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PubMed1989

Children's use of nonegocentric standards in judgments of functional size.

Dimensional adjectives are inherently relative in meaning, and so provide a test of children's ability to apply nonegocentric standards. The present research investigates children's ability to apply one kind of relative standard assessing the size of an object with regard to its intended use (a functional interpretation). In 3 experiments, children 3-5 years of age were asked to judge objects as "big" or "little" according to their function (e.g., a hat for a doll; a key for a door). Contrary to previous claims, the ability to use nonegocentric functional standards was present by age 3. However, 3-year-olds performed above chance only when their attention was directed to the relevant function, either by means of action (when actually shown how the objects fit together) or by means of language. In contrast, 4-year-olds performed well without additional action-based or linguistic cues. It is suggested that children have an implicit ordering in their interpretations of big and little, such that functional judgments are lower in priority than 2 other standards: normative (the size of an object is compared to a stored mental standard, e.g., a chihuahua is small for a dog) and perceptual (the size of an object is compared to another physically present object of the same type, e.g., a chihuahua 6 inches tall is big compared to a chihuahua 4 inches tall). Even 3-year-olds can make nonegocentric functional judgments of relative size, but the basis of the judgment must be unambiguous.

Attention↗

PubMed1987

Cognitive processes and individual differences in judgments relevant to drunk driving.

The present study explored cognitive processes in judgments of drunkenness relative to legally allowable blood alcohol levels for driving. Judgments were based on the manipulation of three cues in hypothetical scenarios in a 3 X 4 X 3 factorial design (Type of Drink X Number of Drinks X Time to Consume). In addition, personality and behavioral characteristics influencing the accuracy of judgments of drunkenness relative to true blood alcohol levels were examined. Results indicated the presence of several misperceptions and inappropriate response tendencies that potentially can be modified with educational efforts.

Adult↗

PubMed1979

The influence of clinical judgment on the rate of referral from a school vision screening program.

It has been observed that black preschool children low income families have a higher than average rate of referral from a school vision screening program. One potential contributing factor results from the fact that examiners often modified the referral criteria based on their clinical judgment. This study was designed to investigate the influence of the application of clinical judgment on the proportion of referrals as a function of ethnicity and socioeconomic income level. The results suggest that modifying the referral criteria based on clinical judgment does not significantly influence the proportion of referrals based on ethnicity or socioeconomic income level.

Black or African American↗

PubMed1983

Effects of response language and stimulus context upon judgments of visual and temporal extent.

College-student subjects judged duration (Experiment 1) or line length (Experiment 2) using conventional measurement units (sec and in.) and cross-modality matching. In each experiment, three stimulus contexts were created varying in average stimulus value. Judgmental contrast was observed in the cross-modality judgments, but not in the conventional-units judgments. It was inferred that the context effects were operating on response-translation processes.

Female↗

PubMed1982

Instructional design for aircrew judgment training.

Aircrew training design has made significant progress during recent years. However, significant gaps exist both in design methodology and in existing skills. Training in decision-making and judgment is currently haphazard at best. After a brief review of recent literature, this paper presents a conceptual model of judgment performance. The theoretical model is an extrapolation from Jensen and unites the variables of cognitive complexity, time availability, uncertainty, and stress into one coherent model. The model is used to examine current aircrew training and to develop new training strategies for improving judgment performance.

Aerospace Medicine↗

PubMed1980

A general strategy for quantity judgments: the height width rule.

Previous work has found that 5-year-olds judge the area of rectangles by a height width rule. Present results indicated that 3- and 4-year-olds also judge area by a height width rule. This adding rule was interpreted in terms of a general-purpose judgmental strategy that young children employ to make quantitative judgments. Both the use of a rating scale and the use of an adding rule in judgment indicate an impressive level of quantitative ability at a very early age.

Child Development↗

PubMed1993

Children's implicit personality theories as predictors of their social judgments.

