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PubMed2005

Commercial insurance vs community-based health plans: time for a policy option with clinical emphasis to address the cost spiral.

The nation continues its ceaseless struggle with the spiraling cost of health care. Previous efforts (regulation, competition, voluntary action) have included almost every strategy except clinical. Insurers have largely failed in their cost-containment efforts. There is a strong emerging body of literature that demonstrates the relationship between various clinical strategies and reductions in utilization and costs. This article describes the organization of health services, including integration of delivery and financing systems, at the community level as a model that effectively addresses the critical structural flaws that have frustrated control of costs. Community-based health plans (CHPs) have been developed and have demonstrated viability. The key elements of CHPs are a legal organizational structure, a full provider network, advanced care-management systems, and the ability to assume financial risk. Common misconceptions regarding obstacles to CHP development are the complexity of the undertaking, difficulty assuming the insurance function, and insured pools that are too small to be viable. The characteristics of successful CHPs and 2 case studies are described, including the types of advanced care-management systems that have resulted in strong financial performance. The demonstrated ability of CHPs to establish financial viability with small numbers of enrollees challenges the common assumption that there is a fixed relationship between health plan enrollment size and financial performance. Organizing the health system at the community/regional level provides an attractive alternative model in the health-reform debate. There is an opportunity for clinical systems and state and federal leaders to support the development of community-based integrated delivery and financing system models that, among other advantages, have significant potential to modulate the pernicious cost spiral.

Community Health Services↗
PubMed1993

Conflicting aims. Voluntary health insurance and contemporary medical practice.

American medicine is financed today by a patchwork of systems formed around a concept of competitive voluntary health insurance that evolved over the past 50 years. This article reviews the theory of health insurance from a clinical perspective to examine whether changes in medical science and practice have made such an insurance system obsolete. As it is currently applied, a system of competitive voluntary health insurance conflicts with the goals of modern medical practice due to advances in screening and in treatment and the need to deal more effectively with paying for care of unknown efficacy. Proposals to reform health insurance must deal with the medical failings of competitive voluntary health insurance and should do more than simply extend the current system to cover more Americans.

Economic Competition↗
PubMed2004

Are Colombian sickness funds cream skimming enrollees? An analysis with suggestions for policy improvement.

One of the primary objectives of Colombian social health insurance reform was to increase competition among for-profit insurers. Unfortunately, the flat capitated formula creates an opportunity for sickness funds to maximize reimbursement gains by cream skimming--selecting against unhealthy individuals. This paper explores sickness fund selection behavior to evaluate the efficiency losses associated with the introduction of managed competition in Colombia. Data from a 1997 Colombian household survey are analyzed with a bivariate probit model with partial observability using instrumental variables. The model yields some evidence of sickness fund selection based on health status. Public policy options to discourage risk selection by health status are discussed.

Colombia↗
PubMed1998

Cream-skimming in deregulated social health insurance: evidence from Switzerland.

Policymakers fear that health insurers when exposed to competition will engage in cream-skimming (i.e. selection of good risks) rather than trying to improve their benefit to premium ratio. This fear surfaced also when Swiss federal government proposed pro-competitive Law on social health insurance, which barely passed a popular referendum in 1994. While a risk equalization mechanism based on age, gender, and place of residence has already been created, there is a considerable interest in improving its formula. This paper shows that a dummy variable indicating an individual's death during the period of observation causes the coefficient of determination to jump from 0.039 to 0.111. More-over, simulations of the risk selection process suggest that risk equalization should be made a permanent institution rather than being limited to a life of 10 years as prescribed by present legislation. In fact, the formula in use, with all its shortcomings, can be shown to neutralize to a great extent insurer interest in cream skimming provided he takes a longer-run view.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Cost-effectiveness and the socialization of health care.

