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PubMed2006

An application of the poisson race model to confidence calibration.

In tasks as diverse as stock market predictions and jury deliberations, a person's feelings of confidence in the appropriateness of different choices often impact that person's final choice. The current study examines the mathematical modeling of confidence calibration in a simple dual-choice task. Experiments are motivated by an accumulator model, which proposes that information supporting each alternative accrues on separate counters. The observer responds in favor of whichever alternative's counter first hits a designated threshold. Confidence can then be scaled from the difference between the counters at the time that the observer makes a response. The authors examine the overconfidence result in general and present new findings dealing with the effect of response bias on confidence calibration.

Attention↗

PubMed2006

Intuitive confidence: choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives.

People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options (favorites) more often than equally valid (or even more valid) nonintuitive alternatives (underdogs). Critically, though, this effect was largely determined by people's confidence in their intuitions (intuitive confidence). Across naturalistic, expert, and laboratory samples (Studies 1-3), against personally determined point spreads (Studies 4-11), and even when intuitive confidence was manipulated by altering irrelevant aspects of the decision context (e.g., font; Studies 12 and 13), the authors found that decreasing intuitive confidence reduced or eliminated intuitive biases. These findings indicate that intuitive biases are not inevitable but rather predictably determined by contextual variables that affect intuitive confidence.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed2006

Seeing the forest when entry is unlikely: probability and the mental representation of events.

Conceptualizing probability as psychological distance, the authors draw on construal level theory (Y. Trope & N. Liberman, 2003) to propose that decreasing an event's probability leads individuals to represent the event by its central, abstract, general features (high-level construal) rather than by its peripheral, concrete, specific features (low-level construal). Results indicated that when reported probabilities of events were low rather than high, participants were more broad (Study 1) and inclusive (Study 2) in their categorization of objects, increased their preference for general rather than specific activity descriptions (Study 3), segmented ongoing behavior into fewer units (Study 4), were more successful at abstracting visual information (Study 5), and were less successful at identifying details missing within a coherent visual whole (Study 6). Further, after exposure to low-probability as opposed to high-probability phrases, participants increasingly preferred to identify actions in ends-related rather than means-related terms (Study 7). Implications for probability assessment and choice under uncertainty are discussed.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed2003

Evaluation of six multinomial models of conscious and unconscious processes with the recall-recognition paradigm.

Six multinomial processing-tree models (W. H. Batchelder & D. M. Riefer, 1999), which include parameters representing conscious and unconscious memory processes, were tested using the recall-recognition paradigm. Data from 2 experiments were fit equally well by 3 of the 6 models. One model recognition was an extension of the generate-recognize model (L. L. Jacoby, 1998), and another was an extension of the non-high-threshold model (D. M. McBride & B. A. Dosher, 1999). The 3rd model was the source evaluation model (D. M. McBride & B. A. Dosher, 1999). Values of the parameters of 2 of these 3 models, excepting the non-high-threshold model, responded to experimental manipulations in accordance with the meaning of the parameters. The equivalence of models with regard to goodness-of-fit tests is discussed as is how experiments can be designed to demonstrate the superiority of one model over another. The potential usefulness of these models in the study of amnesia is considered.

Attention↗

PubMed2003

Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning.

D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1982), in a seminal study on counterfactual reasoning, claimed empirical support for a simulation heuristic wherein ease of converting unusual conditions determines their selection as causes over normal conditions. Discourse analysis of their stories revealed a confounding of explanation and normality. A connectionist simulation of online comprehension and memory access of alternative conditions without conversion accounted for their data. Normality and explanation were varied independently in 2 experiments. Explanation but not normality affected the rank ordering of counterfactual conditions after reading. Access of alternative conditions in simulation was again the best predictor of empirical findings. Comprehension and memory operate where stories communicate information for decision making such as counterfactual reasoning and hindsight bias.

Comprehension↗

PubMed2003

Context effects: the proportional difference model and the reflection of preference.

The reflection effect (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979) was investigated using the stochastic model of choice developed by C. Gonzalez-Vallejo (2002). The model assumes that individuals make trade-offs among attribute values by relying on a difference variable. The model also specifies a threshold representing individual proclivities to reach to attribute differences. Two experiments demonstrated that changes in risk attitudes, from a gain to a loss situation, depended on the stimuli as well as on individuals' thresholds. Thresholds were generally lower in losses than in gains, indicating a risk-taking tendency. Thresholds were also lower when participants were endowed with greater savings. Model testing revealed better fits for the stochastic model than cumulative prospect theory (A. Tversky &. D. Kahneman, 1992).

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed2004

Sequence effects in the categorization of tones varying in frequency.

In contrast to exemplar and decision-bound categorization models, the memory and contrast models described here do not assume that long-term representations of stimulus magnitudes are available. Instead, stimuli are assumed to be categorized using only their differences from a few recent stimuli. To test this alternative, the authors examined sequential effects in a binary categorization of 10 tones varying in frequency. Stimuli up to 2 trials back in the sequence had a significant effect on the response to the current stimulus. The effects of previous stimuli interacted with one another. A memory and contrast model, according to which only ordinal information about the differences between the current stimulus and recent preceding stimuli is used, best accounted for these data.

Humans↗

PubMed2005

The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making.

Three experiments with paired comparisons were conducted to test the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002) in judgment and decision making. Recognition and knowledge about the recognized alternative were manipulated. In Experiment 1, participants were presented pairs of animal names where the task was to select the animal with the larger population. In Experiment 2, participants chose the safer 1 out of 2 airlines, and 3 knowledge cues were varied simultaneously. Recognition effects were partly compensated by task-relevant knowledge. The compensatory effects were additive. Decisions were slower when recognition and knowledge were incongruent. In Experiment 3, compensatory effects of knowledge and recognition were found for the city-size task which had originally been used to demonstrate the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic. These results suggest that recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Adults' age-related differences in adaptivity of strategy choices: evidence from computational estimation.

Four experiments document adults' age-related changes in computational estimation performance and in adaptivity of strategy choices (i.e., the ability to choose the most precise strategy on each trial). Young and older adults were asked to provide estimates of 2-by-2-digit multiplication problems (e.g., 43 x 78) under varying conditions of speed and accuracy emphasis. The main findings showed that (a) older adults provided less accurate estimates and took more time to estimate, especially on the most difficult problems or when using harder strategies; (b) young and older adults had similar strategy preferences; and (c) older adults chose estimation strategies less adaptively than young adults. Implications of these findings for understanding strategic changes during adulthood in a wide variety of cognitive domains are discussed.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed2004

You say "probable" and I say "likely": improving interpersonal communication with verbal probability phrases.

When forecasters and decision makers describe uncertain events using verbal probability terms, there is a risk of miscommunication because people use different probability phrases and interpret them in different ways. In an effort to facilitate the communication process, the authors investigated various ways of converting the forecasters' verbal probabilities to the decision maker's terms. The authors present 3 studies in which participants judged the probabilities of distinct events using both numerical and verbal probabilities. They define several indexes of interindividual coassignment of phrases to the same events and evaluate the conversion methods by comparing the values of these indexes for the converted and the unconverted judgments. In all the cases studied, the conversion methods significantly reduced the error rates in communicating uncertainties.

Adolescent↗

PubMed1966