Social judgment and trait ascription have long been central issues in psychology. Two studies tested the hypothesis that children who believe that personality is a fixed quality (entity theorists) would make more rigid and long-term social judgments than those who believe that personality is malleable (incremental theorists). Fourth and fifth graders (mean age 10.2 years) viewed a slide show of a boy displaying negative behaviors (Study 1--being shy, clumsy, and nervous; Study 2--lying, cheating, and stealing) and then made a series of ratings. Half of the subjects saw a consistent (negative) ending, and half saw an inconsistent (more positive) ending. Even when they viewed positive counterevidence, entity theorists did not differ in their ratings of the focal traits, but incremental theorists did. Entity theorists in Study 2 also predicted significantly less change in the short term and the long term than did incremental theorists. Study 2 further revealed that, when the behaviors were more negative, entity theorists made more generalized and global negative trait evaluations of the target, showed less empathy, and recommended more punishment. Differences in the social judgment processes of entity and incremental theorists are discussed, and implications for issues (such as stereotyping) are explored.

Child↗

PubMed1993

Rethinking clinical judgment.

In this paper, I've attempted to explicate ways in which the cognitive models rooted in the rational tradition have dominated our thinking about clinical judgment in nursing--both in framing research into so-called "cognitive processes" and in shaping our educational practices. Using exemplars from a study of clinical expertise in nursing, I have described several aspects of clinical judgment which cannot be accounted for by the cognitive models. I've highlighted assumptions underlying our educational practices which are challenged by our new understanding of clinical judgment and offered one illustration of an alternative approach to teaching which may be relevant for RN education.

Clinical Competence↗

PubMed1996

Predicting outcomes of community-based continuing care. Four-year prospective study of functional assessment versus clinical judgment.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the predictive power of functional assessment for death and institutionalization with the clinical judgment of continuing care nurses; to determine the rates of functional impairment in elderly community-based continuing care clients; to describe long-term group trends in this population. DESIGN: A prospective cohort study, which lasted 4 years. SETTING: Community-based continuing care nursing program. PARTICIPANTS: Two hundred thirty-seven elderly (65 years or older) clients of the program. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Activities of daily living (ADL), cognitive function, and affective function were assessed when clients entered the program (using the Barthel Index, the Canadian Mental Status Questionnaire, and the Memorial University Scale of Happiness). Home care nurses were asked to predict whether individual clients would have died or dropped out of the program at 1 year after entry. RESULTS: Cognitive function and ADL function tests were significant predictors of both death and drop-out from the program; they were better than clinical judgment. Rates of cognitive and ADL functioning were as expected; the rate of affective impairment (53.6%) was much higher than anticipated. At the end of 4 years, only 22.5% of the cohort were still receiving continuing care. CONCLUSIONS: Functional assessment of cognitive and ADL domains was a better predictor of outcomes than clinical judgment. Studying the cohort enabled us to describe group trends, which could be valuable for program managers.

Aged↗

PubMed1997

A case study application of the Integrated Ethical/Clinical Judgment Model.

PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES: To discuss diagnostic, therapeutic and ethical reasoning, as linked in the Gordon Murphy Candee and Hiltunen Integrated Clinical Judgment Model in the context of a case study. DATA SOURCES: An interview conducted with a widow who had been her husband's primary hospice caregiver while he was dying at home of lung cancer as well as published books and articles. DATA SYNTHESIS: Elements of ethical reasoning parties claims and moral basis for claims are revealed in the experiences of one family receiving hospice care. CONCLUSIONS: The Integrated Clinical Judgment Model has applicability in ethical research and clinical nursing practice. IMPLICATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE: Nurses firm grounding in both diagnostic and ethical reasoning will facilitate the application of sound clinical judgment in the provision of optimal hospice nursing care.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed1998

Single-case causality assessment as a basis for clinical judgment.

