance in occupational disease prevention].

The German compulsory sickness insurance bodies are now required to extend their preventive health measure contributions to such measures in commercial enterprises and industrial establishments. This raises two general problems as far as the sickness insurance bodies are concerned. On the one hand it must be determined how far these bodies are accepted by the companies as partners in mutual cooperation. On the other hand, it must be clarified to what extent the insurance bodies can develop programmes and measures for the target groups of company employees in accordance with the prerequisites and structures of these insurance bodies. Major differences exist between the individual types of German sickness insurance bodies, such as company-run insurance bodies, compulsory Government-run sickness insurance bodies and corporate sickness insurance sponsored and run individually by the different German guilds of artisans, craftsmen and other professions. Several examples are cited to illustrate this variety of German sickness insurance bodies.

Back Pain↗
PubMed2005

The ins and outs of dental insurance.

BACKGROUND: In the past three decades, dental insurance has become a permanent fixture in the delivery of dental services. Some would argue that this has not been good for dentists. However, none will dispute that it is here to stay and that dentists must make some very important decisions in their practices with regard to dental insurance. This article will explore some of those decisions and offer some guidance on how to decide wisely. CONCLUSIONS: Dental insurance now is a permanent fixture in the delivery of dental care. Each dentist must decide if participation with a dental insurance company is in his or her best interest. To make this decision, a dentist must have as much information as possible to evaluate each specific dental plan. If a dentist does decide to participate, the dentist must know the rules. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: Participation with a dental insurance company may influence the dentist-patient relationship. Dentists must be prepared to answer the question, "Why do I need this service if my dental insurance does not cover it?" Non-participation with a dental insurance company may result in a reduced number of new patients.

Computer Communication Networks↗
PubMed1958

Analysis of your professional liability insurance policy.

The most important lessons for the physician to learn in regard to his professional liability insurance coverage are the following:1. The physician should carefully read his professional liability policy and should secure the educated aid of his attorney and his insurance broker, if they are conversant with this field.2. He should particularly read the definition of coverage and carefully survey the exclusion clauses which may deny him coverage under certain circumstances.3. If the physician is in partnership or in a group, he should be certain that he has contingent partnership coverage.4. The physician should accept coverage only from an insurance carrier of sufficient size and stability that he can be sure his coverage will be guaranteed for "latent liability" claims as the years go along-certainly for his lifetime.5. The insurance carrier offering the professional liability policy should be prepared to offer coverages up to at least $100,000/$300,000.6. The physician should be assured that the insurance carrier has claims-handling personnel and legal counsel who are experienced and expert in the professional liability field and who are locally available for service.7. The physician is best protected by a local or state group program, next best by a national group program, and last, by individual coverage.8. The physician should look with suspicion on a cancellation clause in which his policy may be summarily cancelled on brief notice.9. The physician should not buy professional liability insurance on the basis of price alone; adequacy of coverage and service and a good insurance company for his protection should be the deciding factors.

Insurance↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The first private sector health insurance company in Ghana.

This article analyses the development of Ghana's first private sector health insurance company, the Nationwide Medical Insurance Company. Taking both policy and practical considerations into account (stakeholders' perspectives, economic viability, equity and efficiency), it is structured around key questions which help to define the position and roles of stakeholders--the insurance agency itself, contributors, beneficiaries, and providers--and how they relate to one another and the insurance scheme. These relationships will to a large extent determine Nationwide's long-term success or failure. By creating a unique alliance between physician providers and private sector companies, Nationwide has used employers' interest in cost containment and physicians' interest in expanding their client base as an entrée into the virgin territory of health insurance, and created a hybrid variety of private sector insurance with some of the attributes of a health maintenance organization or managed care. The case study is unusual in that, while public sector programs are often open to academic scrutiny, researchers have rarely had access to detailed data on the establishment of a single private sector insurance company in a developing country. Given that Ghana is planning to launch a national health insurance plan, the article concludes by considering what the experience of this private sector initiative might have to offer public sector planners.

Cost Control↗
PubMed2003

Medical care use and selection in a social health insurance with an equalization fund: evidence from Colombia.

