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PubMed1988

Possible people.

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Ethical Theory↗
PubMed1990

Consciousness, the brain and what matters.

Grant Gillett argues that it is consciousness which makes a human or other being the 'locus of ethical value'. Since cortical functioning is, in Gillett's view, necessary for conscious activity, an individual whose neocortex is permanently non-functional is no longer a locus of ethical value and cannot be benefited or harmed in a morally relevant sense. This means that there is no obligation to continue treating those who have suffered neocortical death.

Brain↗
PubMed1990

A plea for the heart.

Martyn Evans believes that it is a 'shocking feature' of brain-centred conceptions of death that they require us to regard as dead a person whose heart may continue to beat spontaneously. When it comes to neocortical conceptions of death, we might even be burying or cremating a 'breathing corpse'. If proponents of neocortical definitions of death suggest active interventions to stop the remaining spontaneous functions, in what sense, asks Evans, is this different from killing? Also, does it make sense to accept, as many proponents of brain-centred conceptions of death do, that it is proper to 'explant' organs from 'beating-heart cadavers', whilst squirming at the thought of cremating a 'breathing corpse'?

Attitude to Death↗
PubMed1991

Genetic harm: bitten by the body that keeps you?

... We must attempt to explain, how, if ever, our existence may harm us. To address this and the other questions raised, I propose to examine what constitutes harm and whether it makes sense to say that our genetic makeup may harm us. To do this I will describe three approaches to the problem of describing the status of negative effects our genes have upon us, which I have named the "technical harm" view, the "constitutive" view, and the "harmful conditions" view. On the technical harm view, the standard definitions of harm are applied to genetic disposition in an attempt to couch genetic defects or flaws in terms of harming. The constitutive view rejects applying the concept of harm to genetic disposition on the grounds that it is impossible to separate genetic disposition from individual identity. Lastly, the harmful conditions view, which I conclude is the most successful of the three, focuses on the tendency of certain genetic dispositions to cause harm in the future and thus avoids what I will argue are the "context" shortcomings of the other two approaches. To conclude the discussion I will very briefly analyze the ramifications of a harmful conditions view for the concept of genetic disease and the prospects for genetic counseling, gene therapy, and reproductive decision making.

Altruism↗
PubMed1991

Commentary on "Genetic harm: bitten by the body that keeps you?

Several important issues are raised and illuminated in "Genetic Harm"; not least, in its detailed discussion of specific genetic disorders. In particular, it focuses on a type of disorder whose ill effects are not manifested at birth, but only at a later stage in life. The conclusion, with its significant implications for practice, seems quite valid: a moral duty should be recognized to genetically (or otherwise, if feasible) cure an embryo of that which is expected to (later) cause such prospective suffering. Yet the reasons given for that conclusion, as well as much of the argument throughout, concentrate on a debatable notion of "harm". On an alternate account -- drawn in terms of personal identity -- what makes the moral difference in this type of case is rather that the genotype manifests itself, and that a life-history begins, prior to (and thus independently of) any effects of the gene(s) we are called to alter.

Altruism↗