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PubMed1983

Semantic congruity and expectancy in symbolic judgments.

These experiments assess the degree to which the semantic-congruity effect in comparative judgment can be explained by such expectancy effects as priming, perceptual "set," or strategies used in the task. The first experiment mixed a lexical-decision task with the comparative-judgment task and showed that neither automatic semantic priming nor deliberate preparation can account for the congruity effect. Experiments 2-4 assessed expectancy effects in a different way by presenting the instructions for comparative judgment either before or after the pair to be judged. These experiments included, among other things, a number of safeguards against artifacts in this paradigm. In these three experiments the congruity effect was obtained with both orders of stimuli and instructions, contrary to the prediction of an expectancy hypothesis. The results indicate that when stimuli are not degraded. The semantic-congruity effect depends largely on the relation between the stimuli and the instructions and only to a small degree, if at all, on expectancy.

Cues↗
PubMed1983

General mental resources and perceptual judgments.

We argue that the requirement of task-general mental resources marks more "cognitive" kinds of perception. In Experiment 1, subjects are slower to discover the alternative organization of ambiguous stimuli if they are simultaneously doing mental arithmetic; in Experiment 2, latency to first reversal is increased by a concurrent memory load of seven digits. In Experiment 3, counting tasks also slow subjects solving the Street figures and judging whether drawings depict possible three-dimensional objects. There is no effect of distractor tasks on the perception of random-dot stereograms. Further, the data argue that the pattern of disruption cannot be attributed either to the unfamiliarity of the judgments or to their latency. We suggest that the distractor tasks are competing with the perceptual judgments for working memory and that perceptual judgments demand memory whenever a perceptual "solution" cannot be locally confirmed.

Attention↗
PubMed1987

Perceptual and memorial constructs in children's judgments of quantity: a law of across-representation invariance.

Children at three different ages made judgments of physically presented (perceptual estimation) or symbolically represented (memorial estimation) rectangles. Height and width were integrated according to different, age-dependent algebraic rules. Memorial data obeyed the same integration rules that operated in the original perceptual judgments even when younger children and older children used completely different combination models. Valuation operations were the same in perception and memory for the youngest group (6-year-olds) but became discriminably different at older ages (for the 8- and 10-year olds). Three additional experiments on judgments of volume, liquid quantity, and visual length yielded strong cross-validation support for the general invariance claim (with respect to integration rule theory) but less strong support for the specific invariance claim (with respect to valuation function for the 6-year-old subjects). Results are interpreted as demonstrating lawful and long-enduring ecological constraints on internal representation.

Attention↗
PubMed2000

A sampling approach to biases in conditional probability judgments: beyond base rate neglect and statistical format.

Conditional probability judgments of rare events are often inflated. Early accounts assumed a general deficit in using statistical base rates. More recent approaches predict improvement when problems are presented in frequency format or refer to natural categories. The present theory focuses on sampling processes. Experiment 1 showed that a seeming advantage of frequency over probability formats is due to a confounded factor, the need to mentally transform stimulus samples. An information search paradigm was used in Experiment 2. When sampling by the predictor, the probability to be estimated, p(criterion/predictor), was conserved in the samples and judgments were quite accurate. However, when sampling by the criterion, the low base-rate event was strongly overrepresented, accounting for the entire bias. Judgments were quite sensitive to the sampled data, but failed to take sampling constraints into account, as shown in Experiments 3 and 4.

Adult↗
PubMed1993

An evaluation of the total similarity principle: effects of similarity on frequency judgments.

Memory models that embody the total similarity principle (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1988; Murdock, 1982; Ratcliff, 1990) assume that frequency judgments reflect the total similarity of a test item to stimuli that have been studied. In 4 experiments, subjects estimated the frequencies of target words that had been presented in the context of varying numbers of semantically similar words. In a fifth experiment, subjects made forced-choice relative frequency judgments. The results of these experiments supported 1 prediction of total similarity models: Presenting similar words will increase rather than decrease frequency judgments of target words. However, a second prediction of these models was not supported. In particular, similar-word presentations had no effect on the judged frequencies of target words that had not been shown.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Role of an abstract order schema in conceptual judgment.

