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PubMed1992

Choice behavior in transition: development of preference with ratio and interval schedules.

In Experiment 1, the choice responses of 8 pigeons were observed during 50 periods of transition. Each condition began with equal probabilities of reinforcement on 2 response keys and switched to unequal probabilities. With the ratio of the 2 probabilities held constant, preference for the higher probability developed more rapidly when the 2 probabilities were high than when they were low. In Experiment 2, each condition began with 2 equal variable-interval schedules, but later 1 key delivered 60%, 75%, or 90% of the reinforcers. The rate of approach to asymptotic performance was roughly the same with all 3 reinforcement percentages. These and previous results pose difficulties for some well-known models of acquisition, but the results are well described by a simple model that states that the strength of each response is independently increased by reinforcement and decreased by nonreinforcement.

Animals↗
PubMed1996

Bayesian analysis of foraging by pigeons (Columba livia).

In this article, the authors combine models of timing and Bayesian revision of information concerning patch quality to predict foraging behavior. Pigeons earned food by pecking on 2 keys (patches) in an experimental chamber. Food was primed for only 1 of the patches on each trial. There was a constant probability of finding food in a primed patch, but it accumulated only while the animals searched there. The optimal strategy was to choose the better patch first and remain for a fixed duration, thereafter alternating evenly between the patches. Pigeons were nonoptimal in 3 ways: (a) they departed too early, (b) their departure times were variable, and (c) they were biased in their choices after initial departure. The authors review various explanations of these data.

Animals↗
PubMed1990

Contributions of specific cell information to judgments of interevent contingency.

College students considered the possible effect of an experimental drug on a skin rash. The information came from a 2 x 2 contingency table involving receipt or nonreceipt of the drug and improvement or nonimprovement of the rash: Cell A = receipt-improvement; Cell B = receipt-nonimprovement; Cell C = nonreceipt-improvement; Cell D = nonreceipt-nonimprovement. Without numerical information. Ss judged cells to be ordered A greater than B greater than C greater than D. The same order held when the contribution of each cell was derived from the contingency judgments of other subjects given numerical information. No such consistency was seen when one group of Ss made both judgments: whether individual Ss equally or unequally assessed the importance of the four cells, their contingency estimates showed cell use to be ordered A greater than B greater than C greater than D. These findings may result from strong biases that Ss harbor in processing contingency information.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

Reasoning with conditionals containing negated constituents.

Three experiments investigated matching bias in conditional reasoning tasks. Matching bias occurs when Ss ignore negations and match named items. Experiment 1 used an abstract and a thematic version of Evans's (1972) construction task. Results showed that matching may be due to an interaction between task demands and constructing contrast classes when interpreting negations. Experiment 2, which used Wason's (1968) selection task, introduced a manipulation to ease contrast-class construction. Confirmation plus falsification dominated over matching. Experiment 3 introduced two other manipulations to aid contrast-class construction with abstract material. Confirmation was facilitated, matching was suppressed, and falsification remained unchanged. These results suggest that matching occurs only when insufficient or ambiguous information prevents the intended interpretation of negations.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

Effects of probability mode on preference reversal.

Six analysts estimated verbally and numerically the chances that specific events will occur. Sixty decision makers used each type of estimate to make binary-choice decisions and to bid for lotteries based on the events. The usual reversal of preference between choice and bidding procedures was found in the numerical condition, but the frequency of preference reversals was significantly reduced in the verbal condition. This reduction occurred because risk aversion was reduced in choice when verbal estimates were given, whereas bidding was unaffected by presentation mode. The pattern of results was predicted by and supports the hypothesis that the relative importance given to the dimensions of a prospect depends on the form in which the information is displayed.

Decision Theory↗
PubMed1997

Tests of consequence monotonicity in decision making under uncertainty.

