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PubMed2005

Lifetime cover in private insurance markets.

In the last few decades, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In countries and states with community rating, a major cause is adverse selection. In order to address age-based adverse selection, Australia has recently begun a novel approach which imposes stiff penalties for buying private insurance later in life, when expected costs are higher. In this paper, we analyze Australia's Lifetime Cover in the context of a modified version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). We allow empirically-based probabilities to increase by age for low-risk types. The model highlights the shortcomings of the Australian plan. Based on empirically-based probabilities of illness, we predict that Lifetime Cover will not arrest adverse selection. The model has many policy implications for government regulation encouraging long-term health coverage.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2006

Risk selection and complementary health insurance: the Swiss approach.

To avoid risk selection, the market for complementary health insurance is usually completely separate from the market for basic health insurance. In Switzerland, however, the basic benefit package and complementary insurance are offered by the same insurer. Risk-based premiums are allowed with respect to complementary insurance. This paper compares the Swiss integration approach to the separation approach. It is shown that under the integration approach insurers cream-skim by selling complementary insurance to low risks at a discount. Nevertheless, the integration approach can be Pareto-superior if the cost savings due to the integration of basic and complementary insurance are sufficiently large.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗
PubMed2006

Genetic testing and private insurance--a case of "selling one's body"?

Arguments against the possible use of genetic test results in private health and life insurance predominantly refer to the problem of certain gene carriers failing to obtain affordable insurance cover. However, some moral intuitions speaking against this practice seem to be more fundamental than mere concerns about adverse distributional effects. In their perspective, the central ethical problem is not that some people might fail to get insurance cover because of their 'bad genes', but rather that some people would manage to get insurance cover because of their 'good genes'. This paper tries to highlight the ethical background of these intuitions. Their guiding idea appears to be that, by pointing to his favourable test results, a customer might make an attempt to 'sell his body'. The rationale of this concept is developed and its applicability to the case at issue is critically investigated. The aim is to clarify an essential objection against the use of genetic information in private insurance which has not yet been openly addressed in the academic debate of the topic.

Commerce↗
PubMed1991

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the Medigap insurance market.

Using data from a longitudinal study of the recently retired we attempt to separate the moral hazard effect of Medicare supplementary (Medigap) insurance on health care expenditures from the adverse selection effect of poor health on Medigap coverage. We find evidence of adverse selection, but its magnitude is unlikely to create serious efficiency problems. Taking adverse selection into account reduces the estimate of the moral hazard effect. In addition, we find a strong positive wealth effect on the demand for supplementary insurance.

Aged↗
PubMed1992

Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: a simulation analysis.

This study uses simulation methods to quantify the effects of adverse selection. The data used to develop the model provide information about whether families can accurately forecast their risk and whether this forecast affects the purchase of insurance coverage--key conditions for adverse selection to matter. The results suggest that adverse selection is sufficient to eliminate high-option benefit plans in multiple choice markets if insurers charge a single, experience-rated premium. Adverse selection is substantially reduced if premiums are varied according to demographic factors. Adverse selection is also restricted in supplementary insurance markets. In this market, supplementary policies are underpriced because a part of the additional benefits that purchasers can expect is a cost to the base plan and is not reflected in the supplementary premium. As a result, full supplementary coverage is attractive to both low and high risks.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed1995

Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study.

If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed1992

Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts.

The determination of the payment or premium to be paid to the insurer by a large purchaser of care must accurately represent the risk of the enrolled persons. One approach is a risk-adjusted payment established by a mathematical formula, which estimates the effect of many variables on total care costs, and for different groups of persons determine an average cost. This method has several problems, and an alternative is competitive bidding. Market forces pressure providers to offer the lowest possible bids while attempting to remain fiscally viable and provide high-quality services. Research from the U.S. demonstrates that competitive contracting effectively lowered the costs of health care for those sectors of the health care system that used this strategy. Bidding by area gave far more equitable results than could have been obtained with a state-wide system with crude adjustments for each area. It is an alternative which can create strong incentives for innovation and cost-containment, and at the same time allows insurers to take into account local variation in supply and demand of care. As a potential alternative to a regulatory system, competitive bidding should be considered for regional experimentation in health insurer payment.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed1995

The introduction of deductibles for prescription drugs in a national health insurance: compulsory or voluntary?