Current methodology of therapeutic causality assessment can be traced back to four underlying paradigms: (1) empirical scientific judgment relies on experimentation (paradigm of experiment), (2) causality assessment requires repeated observations (paradigm of large numbers), (3) observed results must be compared with results of control observations (paradigm of comparison), and (4) observed objects or patients must be distributed to verum and control group by chance (paradigm of randomization). Problematic aspects of conventional methodology and the historical evolution of contemporary causality assessment illustrate the necessity and possibility of methodological alternatives. A fundamental alternative is offered by figural correspondence and figural experiments, which allow valid causality assessments in single-case situations without blinding, randomization, comparison, or large numbers of observations. The epistemological foundation of such single-case causality assessment is explained. Examples from clinical judgment are presented. Single-case causality assessment may be particularly appropriate for therapy judgment in complementary medicine.

Complementary Therapies↗

PubMed1998

The Social Construction of Injustice: Fairness Judgments in Response to Own and Others' Unfair Treatment by Authorities.

The research literature in organizational justice has examined in some detail the dynamics and consequences of justice judgments based on direct experiences with fair and unfair authorities, but little is known about how people form justice judgments on the basis of reports of injustice by others or how group discussion changes justice judgments. The present study examined the consequences of distributed injustice, in which all members of a group experience some denial of voice, and concentrated injustice, in which one member experiences repeated denial of voice and others do not. It was predicted and found that mild personal experiences of injustice are a more potent source of group impressions of injustice than are reports of more severe injustice experienced by others. In both conditions, group ratings of unfairness were more extreme than were the mean of individual ratings either before or after discussion. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed1998

A Rejection Threshold in Justice Evaluations: Effects on Judgment and Decision-Making.

This research examined the process through which justice evaluations are formed. Using image theory's screening process we hypothesized that a rejection threshold exists with regard to violations of just treatment (e.g., laying off an employee without notice). If the number of violations exceeds the decision-maker's threshold, a negative justice evaluation results. Nonviolations (e.g., providing laid-off employees with a generous severance package) were hypothesized to only influence justice evaluations when violations do not exceed the threshold. Three studies compared the impact of justice violations and nonviolations on fairness evaluations. We also examined differences in fairness evaluations operationalized as judgments vs decisions. Results indicated that when making judgments about fairness, both violations and nonviolations are equally important. However, when one has to decide on a course of action based on considerations of fairness, nonviolations are only considered if fewer than three violations have been encountered. These results identify important distinctions between judgment and decisions and have implication for research examining outcomes of justice evaluations. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed1999

Culture and Negotiator Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures.

In this paper, we argue that judgment biases in negotiation are perpetuated by underlying cultural values and ideals, and therefore, certain judgment biases will be more prevalent in certain cultural contexts. Based on theory in cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), we considered the notion that fixed pie error, a judgment bias in which negotiators fail to accurately understand their counterparts' interests (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), would be more prevalent at the end of negotiations in the United States, an individualistic culture, than Greece, a collectivistic culture. The results of a 2-week computer-mediated intercultural negotiation experiment, which took place between American students in Illinois and Greek students in Athens, supported this view. Theoretical implications of culture and cognition in negotiation are also discussed. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed1999

The Effects of Subject-Defined Categories on Judgmental Accuracy in Confidence Assessment Tasks.

The accuracy of confidence judgments can be determined using measures of discrimination and calibration. The present paper utilizes a new assessment methodology that decomposes the confidence assessment task, allowing us to investigate discrimination and calibration skills in greater depth than has been done in previous studies. Researchers investigating the goodness of confidence judgments have typically grouped forecasters' assessments into experimenter-defined categories, generally in equal widths of.10. In the present research, subjects created their own categories and later assigned confidence judgments to the categories, separating the tasks of discriminating categories (discrimination) and assigning numbers to categories (calibration). Further, the typical assessment procedure assumes that subjects are able to discriminate equally across the confidence scale. Since subjects in the present study defined their own assessment categories, they could locate those categories at any point on the scale. A final issue of interest was whether subjects were able to determine accurately the number of categories into which they could discriminate. Sixty subjects performed 1 of 2 tasks, general knowledge or forecasting, in both relatively easy and relatively hard conditions. Results showed a trade-off in performance: Calibration generally became worse as the number of categories increased, while discrimination generally improved. Overall accuracy was not affected by the number of categories used. Further, subjects partitioned categories more at the high end of the scale. Finally, measures showed that subjects were not accurate in their beliefs about their own discrimination ability. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2000