This paper studies the relationship between health status and insurance participation, and between insurance status and medical use in the context of a social health insurance with an equalization fund (SHIEF). Under this system, revenues from a mandatory payroll tax are collected into a single pool (equalization fund) that reimburses for-profit insurance companies according to a capitated formula. Although competition should induce insurers to control costs without reducing the quality of service necessary to attract consumers, limitations in the capitation formula might induce insurers to select against bad risks, and limitations in the contribution system might induce more healthy individuals to evade enrollment. A three-equation model having social health insurance, private health insurance, and using medical services is estimated using a 1997 Colombian household survey. Consistent with similar studies, participation in SHIEF increases medical care use. On the other hand, the evidence on selection is somewhat mixed: individuals who report good health status are more likely to participate in SHIEF, while those without a chronic condition are less likely to participate in SHIEF.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed2000

The importance of health insurance as a determinant of cancer screening: evidence from the Women's Health Initiative.

BACKGROUND: Amid current changes in health care access across the United States, the importance of health insurance status and insurance type relative to demographic, actual, and perceived health variables as determinants of screening for breast, colorectal, and cervical cancer is uncertain. This analysis evaluates the hypothesis that health insurance independently predicts cancer screening in the Women's Health Initia tive Observational Study cohort. METHODS: Questionnaire data from 55,278 women en rolled in the Women's Health Initiative Observational Study between September 1994 and February 1997 were analyzed by multiple logistic regression to identify predictors of self-reported mammography within 2 years, Pap smear within 3 years, and stool guaiac or flexible sigmoidoscopy within 5 years. RESULTS: Positive determinants of reporting cancer screening were age, ethnic origin, household income, educational level, family history of cancer, having a usual care provider, time since last provider visit, and insurance status and type. Smoking, diabetes, and, among older women, prior cardiovascular events were negative determinants of cancer screening. Among women younger than 65, lacking health insurance or having fee-for-service insurance was strongly associated with failure to report cancer screening, independently of having or using a usual care provider and of demographics, self-perceived health, and health characteristics. Among women 65 and older, those with Medicare alone were less likely, whereas those with Medicare + prepaid insurance were more likely, to report cancer screening. CONCLUSIONS: In the Women's Health Initiative Obser vational Study, a large, diverse group of older women, health insurance type and status were among the most important determinants of cancer screening indepen dent of demographics, chronic health conditions, and self-perceived health characteristics.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1989

[Determinants of income and expenditure development in the annual reports of the health insurance of the Federal Republic of Germany].

Contribution rates to the German statutory health insurance differ considerably between different sickness funds. While insurance benefits are largely standardized, these differences are widely regarded as a problem for the state's social policy. The health insurance bodies often offer hasty interpretations to justify the differences of contribution rates. These interpretations, however, cannot be checked on the basis of data from the annual reports of the health insurance. In reality, there is a number of determinants of the contribution rate which lie as well inside as outside the sphere of influence of the health insurance bodies. In order to estimate the respective impact of single determinants it is important to differentiate the health expenditures by age and sex of all insured persons (both the contribution paying members and their co-insured dependents). A further disentanglement of health expenditures into prices, quantities and structural components allows to identify the reasons of increases in health costs. This is also a necessary precondition for creating and implementing suitable measures that are directed to control health costs. At the same time, the improved information system of the statutory health insurance would contribute to a better understanding of the performance of the health system in general.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2006

Risk selection and complementary health insurance: the Swiss approach.

To avoid risk selection, the market for complementary health insurance is usually completely separate from the market for basic health insurance. In Switzerland, however, the basic benefit package and complementary insurance are offered by the same insurer. Risk-based premiums are allowed with respect to complementary insurance. This paper compares the Swiss integration approach to the separation approach. It is shown that under the integration approach insurers cream-skim by selling complementary insurance to low risks at a discount. Nevertheless, the integration approach can be Pareto-superior if the cost savings due to the integration of basic and complementary insurance are sufficiently large.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗
PubMed2006

Complementary health insurance in France. Who pays? Why? Who will suffer from public disengagement?

The study is based on a rare database with information about health status, socioeconomic characteristics and the complementary health insurance choices of the French population. We intend to characterise a two-stage decision process: first, the decision to purchase complementary health insurance, and then the factors related to choice of policy quality. Our econometric study indicates that (i) income level has a strong and significant effect on the decision to purchase complementary insurance, whilst there is no evidence that health risk considerations affect this decision at all; (ii) the individual decision about quality is associated barely if at all with any rational explanatory variables. The population's concrete behaviour, revealed by the study, is consistent with an allocation of low-risk people to private insurance and high-risk people to public insurance. Complementary insurance is not especially relevant to patients with serious diseases, who depend much more on the public system. If the public insurance system were to disengage significantly from coverage of serious illness, a vacuum would be created that would leave people at high risk without full coverage. These results have broad implications for numerous national systems of social protection seeking a new mix between private and public insurance.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

Insurance status and race represent independent predictors of undergoing laparoscopic surgery for appendicitis: secondary data analysis of 145,546 patients.