The more health care is socialized, the more cost-effectiveness is an appropriate criterion for expenditure. Utility-maximizing individuals, facing divisibility of health care purchases and declining marginal health gains, and complete information about probable health improvements, should buy health care according to its cost-effectiveness. Absent these features, individual health spending will not be cost-effective; and in any case, differences in personal utilities and risk aversion will not lead to the same ranking of health care interventions for everyone. Private insurance frees consumers from concern for cost, which undermines cost-effectiveness, but lets them emphasize effectiveness, which favors value for money. This is most important for costly and cost-effective interventions, especially for poor people. Cost-effectiveness is more appropriate and easier to achieve under second-party insurance. More complete socialization of health care, via public finance, can yield greater efficiency by making insurance compulsory. Cost-effectiveness is also more attractive when taxpayers subsidize others' care: needs (effectiveness) take precedence over wants (utility). The gain in effectiveness may be greater, and the welfare loss from Pareto non-optimality smaller, in poor countries than in rich ones.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗
PubMed1995

A prepayment scheme for hospital care in the Masisi district in Zaire: a critical evaluation.

In most developing countries, government funding allocated to the health services is not sufficient to allow these services to provide appropriate health care accessible to all. Consequently, community financing has received much more attention in recent years and innovative schemes are being explored throughout the developing world. Risk-sharing schemes, like prepayment, are interesting because of their potential redistributive effects. At the end of the eighties, a prepayment scheme for hospital care was experimented with in the Masisi health district in Eastern Zaire. In the present paper, the experiment is described in a chronological way and the results are analyzed and discussed in detail. Although this particular case-study was not successful, it yields important lessons concerning the design, implementation and evaluation of prepayment schemes for hospital health care in developing countries. More specifically, phenomena like adverse selection and moral hazard are discussed. Finally, conditions for success of similar experiments are discussed. These conditions relate mainly to the organization pattern of the district health services system. The Masisi experiment is a nice illustration of the fact that prepayment is not a 'magic bullet': the lessons drawn from it may be of relevancy to health planners intending to implement hospital prepayment schemes in similar settings.

Democratic Republic of the Congo↗
PubMed2000

Risk segmentation: goal or problem?

This paper traces the evolution of economists' views about risk segmentation in health insurance markets. Originally seen as a desirable goal, risk segmentation has come to be viewed as leading to abnormal profits, wasted resources, and inefficient limitations on coverage and services. We suggest that risk segmentation may be efficient if one takes an ex post view (i.e., after consumers' risks are known). From this perspective, managed care may be a much better method for achieving risk segmentation than limitations on coverage. The most serious objection to risk segmentation is the ex ante concern that it undermines long-term insurance contracts that would protect consumers against changes in lifetime risk.

Economic Competition↗
PubMed2002

Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison.

In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2002

Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages.

This paper presents a model of a competitive health insurance market with two risk types and two health benefits. In the benchmark case, community rating insurers (CRIs) are only allowed to offer the basic benefit. The additional benefit is sold by risk rating insurers (RRIs). It is shown that low risk types can only be better off at the expense of high risk types if CRIs are allowed to offer the additional benefit and no additional measures are taken. However, high risk types can be made better off if CRIs must offer the additional benefit or if community rating health insurers offering the additional benefit are subsidized while those selling only the basic benefit are taxed.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2003

Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system.

Reform proposals of health care systems in several countries have advocated variations of a risk adjustment/capitation system. These proposals face a serious objection: incentives to risk selection are prevalent in the system. By now, considerable literature has been devoted to finding ways of mitigating, if not eliminating, this problem, while at the same time preserving incentives to efficiency. We contribute to this debate presenting a transfer system that, under some circumstances, attains both provider efficiency and no risk selection. The transfer system extends typical linear payment systems. It can be interpreted as a fixed transfer in the beginning of the period plus an ex-post fund at the end of the period. The novelty rests in the way contributions to this fund are defined.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed2003

Needs for further improvement: risk adjustment in the German health insurance system.