Consequence monotonicity means that if 2 gambles differ only in 1 consequence, the one having the better consequence is preferred. This property has been sustained in direct comparisons but apparently fails for some gamble pairs when they are ordered in terms of judged monetary certainty equivalents. In Experiments 1 and 3 a judgment procedure was compared with 2 variants of a choice procedure. Slightly fewer nonmonotonicities were found in one of the choice procedures, and, overall, fewer violations occurred than in previous studies. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the difference was not due to procedural or stimulus presentation differences. Experiment 4 tested a noise model that suggested that the observed violations were due primarily to noise in estimating certainty equivalents, and so, despite some proportion of observed violations, consequence monotonicity cannot be rejected in that case.

Adult↗
PubMed2001

Exemplar accounts of blending and distinctiveness effects in perceptual old-new recognition.

Recent findings from the perceptual old-new recognition literature indicate that observers have extremely high false-alarm rates to new items that are "blends" of old ones. In addition, evidence suggests that "distinctive" old items--that is, those located in isolated regions of the similarity space--are recognized with higher probability than are typical old items. Both types of phenomena challenge the predictions of global-familiarity exemplar models of perceptual old-new recognition, which posit that the probability that an observer judges an item as old is based on its summed similarity to previously presented exemplars. In the present research the authors pursued these blending and distinctiveness effects by testing paradigms in which similarity relations among objects are highly controlled and in which the variables of blending and distinctiveness are not confounded with other properties associated with the individual objects themselves. In contrast to previous results, the authors found effects of blending and distinctiveness that are compatible with the predictions of a pure summed-similarity exemplar model.

Adult↗
PubMed2001

Revealing hidden covariation detection: evidence for implicit abstraction at study.

Four experiments in the brain scans paradigm (P. Lewicki, T. Hill, & I. Sasaki, 1989) investigated hidden covariation detection (HCD). In Experiment 1 HCD was found in an implicit- but not in an explicit-instruction group. In Experiment 2 HCD was impaired by nonholistic perception of stimuli but not by divided attention. In Experiment 3 HCD was eliminated by interspersing stimuli that deviated from the critical covariation. In Experiment 4 a transfer procedure was used. HCD was found with dissimilar test stimuli that preserved the covariation but was almost eliminated with similar stimuli that were neutral as to the covariation. Awareness was assessed both by objective and subjective tests in all experiments. Results suggest that HCD is an effect of implicit rule abstraction and that similarity processing plays only a minor role. HCD might be suppressed by intentional search strategies that induce inappropriate aggregation of stimulus information.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving.

This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.

Attention↗
PubMed2000

The effects of averaging subjective probability estimates between and within judges.

The average probability estimate of J > 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average of conditionally pairwise independent estimates will be highly diagnostic, and Prediction 2 is that the average of dependent estimates (differing only by independent error terms) may be well calibrated. Prediction 3 contrasts between- and within-subject averaging. Results demonstrate the predictions' robustness by showing the extent to which they hold as the information conditions depart from the ideal and as J increases. Practical consequences are that (a) substantial improvement can be obtained with as few as 2-6 judges and (b) the decision maker can estimate the nature of the expected improvement by considering the information conditions.

Adult↗
PubMed2005

Reasoning, emotions, and delusional conviction in psychosis.

The aim of the study was to elucidate the factors contributing to the severity and persistence of delusional conviction. One hundred participants with current delusions, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (PRP trial), were assessed at baseline on measures of reasoning, emotions, and dimensions of delusional experience. Reasoning biases (belief inflexibility, jumping to conclusions, and extreme responding) were found to be present in one half of the sample. The hypothesis was confirmed that reasoning biases would be related to delusional conviction. There was evidence that belief inflexibility mediated the relationship between jumping to conclusions and delusional conviction. Emotional states were not associated with the reasoning processes investigated. Anxiety, but not depression, made an independent contribution to delusional conviction.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1989

Quantitative meanings of verbal probability expressions.