BACKGROUND: Studies have shown that racial and socioeconomic differences lead to inequality in access to health care. It is unknown whether insurance status and race affect the choice of surgical treatment for patients presenting with appendicitis. STUDY DESIGN: Patients with primary ICD-9 procedure codes for laparoscopic and open appendectomy were selected from the 1998, 1999, and 2000 Nationwide (US) Inpatient Samples. The primary predictor variables were insurance status (private, Medicare, Medicaid, other) and race (Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, other). Multiple logistic regression models were used to assess whether insurance status and race are associated with the choice of surgical procedure for patients presenting with appendicitis. RESULTS: Discharge abstracts of 145,546 patients were used for our analyses. There were 32,407 patients (22.3%) who underwent laparoscopic appendectomy and 113,139 patients (77.7%) who had open appendectomy. Although 24.2% of privately insured patients underwent laparoscopic appendectomy, only 16.9% of Medicare patients, 17.4% of Medicaid patients, and 19.6% of patients in the "other" insurance category were treated using the laparoscopic procedure (p < 0.001). Caucasian patients underwent laparoscopic surgery in 24.8%, African Americans in 18.6%, Hispanics in 19.6%, and other ethnicities in 18.8% of patients (p < 0.001). Compared with the Medicaid subset, and after adjusting for potential confounders such as age, gender, race, patient comorbidity, median ZIP code income, hospital location and teaching status, and presence of abscess or perforation, privately insured patients (odds ratio [OR] = 1.26, 95% [CI [1.20, 1.33], p < 0.001) and Medicare patients (OR = 1.17, 95% CI [1.05, 1.30], p = 0.004) were significantly more likely to undergo laparoscopic surgery. Caucasian patients (OR = 1.42, 95% CI [1.33, 1.51], p < 0.001) and Hispanics (OR = 1.12, 95% CI [1.04, 1.20], p = 0.002) were significantly more likely to have laparoscopic appendectomy, compared with African Americans, even after adjusting for the previously mentioned confounders and insurance status. CONCLUSIONS: Even after adjusting for potential confounders, insurance status and race are marked independent predictors of having laparoscopic surgery in patients treated for appendicitis in this sample.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance.

When the insurer has access to information about test status, genetic insurance can handle the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent.

Access to Information↗
PubMed2005

Children in the United States with discontinuous health insurance coverage.

BACKGROUND: Estimates of the number of uninsured people in the United States usually exclude those with discontinuous coverage. The effects of gaps in insurance coverage for children on access to and use of ambulatory care are poorly understood. METHODS: We analyzed a sample of 26,955 children under 18 years of age from the 2000 and 2001 National Health Interview Surveys. Children with discontinuous health insurance coverage were compared with those who were uninsured all year and with those who had public or private full-year coverage. RESULTS: During the last 12 months before they were interviewed, 6.6 percent of children in the United States had no insurance and an additional 7.7 percent had gaps in insurance. Children who had full-year insurance coverage (private or public) had low rates of unmet health care needs and good access to care (delayed care, unmet medical care, and unfilled prescriptions were reported in <3 percent, and <5 percent had no usual place of care). Access to care was much worse for children who were uninsured for part of the year and for those who were uninsured for the full year (delayed care, 20.2 percent and 15.9 percent, respectively; unmet medical care, 13.4 percent and 12.6 percent, respectively; unfilled prescriptions, 9.9 percent and 10.0 percent, respectively; P<0.01 for all comparisons with children with full-year, private insurance coverage). In multivariate analyses adjusting for age, income, race or ethnic group, region, citizenship, family structure, parental employment, and health status, the differences in access to care persisted. As compared with the parents of children with full-year, private insurance, parents of children uninsured for the full year were far more likely to report delaying care (adjusted odds ratio, 12.65; 95 percent confidence interval, 9.45 to 16.94), as were parents of children uninsured for part of the year (adjusted odds ratio, 13.65; 95 percent confidence interval, 10.41 to 17.90). CONCLUSIONS: Children with gaps in health insurance coverage commonly do not seek medical care, including preventive visits, and do not get prescriptions filled. These findings are important for both research and policy and point to the need for more encompassing and sensitive measures of the situation of being uninsured.

Adolescent↗