["Phylogenetic presumptions"--can jurisprudence terms promote comparative biology?].
The paper presents the results of a critical analysis of the "phylogenetic presumptions" conception by means of its comparison with the hypothetic-deductive method of the phylogeny reconstruction within the framework of the evolutionary systematics. Rasnitsyn (1988, 2002) suggested this conception by analogy with the presumption of innocence in jurisprudence, where it has only moral grounds. Premises of all twelve the "phylogenetic presumptions" are known for a long time as the criteria of character homology and polarity or as the criteria of relationship between organisms. Many of them are inductive generalizations based on a large body of data and therefore are currently accepted by most of taxonomists as criteria or corresponding rules, but not as presumptions with the imperative "it is true until the contrary is proved". The application of the juristic term "presumption" in phylogenetics introduces neither methodical profits, nor anything to gain a better insight of problems of the phylogenetic reconstruction. Moreover, it gives ill effects as, by analogy with a judicially charged person and his legal defense, it allows a researcher not to prove or substantiate his statements on characters and relationships. Some of Rasnitsyn's presumptions correspond to criteria, which have been recognized as invalid ones on the reason of their non-operationality (presumption "apomorphic state corresponds more effective adaptation") or insufficient ontological grounds (presumptions "are more complex structure is apomorphic", "the most parsimonious cladogram is preferable", and "one should considered every to be inherited").