The meanings of 18 verbal probability expressions were studied in 3 ways: (a) frequency distributions of what single number best represented each expression; (b) word-to-number acceptability functions from what range of numbers from 0% to 100% best represented each expression; and (c) number-to-word acceptability functions from which expressions were appropriate for multiples of 5% from 5% to 95%. These results agreed highly with others and were highly consistent across methods. Expressions incorporating the stem probable were quantitatively synonymous with expressions incorporating the stem likely. Except for expressions using the word chance, positive expressions (e.g., likely) were closer to 50% in meaning than corresponding negative expressions (e.g., unlikely). This method proved very useful in deriving fuzzy-set membership functions for probability words, encouraging us in our ongoing codification effort.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect.

Four experiments explored the psychological processes by which people make comparative social judgments. Each participant chose how much money to wager on beating an opponent on either a difficult or a simple trivia quiz. Quiz difficulty did not influence the average person's probability of winning, yet participants bet more on a simple quiz than on a difficult quiz in the first 3 experiments. The results suggest that this effect results from a tendency to attend more closely to a focal actor than to others. Experiment 4 directly manipulated focusing; when participants were led to focus on the opponent instead of themselves, the effect was reversed. The discussion relates the results to other literatures including overly optimistic self-evaluation, false consensus, overconfidence, and social comparison.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2002

Ecological and evolutionary validity: comments on Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni's (1999) mental-model theory of extensional reasoning.

The mental-model account of naive probabilistic reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, M. S. Legrenzi, and J.-P. Caverni (1999) provides an opportunity to clarify several similarities and differences between it and ecological rationality (frequentist) accounts. First, ambiguities in the meaning of Bayesian reasoning can lead to disagreements and inappropriate arguments. Second, 2 conflated effects of using natural frequencies are noticed but not actually tested separately because of an artificial dissociation of frequency representations and natural sampling. Third, similarities are noted between the subset principle and the principle of natural sampling. Finally, some potentially misleading portrayals of the role of evolutionary factors in psychology are corrected. Mental-model theory, rather than better explaining probabilistic reasoning, may be able to use frequency representations as a key element in clarifying its own ambiguous constructs.

Bayes Theorem↗
PubMed2004

On the composition of risk preference and belief.

Prospect theory assumes nonadditive decision weights for preferences over risky gambles. Such decision weights generalize additive probabilities. This article proposes a decomposition of decision weights into a component reflecting risk attitude and a new component depending on belief. The decomposition is based on an observable preference condition and does not use other empirical primitives such as statements of judged probabilities. The preference condition is confirmed by most of the experimental findings in the literature. The implied properties of the belief component suggest that, besides the often-studied ambiguity aversion (a motivational factor reflecting a general aversion to unknown probabilities), perceptual and cognitive limitations play a role: It is harder to distinguish among various levels of likelihood, and to process them differently, when probabilities are unknown than when they are known.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed2006

The Bayesian reader: explaining word recognition as an optimal Bayesian decision process.

This article presents a theory of visual word recognition that assumes that, in the tasks of word identification, lexical decision, and semantic categorization, human readers behave as optimal Bayesian decision makers. This leads to the development of a computational model of word recognition, the Bayesian reader. The Bayesian reader successfully simulates some of the most significant data on human reading. The model accounts for the nature of the function relating word frequency to reaction time and identification threshold, the effects of neighborhood density and its interaction with frequency, and the variation in the pattern of neighborhood density effects seen in different experimental tasks. Both the general behavior of the model and the way the model predicts different patterns of results in different tasks follow entirely from the assumption that human readers approximate optimal Bayesian decision makers.

Attention↗
PubMed2006

The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs.

Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.

Attention↗
PubMed1991

Recognition failure and the composite memory trace in CHARM.

The relation between recognition and recall, and especially the orderly recognition-failure function relating recognition and the recognizability of recallable words, was investigated using a composite holographic associative recall-recognition memory model (CHARM). Ten series of computer simulations are presented. Analysis of CHARM and comparisons to other models indicate that the recognition-failure function depends on (a) both recognition and recall being similar (convolution-correlation) processes such that an interpretable representation is retrieved in both tasks and (b) the information underlying both recall and recognition being stored in the same composite memory trace. It is of considerable interest that constructs central to the distributed nature of CHARM are responsible for the model's adherence to the recognition-failure function.

Attention↗