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PubMed1996

Arguing with the cognitivists.

A number of cognitivists have claimed that it is somehow illegitimate for those people who do not accept that cognitions are the only cause of human behavior to enter into debate on the issue. Their argument appears to be that it is not possible to develop an argument without making use of the sort of cognition described by Bandura [Bandura (1995) Comments on the crusade against the causal efficacy of human thought, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 179-190] and others, nor is it possible to influence other people without attempting to change their cognitive model of the topic, and therefore the mere fact of arguing is enough to disprove the non-cognitivists' position. This paper argues that argument is not dependent on an inner monologue but is a behavioral process; and attempting to persuade others does not necessitate a belief in a central causal role for cognitions. It is quite possible to engage in academic debate without adopting a dualist model of the human being, and, by extension, it is quite possible to explain a wide range of complex human activities without recourse to the limiting models of contemporary cognitive psychology.

Behaviorism↗
PubMed1996

Ontological and epistemological terrains revisited.

The present commentary discusses the scientific legitimacy of theories confined to correlations of observables and those that specify the mechanisms governing the relations between observable events. Operant analysts frame the theoretical differences misleadingly when the operant approach is portrayed as addressing environmental influence for effecting change but cognitive approaches are depicted as disembodied from environmental influences and thus can only provide correlates with action. In point of fact, both approaches encompass environmental influences. The major issues in contention are whether human thinking is entirely or only partially shaped by environmental influences; whether the influences in the person-environment relation flow unidirectionally or bidirectionally; and whether human thought serves a determinative function or is a functionless epiphenomenon. Proponents of epiphenomenalism regard other people's thinking as functionless by-products of conditioned responses, but present their own thoughts on matters as the right ones that provide functional guides for structuring interventions. This commentary discusses the self-negating nature of the epiphenomenalism argument. It also corrects misunderstandings and misrepresentations of self-efficacy theory.

Behaviorism↗
PubMed1996

What are the benefits from a debate about cognition, behavior, and causality?

Some authors have argued that the debate about whether or not self-efficacy can be legitimately viewed as a cause of behavior is futile due to incommensurability between underlying philosophies. Nevertheless, the debate provides a valuable case study of comparative paradigms in psychology for teaching purposes. It also stimulates a secondary debate about whether clinical utility is a sufficient criterion in clinical decision making. Another consequence of the debate has been a reminder of the negative consequences of the focus on the individual in contemporary psychology.

Behaviorism↗
PubMed2001

Chronic pain: a reformulation of the cognitive-behavioural model.

The last few decades has seen psychological theories of chronic pain dominated by behavioural concepts and particularly, by the operant model as described by Fordyce et al. (1968: Fordyce, W., Fowler, R., & DeLateur, B. (1968) An application of behavior modification technique to a problem of chronic pain. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 6, 105-107, 1976: Fordyce, W.E. (1976) Behavioral methods for chronic pain and illness. St Louis, MO: C. V Moseby). More recently, cognitive constructs have been included, giving the impression that the operant theory of chronic pain has been replaced by a cognitive-behavioural theory (CBT). Given the fact that CBTs were introduced essentially to overcome some inherent problems with operant theory, it is notable that they are still very much based on operant theory and continue to be founded upon operant principles. Further, the extent to which CBTs (at this stage) have included contemporary cognitive research has been limited. This paper argues that it is of questionable validity to continue to include problematic concepts (e.g., operant principles) into a revised theory (e.g., CBT). Instead, consistent with research from other areas (particularly the anxiety disorders), chronic pain and the problems associated with it may be better explained by a reformulated cognitive-behavioural theory which although not ignoring the observable behaviours of pain patients and their associations with social reinforcers, interprets these phenomena from a cognitive perspective. Thus, a modified CBT is proffered, focusing more directly on patients' thoughts about, and appraisals of, their pain. Evidence in support of such a theory is provided, as are suggestions for further research and the implications such a theory has for treatment.

Chronic Disease↗
PubMed2001

On the scientific status of cognitive appraisal models of anxiety disorder.