Ss performed same-different judgments for which order information was logically irrelevant. In Experiments 1 and 2, the stimuli for the judgment task were derived from an ordered set of concepts from long-term memory (U.S. presidents ordered on the dimension of historical time); in Experiments 3 and 4 the stimuli were derived from two ordered sets of concepts. In the stimulus set for each experiment, there were several associate phrases for each concept and the task was to judge whether the phrases were paired with the same concept (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or the same ordering (Experiment 4). The time to respond "different" decreased with the ordinal distance between the concepts even when the concepts belonged to different orderings. It is concluded that same-different judgments are based in part on amodal order information (i.e., not tied to any particular dimension). Two models of the implicated order schema are proposed and tested.

Humans↗
PubMed2000

Causal judgment from contingency information: the interpretation of factors common to all instances.

Participants made judgments about stimulus materials in which there were 2 possible causes of an outcome. One of these was a common factor, a factor present in all instances presented for judgment, and the other was a positive covariate of the outcome. Instead of interpreting the positive covariate as the cause, participants consistently preferred an interpretation in which the common factor was the cause and the positive covariate enabled the cause to produce its effect. Participants' judgments of both interpretations were predicted by the proportion of instances that were confirmatory for the interpretation and not by deltaP. The findings support a hypothesis that people have a multirole conceptualization of causality including, in addition to the roles of cause and effect, that of an enabler, a factor the presence of which ensures that a thing is in a state of readiness to produce a particular effect.

Adult↗
PubMed2000

Repetition priming for familiar and unfamiliar faces in a sex-judgment task: evidence for a common route for the processing of sex and identity.

Repetition priming for faces was examined in a sex-judgment task given at test. Priming was found for edited, hair-removed photos of unfamiliar and familiar faces after a single presentation at study. Priming was also observed for the edited photos when study and test faces were different exemplars. Priming was not observed, however, when sex judgments were made at test to photos of complete, hair-included faces. These findings were interpreted by assuming that, for edited faces, internal features are attended, thereby activating face-recognition units that support performance. With complete faces, however, participants provided speeded judgments based primarily on the hairstyle. It is suggested that, for both familiar and unfamiliar faces, a common locus exists for the processing of the identity of a face and its sex. A single face-recognition model for the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces is advocated.

Adult↗
PubMed1982

Can automatic picture processing influence word judgments?

Two experiments were undertaken in order to evaluate the influence of automatic semantic processing of pictures on word judgments. In both studies, picture-word analogs of the Stroop task were employed. In Experiment 1, subjects were required to make a semantic category judgment about the word; in Experiment 2, they were simply to respond yes or no to whether the word was DOG. Taken together, the results of these experiments indicated that (a) perceptual factors such as lateral masking influence responding in these types of tasks and their contributions must be partialed out from the effects of semantic factors, (b) picture processing can facilitate word processing but only in a restricted set of circumstances, and (c) background pictures incompatible with the correct response can interfere with word judgments. The facilitation observed was attributed to the effects automatic picture processing has on an initial input process, while the interference appears to arise at a response selection and execution stage. Further, the results suggest that the semantic nature of automatic picture processing is at least somewhat different from that of automatic word processing.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Examining clinical judgment in an adaptive intervention design: The fast track program.

Although clinical judgment is often used in assessment and treatment planning, rarely has research examined its reliability, validity, or impact in practice settings. This study tailored the frequency of home visits in a prevention program for aggressive- disruptive children (n = 410; 56% minority) on the basis of 2 kinds of clinical judgment: ratings of parental functioning using a standardized multi-item scale and global assessments of family need for services. Stronger reliability and better concurrent and predictive validity emerged for the 1st kind of clinical judgment than for the 2nd. Exploratory analyses suggested that using ratings of parental functioning to tailor treatment recommendations improved the impact of the intervention by the end of 3rd grade but using more global assessments of family need did not.

