Ulysses contracts.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search PubMed
Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Those who wish to refute the view that it is worse to kill than to let die sometimes produce examples of cases in which an agent lets someone die but would be generally agreed to be no less reprehensible than if he had killed. It is argued that the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were designed to undermine.
Attempts to solve the Trolley Problem by means of a single principle have proved unpersuasive. Nor can the intuition about Transplant be adequately grounded in the hypothetical dissent of rational contractors. It is explained by the initial liability principle, that loss should lie where it falls unless there is sufficient reason to shift it. If we did not think we should accept misfortune in such cases and thought that minimising loss of life was sufficient reason to shift the loss we should not be according others the minimum respect and treatment we feel is their due. The intuition about Trolley is explained by the affinity of that case to the pure case where the choice is between saving many and saving fewer, where minimising misfortune is the only credible option. But these considerations are not yet enough to accommodate the cases that lie between the extremes of Trolley and Transplant. We can handle the intermediate cases by attempting to assimilate them to one or other paradigm and to one another with a sensitivity to morally relevant and irrelevant differences that seeks initially to be faithful to the values reflected by our moral intuitions. Those intuitive judgements are unlikely to survive such an examination wholly unmodified.
Criminal behaviour is but one behavioural tendency for which a genetic influence has been suggested. Whilst this research certainly raises difficult ethical questions and is subject to scientific criticism, one recent research project suggests that for some families, criminal tendency might be predicted by genetics. In this paper, supposing this research is valid, we consider whether intervening in the criminal tendency of future children is ethically justifiable. We argue that, if avoidance of harm is a paramount consideration, such an intervention is acceptable when genetic selection is employed instead of genetic enhancement. Moreover, other moral problems in avoiding having children with a tendency to criminal behaviour, such as the prospect of social discrimination, can also be overcome.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Ethical issues surrounding decisions to limit treatment often focus on dramatic and highly technical interventions, such as mechanical ventilation. Many less dramatic forms of therapy are considered routine, and ethical aspects of their use may be less closely examined. Nutritional support can be crucially important in elderly patients, especially the very frail. Yet, appropriate use of nutritional therapy must consider the circumstances of an individual patient. Where severe underlying illness cannot be reversed, technical means of providing nutrition can represent extraordinary rather than ordinary means of prolonging life. The following case examines the ethical issues in respecting the apparent refusal of nutritional support by a severely debilitated geriatric patient.
This paper examines the moral and professional issues present in cases involving continued treatment of fatally ill patients in order to benefit a third party. It is argued that such treatment can be justified in some cases from a moral point of view. Practical considerations make such cases difficult to identify at times. It is also argued on the other hand that professional concerns should rule out the permissibility of continuing such treatment. Thus, even though it may be morally permissible at times to continue treatment, it is not good medical practice to do so.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The authors look closely at the often cited Rule of Double Effect and argue that, in some cases, a physician can legitimately claim to have acted within the Rule's parameters. In other cases, however, physicians can abuse the notion of unintended consequences. The test case they offer concerns palliative care that causes foreseeable death.
While the author believes that Nuccetelli and Seay have not succeeded in replacing the Rule of Double Effect with a more workable and practical moral principle, he believes they have emphasized a frequently overlooked element: that certain clear conditions must first be met before the Rule can be applied.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.