The cognitive paradigm for understanding and treating anxiety disorders comprises two distinct and potentially incompatible approaches: appraisal and information-processing. Advocates of the latter approach have sharply criticized the scientific adequacy of the appraisal models popularized by cognitive therapists. The purpose of this essay is to provide a reappraisal of these critiques of appraisal, and to defend an argument for methodological pluralism.

Anxiety Disorders↗
PubMed1999

The catastrophic misinterpretation of physiological distress.

Cognitive theories of panic disorder suggest that the catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations is the trigger for a panic attack. A challenge to cognitive theories is the suggestion that dyspnea (shortness of breath) is central to the development of panic and that negative cognitions are by-products of panic. To examine these seemingly contradictory theoretical perspectives, the present study investigated panic symptomatology in a sample of patients with chronic shortness of breath (i.e. pulmonary patients). Past studies have shown an increased prevalence of panic in pulmonary patients, a finding that may be useful in elucidating panic etiology. The current sample of pulmonary patients (N = 28) confirmed previous reports of high prevalence rates of panic in this population. Based on self-report of panic symptomatology, a total of nine patients (32%) met DSM-IV criteria that were consistent with panic disorder. Multivariate comparison of participants with and without panic symptomatology revealed that panickers had significantly higher levels of anxiety, depression and agoraphobic cognitions. However, these groups showed no significant differences on physiological measures of pulmonary functioning. The authors conclude that dyspnea alone is inadequate in predicting panic development. High levels of panic symptomatology in pulmonary samples may reflect increased opportunities for these patients to misinterpret bodily sensations and, in particular, their pulmonary symptoms.

Aged↗
PubMed2000

Hypochondriacs' estimation of negative outcomes: domain-specificity and responsiveness to reassuring and alarming information.

Based on hypochondriacal patients' tendency to overestimate the seriousness of bodily sensations and health risks [Barsky, A. J., Wyshak, G. & Klerman, G. L. (1990). The Somatosensory Amplification Scale and its relationship to hypochondriasis. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 24, 323-334; Warwick, H. M. C., & Salkovskis, P. M. (1990). Hypochondriasis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 105-117], we investigated whether hypochondriacal individuals (n = 20) are inclined to report higher estimates of negative outcomes than healthy controls (n = 20) when interpreting ambiguous health-related and nonhealth-related events. In addition, we explored the influence of additional reassuring and alarming information on hypochondriacs' estimates of negative outcomes. Following the cognitive-behavioural model of hypochondriasis [Warwick, H. M. C. & Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Hypochondriasis. In J. Scott, J. M. G. Williams & A. T. Beck (Eds.), Cognitive therapy in clinical practice: an illustrative casebook. (pp. 78-102). London: Routledge] we hypothesized that hypochondriacal individuals would be more responsive to alarming information and less responsive to reassuring information than healthy controls. Yet, hypochondriacs were neither found to be immune for reassuring information, nor to be hypersensitive to alarming information. Meanwhile, irrespective of the additional alarming or reassuring information, hypochondriacs clearly showed a domain-specific bias towards higher estimates of negative outcomes in ambiguous health-related situations.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2001

Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision.

This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as 'this' or 'that') this direct connection allows entities to be referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconceptual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empirical phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is briefly discussed and it is argued that viewing it as performing a demonstrative or preconceptual reference function has far-reaching implications not only for a theory of situated vision, but also for suggesting a new way to look at why the primitive individuation of visual objects, or proto-objects, is so central in computing visual representations. Indexing visual objects is also, according to this view, the primary means for grounding visual concepts and is a potentially fruitful way to look at the problem of visual integration across time and across saccades, as well as to explain how infants' numerical capacity might arise.

Cognitive Science↗
PubMed1997

False categories in cognition: the Not-the-Liver fallacy.