We consider a situation of full insurance coverage for prescription drugs where, at a certain point in time, people are given the opportunity to take a deductible in exchange for a lower premium. Four determinants of this premium reduction can be considered: expected out-of-pocket payments, adverse selection effects, moral hazard effects, and administration costs. The purpose of this study is to analyse the first two determinants. Survey data of 17,242 insureds in the Netherlands have been used for this research. Results show that the expected out-of-pocket expenditures in case of a certain deductible amount depend strongly on age and gender. People in poor health could be given a larger premium discount if they would take a deductible than those in good health. This implies that a uniform premium discount would induce adverse selection. The effects of such selection have been simulated by using a survey question about the preference to take a general deductible. If the premium reductions for policies with a deductible are adjusted for age and gender, the selection effect will halve but will still be substantial. We conclude that, in the situation considered here, it is largely immaterial whether deductibles are compulsory or voluntary, provided premium reductions are allowed to depend on relevant risk factors.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1992

Towards a capitation formula for competing health insurers. An empirical analysis.

In many countries the concept of capitating health care insurers is receiving increasing attention. The main reason is, that capitation may induce health care insurers in a competitive environment to concentrate more on cost containment. However, if the adjusters on which capitation payments are based, are too global, there may be ample room for risk selection by the insurers whilst also an unfair distribution of funds over the insurers may result, thereby undermining the objectives of capitation. The prime motivation for the present study is, that the Dutch government, as part of proposals for a new, market oriented structure of health care system, is considering to capitate insurers on the basis of global parameters like age, gender and location. Our analysis based on panel data of some 35,000 individuals, shows that the proportion of variance in annual health care expenditures that can be predicted (R2) by such a global capitation formula, is only 0.024. This is less than 1/5 of our estimate of the theoretically maximum achievable R2 which amounts to 0.138, implying the existence of abundant selection opportunities, e.g. on the basis of past expenditures or other health indicators. Alternative capitation formulae incorporating prior-year's costs and reaching about 3/5 of the maximum obtainable R2, effectively remove the profitableness of selection on the basis of past expenditures. The findings suggest, however, that selection via (chronic) health status may still be profitable to some extent. Therefore, we also analyzed data from the Dutch Health Interview Survey (N approximately 20,000) which comprised better health indicators. It appeared that a capitation formula based on the global adjusters mentioned above as well as three health status indicators and several background characteristics, yields an R2 of about 0.114, which probably accounts for 3/4 of our estimate of the maximum obtainable R2. The main conclusion is, that in the short term information on prior expenditures, which is available in the files of most insurers and thus may be used for risk selection, should be included in the capitation formula. For the more distant future, the formula should be expanded with indicators of chronic health status, possibly based on diagnostic information from previous, non-discretionary hospitalizations.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2006

Complementary health insurance in France. Who pays? Why? Who will suffer from public disengagement?

The study is based on a rare database with information about health status, socioeconomic characteristics and the complementary health insurance choices of the French population. We intend to characterise a two-stage decision process: first, the decision to purchase complementary health insurance, and then the factors related to choice of policy quality. Our econometric study indicates that (i) income level has a strong and significant effect on the decision to purchase complementary insurance, whilst there is no evidence that health risk considerations affect this decision at all; (ii) the individual decision about quality is associated barely if at all with any rational explanatory variables. The population's concrete behaviour, revealed by the study, is consistent with an allocation of low-risk people to private insurance and high-risk people to public insurance. Complementary insurance is not especially relevant to patients with serious diseases, who depend much more on the public system. If the public insurance system were to disengage significantly from coverage of serious illness, a vacuum would be created that would leave people at high risk without full coverage. These results have broad implications for numerous national systems of social protection seeking a new mix between private and public insurance.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

The interaction of partial public insurance programs and residual private insurance markets: evidence from the US Medicare program.

A ubiquitous form of government intervention in insurance markets is to provide compulsory, but partial, public insurance coverage and to allow voluntary purchases of supplementary private insurance. This paper investigates the effects of such programs on insurance coverage for the risks not covered by the public program, using the example of the US Medicare program. I find that Medicare does not have substantial effects-in either direction-on coverage in residual private insurance markets. In particular, there is no evidence that Medicare is associated with reductions in private insurance coverage for prescription drug expenditures, an expenditure risk not covered by Medicare. Medicare is, however, associated with a shift in the source of prescription drug coverage, from employer-provided coverage to Medicare HMOs.