The German risk adjustment mechanism is used only within the public system. It was introduced in two steps, 1994 and 1995. Because of the income-related contribution, which the insured pay directly to their sickness fund, income of the insured is equalized by the mechanism and causes the biggest part of the payments among the sickness funds. On the expenditure side age, gender, disability and entitlement for sickness allowances are used as risk adjusters. The mechanism is retrospective, calculating average costs for each of the 670 risk cells defined by the risk adjusters and using these "standardized expenditures" as a base for the payment a single sickness fund gets because of its risk structure. There do still exist incentives for risk selection. The experience shows that mostly the young and healthy are willing to change sickness funds motivated by lower contribution rates. This can be used and is used for self-selection. Another cause of risk selection is regional differences. The central suggestion of an expertise on behalf of the German Ministry of Health on experiences and improvement proposals is the change to a direct modeling of morbidity.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2004

Risk segmentation and equity in the Chilean mandatory health insurance system.

For decades, the Chilean health system has included a requirement for dependent workers to spend a certain percentage of their wages on health insurance. Since 1981, workers have been able to choose between public insurance and several private insurance providers. The reforms introduced more choice, moving away from reliance on an exclusive public provider. By 1999, about half of the country's active dependent workers had opted out of the public and into the private insurance system. The development of the private insurance system has been accompanied by controversy, however, regarding possible inequities in the utilization of medical services, the degree of risk segmentation, inefficiencies in the system's operation, and other factors. This paper discusses the issues of risk segmentation and equity. It starts by reviewing the system's design on a theoretical level, then deriving hypothesis and finally providing empirical evidence regarding these hypothesis. Particular attention is given to the issues of how individuals choose between the public and private system (to determine the reasons behind risk segmentation) and the differences in utilization among the various income groups (to clarify the issue of possible inequities).

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2004

Addressing government and market failures with payment incentives: Hospital reimbursement reform in Hainan, China.

This paper examines the role of provider payment policy as an instrument for addressing government and market failures and controlling costs in the health sector, particularly in developing countries. We empirically evaluate the impact of provider payment reform in Hainan province, China, on expenditures for different categories of services that had been subject to distorted prices under fee-for-service. Using a pre-post study design with a control group, we analyze two years of claims data to assess the impact of a January 1997 change to prospective payment for a sub-sample of the hospitals. This difference-in-difference empirical strategy allows us to isolate the supply-side payment reform effects from demand-side policy interventions. We find that prepayment is associated with a slower increase in spending on expensive drugs and high technology services, compared to fee-for-service. The fact that payment reform is associated with reduced growth in spending on the most expensive drugs is particularly encouraging, given that drugs account for a remarkably high percentage of both the level and growth of aggregate health expenditure in China. Payment reform can be an effective policy instrument for correcting market failures and adverse side effects of government health sector interventions (such as distorted prices to assure access to basic services), both of which can lead to excessive health care expenditure growth. Such health spending growth can have a particularly high opportunity cost for developing countries.

China↗
PubMed1999

Smoking-attributable medical care costs in the USA.

Medical care costs attributable to cigarette smoking are estimated using an econometric model of annual individual expenditures for four types of medical services: ambulatory, hospital, prescription drug, and other (which includes home health and durable medical equipment and excludes dental and mental health). The model follows the two-part specification of Duan et al. (1983). Estimation is carried out using the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. Fitted values are used to calculate smoking-attributable fractions (SAFs) of expense by type of service and by age and gender category. The overall weighted average SAF is 6.54%. SAFs are generally largest for ambulatory and smallest for hospital expenses. They are larger for males and for the older age categories. The model is analyzed for heteroscedasticity and goodness of fit. Additional analysis using the National Health Interview Survey is conducted to test for the possible effect of not being able to include alcohol consumption in the primary model. A balanced repeated replication analysis is conducted to evaluate the variance of the SAFs. Variances are found to be acceptably small. An extension of the model to support evaluation of smoking-attributable costs for special populations such as individual states, and special insurance pools such as Medicaid recipients, is described. Results for the fifty states are presented. Conclusions and subjects for further research are discussed.

Adult↗