Ease of Recall vs Recalled Evidence in Judgment: Experts vs Laymen.

When major reasons of fault are presented in a pruned format, people fail to transfer the proportions of the omitted categories to the "all-other-problems" category. The present research investigated the underlying judgmental processes and the effect of domain knowledge on this phenomenon, known as pruning bias. In Experiment 1, although people with higher levels of domain knowledge failed to adjust completely for omission from the fault tree, they were more accurate and less biased than people with lower levels of domain knowledge. In Experiment 2, two hypothe ses are contrasted: The first, the availability explanation, sug gests that the underestimation of the "all-other-problems" category stems from its label being a less effective retrieval cue for specific fault reasons than the labels of major categories. The second hypothesis suggests that people judge by perceived ease of recall. The results suggest that people generating less failure reasons provide higher proportions to the "all-other-problems" category than people generating more reasons. The latter generation condition was perceived to be more difficult, signaling to people that the "all-other-problems" category is not so prevalent. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 indicate, as hypothesized, that the judgments of people with relatively low levels of domain knowledge are influenced by perceived ease of recall, whereas the judgments of people with higher levels of domain knowledge are influenced by recalled evidence. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed1994

Use of probabilistic expert judgment in uncertainty analysis of carcinogenic potency.

A new approach to characterizing the state of knowledge about carcinogenic potency is described. In this approach, the carcinogenic risk posed by a specific dose is characterized by a probability distribution, indicating the relative likelihood of different risk estimates. The approach utilizes expert judgment and a probability tree and is illustrated in a case study of chloroform exposure. Experts in cancer biology/toxicology, pharmacokinetics, and dose-response modeling were identified by a panel of science-policy specialists. In a workshop, experts reviewed the chloroform data, received training in probability elicitation, and constructed a consensual probability tree based on biological theories of cancer causation. Distributions of carcinogenic risk were developed based on the probability tree, chloroform data, judgmental probabilities provided by the experts, and classical statistical techniques. Risk distributions varied considerably between experts, with some predicting essentially no risk from 100 ppb chloroform in drinking water while other have at least some probability on risks generally considered of regulatory significance. Estimated human risk was much lower when extrapolating from liver tumors in animals than from kidney tumors. Issues of scientific disagreement leading to different risk distributions between experts are discussed. The resulting risk distributions are compared to standard EPA risk calculations for the same exposure scenario as well as to the expert judgement of epidemiologists about cancer risks of chlorinated drinking water. Issues in combining expert judgments are discussed, and several alternative methods are presented. Strengths and weaknesses of the distributional approach are discussed.

Animals↗

PubMed1991

Clinical judgment in forensic neuropsychology: a comment on the risks of claiming more than can be delivered.

There is a vast and growing literature in psychology demonstrating the general limits of human judgment and clinical inference. These findings clearly apply in the new specialty of clinical neuropsychology, and there is little empirical research to support the widespread belief that judgmental accuracy correlates substantially with experience, professional stature, or reputation as a neuropsychologist. However, the demand characteristics of expert testimony in the forensic arena may encourage individual neuropsychologists to state or intimate that they have unique or special expertise in understanding brain-behavior relationships, or in predicting outcomes following cerebral insult or injury. These claims will be increasingly difficult to substantiate as attorneys become more conversant with the literature on human judgment.

Brain Damage, Chronic↗