Aged↗
PubMed2006

Adverse selection in a voluntary Rural Mutual Health Care health insurance scheme in China.

This study examines adverse selection in a subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme, the Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC) scheme, in a poor rural area of China. The study was made possible by a unique longitudinal data set: the total sample includes 3492 rural residents from 1020 households. Logistic regression was employed for the data analysis. The results show that although this subsidized scheme achieved a considerable high enrollment rate of 71% of rural residents, adverse selection still exists. In general, individuals with worse health status are more likely to enroll in RMHC than individuals with better health status. Although the household is set as the enrollment unit for the RMHC for the purpose of reducing adverse selection, nearly 1/3 of enrolled households are actually only partially enrolled. Furthermore, we found that adverse selection mainly occurs in partially enrolled households. The non-enrolled individuals in partially enrolled households have the best health status, while the enrolled individuals in partially enrolled households have the worst health status. Pre-RMHC, medical expenditure for enrolled individuals in partially enrolled households was 206.6 yuan per capita per year, which is 1.7 times as much as the pre-RMHC medical expenditure for non-enrolled individuals in partially enrolled households. The study also reveals that the pre-enrolled medical expenditure per capita per year of enrolled individuals was 9.6% higher than the pre-enrolled medical expenditure of all residents, including both enrolled and non-enrolled individuals. In conclusion, although the subsidized RMHC scheme reached a very high enrollment rate and the household is set as the enrollment unit for the purpose of reducing adverse selection, adverse selection still exists, especially within partially enrolled households. Voluntary RMHC will not be financially sustainable if the adverse selection is not fully taken into account.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2006

Making the normal deviant: the introduction of predictive medicine in life insurance.

Over the past years, one of the most discussed topics in policy debates on genetics has been the use of genetic testing in insurance. Many of these debates have been rather speculative and abstract. In a recent contribution to this journal, Kaufert therefore urged for "a proper research agenda" to study the issue, arguing for the need of anthropological and sociological research of the insurance world. This article will make a start with this. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in two Belgium insurance companies, this study analyses the ways insurers account for predictive medicine (lifestyle, genetics) during underwriting. We demonstrate how insurers highlight predictive lifestyle health information and how this articulates with a fault based approach in underwriting. Individual responsibility for health risks becomes the golden standard for assessing one's fitness for membership of the insurance pool. Moreover, these developments imply a changed concept of "normal standard" in insurance, increasing the conditions to fulfil to be part of the insurance group. Predictive medicine constitutes new ground in the old debates about individual control, responsibility and blame for health. This goes to the heart of the basis for citizenship and how this articulates with membership--or, if you want, exclusion--of the insurance pool.

Belgium↗
PubMed2000

An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: an MSA example.

This paper outlines a feasible employee premium contribution policy, which would reduce the inefficiency associated with adverse selection when a limited coverage insurance policy is offered alongside a more generous policy. The "efficient premium contribution" is defined and is shown to lead to an efficient allocation across plans of persons who differ by risk, but it may also redistribute against higher risks. A simulation of the additional option of a catastrophic health plan (CHP) accompanied by a medical savings account (MSA) is presented. The efficiency gains from adding the MSA/catastrophic health insurance plan (CHP) option are positive but small, and the adverse consequences for high risks under an efficient employee premium are also small.

Community Participation↗
PubMed2000

Risk segmentation: goal or problem?

This paper traces the evolution of economists' views about risk segmentation in health insurance markets. Originally seen as a desirable goal, risk segmentation has come to be viewed as leading to abnormal profits, wasted resources, and inefficient limitations on coverage and services. We suggest that risk segmentation may be efficient if one takes an ex post view (i.e., after consumers' risks are known). From this perspective, managed care may be a much better method for achieving risk segmentation than limitations on coverage. The most serious objection to risk segmentation is the ex ante concern that it undermines long-term insurance contracts that would protect consumers against changes in lifetime risk.

Economic Competition↗