Aggression↗
PubMed2003

A dog's got personality: a cross-species comparative approach to personality judgments in dogs and humans.

This research offers a blueprint for how a cross-species comparative approach can be realized empirically. In a single design, parallel procedures and instruments were used in 2 species, dogs (Canis familiaris) and humans (Homo sapiens), to test whether personality differences exist and can be judged in dogs as accurately as in humans. Personality judgments of humans and dogs were compared on 3 accuracy criteria: internal consistency, consensus, and correspondence. Results showed that, on all 3 criteria, judgments of dogs were as accurate as judgments of humans. These findings are consistent with the evolutionary continuity hypothesis and suggest an important conclusion not widely considered by either personality or animal researchers: Personality differences do exist and can be measured in animals other than humans.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Cognitive processes in stereotype formation: the role of correct contingency learning for biased group judgments.

Three studies investigated contingency learning and stereotype formation in a scenario about group membership and behavior with a confounding context factor. The studies tested predictions from theoretical accounts of biased group judgments in terms of simplistic reasoning, parallel distributed memory, and pseudocontingencies. Study 1 revealed a positive correlation between erroneous stereotype formation and learning of the true contingencies with the confounding factor. Study 2 showed that a focus manipulation during encoding moderated the correlation between stereotype formation and contingency learning but not the strength of the erroneous stereotype. Study 3 used a quasiexperimental comparison between participants with biased versus unbiased group judgments and extended the findings of a positive relation between stereotype formation and contingency learning. The results support an explanation of biased group judgments by pseudocontingencies; that is, unwarranted inferences from accurately perceived bivariate correlations in complex environments.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMed2006

Transcending the "here": the effect of spatial distance on social judgment.

Construal level theory proposes that increasing the reported spatial distance of events produces judgments that reflect abstract, schematic representations of the events. Across 4 experiments, the authors examined the impact of spatial distance on construal-dependent social judgments. Participants structured behavior into fewer, broader units (Study 1) and increasingly attributed behavior to enduring dispositions rather than situational constraints (Study 2) when the behavior was spatially distant rather than near. Participants reported that typical events were more likely and atypical events less likely when events were more spatially distant (Study 3). They were also less likely to extrapolate from specific cases that deviated from general trends when making predictions about more spatially distant events (Study 4). Implications for social judgment are discussed.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMed1989

Clinical judgment, clinical training, and professional experience.

Reviews studies on training, experience, and clinical judgment. The results on the validity of judgments generally fail to support the value of on-the-job experience in mental health fields. The validity results do provide limited support for the value of training. Other results suggest that experienced clinicians are better than less experienced judges at knowing which of their judgments are likely to be correct and which are likely to be wrong. Reasons why clinicians have trouble learning from experience are given. Recommendations are made for improving training and clinical practice.

Clinical Competence↗
PubMed1993

Human contingency judgments: rule based or associative?

The study of the mechanism that detects the contingency between events, in both humans and nonhuman animals, is a matter of considerable research activity. Two broad categories of explanations of the acquisition of contingency information have received extensive evaluation: rule-based models and associative models. This article assess the two categories of models for human contingency judgments. The data reveal systematic departures in contingency judgments from the predictions of rule-based models. Recent studies indicate that a contiguity model of Pavlovian conditioning is a useful heuristic for conceptualizing human contingency judgments.

Conditioning, Classical↗
PubMed2000

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.

Cognition↗
PubMed1989

Person memory and judgment.

Two general types of information about a person are considered in this article: One pertains to specific behaviors a person has manifested, and the other refers to more abstract personality dispositions or behavioral tendencies. A theoretical model of person memory that incorporates both types of information is developed. The model accounts for a large number of factors that are known to affect the recall of social information, the making of interpersonal judgments, and the relation between what is recalled and the judgments that are made. A major strength of the model is its applicability to a wide range of person memory and judgment phenomena that are observed in several different experimental paradigms.

Humans↗