This paper reports on an increasingly frequent error committed in cognition research that at best slows progress, and at worse leads to self-perpetuating false claims and misguided research. The error involves how we identify meaningful processes and categories on the basis of data. Examples are given from three areas of cognition: (1) memory, where the misconception has fueled the popular implicit/explicit categories, (2) perception, where the misconception is used to re-evaluate the classic what/where division, and (3) motor skills, where it is used to draw conclusions from patients with Huntington's disease. Reasons for the prevalence of this error, how it relates to double dissociations, and what it suggests about scientific reasoning are offered.

Cognition↗
PubMed2000

Affixal homonymy triggers full-form storage, even with inflected words, even in a morphologically rich language.

This paper investigates whether affixal homonymy, the phenomenon that one affix form serves two or more semantic/syntactic functions, affects lexical processing of inflected words in a similar way for a morphologically rich language such as Finnish as for morphologically restricted languages such as Dutch and English. For the latter two languages, there is evidence that affixal homonymy triggers full-form storage for inflected words (Bertram, R., Schreuder, R., and Baayen, R. H. (in press). The balance of storage and computation in morphological processing: the role of word formation type, affixal homonymy, and productivity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition; Sereno and Jongman (1997). Processing of English inflectional morphology. Memory and Cognition, 25, 425-437). Two visual lexical decision experiments show the same pattern for Finnish. Apparently, the substantially richer morphology in Finnish does not prevent full-form storage for inflected words when the affix is homonymic.

Cognition↗
PubMed2000

A cognitive theory of pretense.

Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational "code" as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a "pretend desire", but from a real desire to act in a way that fits the description being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense.

Adult↗
PubMed2000

The essentialist aspect of naive theories.

Recent work on children's inferences concerning biological and chemical categories has suggested that children (and perhaps adults) are essentialists - a view known as psychological essentialism. I distinguish three varieties of psychological essentialism and investigate the ways in which essentialism explains the inferences for which it is supposed to account. Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and behavior. This suggests that the data will be equally well explained by a non-essentialist hypothesis that attributes belief in the appropriate causal laws to the child, but makes no claim as to whether or not the child represents essences. I provide several reasons to think that this non-essentialist hypothesis is in fact superior to any version of the essentialist hypothesis.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Challenging the widespread assumption that connectionism and distributed representations go hand-in-hand.

One of the central claims associated with the parallel distributed processing approach popularized by D.E. Rumelhart, J.L. McClelland and the PDP Research Group is that knowledge is coded in a distributed fashion. Localist representations within this perspective are widely rejected. It is important to note, however, that connectionist networks can learn localist representations and many connectionist models depend on localist coding for their functioning. Accordingly, a commitment to distributed representations should be considered a specific theoretical claim regarding the structure of knowledge rather than a core principle, as often assumed. In this paper, it is argued that there are fundamental computational and empirical challenges that have not yet been addressed by distributed connectionist theories that are readily accommodated within localist approaches. This is highlighted in the context of modeling word and nonword naming, the domain in which some of the strongest claims have been made. It is shown that current PDP models provide a poor account of naming monosyllable items, and that distributed representations make it difficult for these models to scale up to more complex language phenomena. At the same time, models that learn localist representations are shown to hold promise in supporting many of the core reading and language functions on which PDP models fail. It is concluded that the common rejection of localist coding schemes within connectionist architectures is premature.

Cognitive Science↗
PubMed2006

John Marshall and the cognitive neuropsychology of reading.

Contemporary cognitive neuropsychology owes a great debt to John Marshall. His pioneering work on acquired and developmental disorders of reading established the principles by which cognitive-neuropsychological theorizing operates as well as leading to a profound understanding of the nature of reading disorders which has subsequently influenced their assessment and treatment.

Brain Damage, Chronic↗
PubMed2006

A method for studies of madness.

In these series of articles honouring John Marshall for his contributions to psychology, linguistics, the history of ideas and many other fields we should not forget his contribution to psychiatry. This has been mostly from the point of view of a critical observer, but also someone deeply interested in the application of cognitive neuropsychology to a broader range of disorders than the traditional ones. This "cognitive neuropsychiatric approach" is discussed in relation to attempts to understand thought disorder, delusions and lack of insight.

Cognition Disorders↗